



Cambridge International Examinations
Cambridge Pre-U Certificate

HISTORY (PRINCIPAL)

9769/02C

Paper 2C European History Outlines, c. 1700–c. 2000

For Examination from 2016

SPECIMEN MARK SCHEME

2 hours 15 minutes

MAXIMUM MARK: 90

The syllabus is approved for use in England, Wales and Northern Ireland as a Cambridge International Level 3 Pre-U Certificate.

This document consists of **39** printed pages and **1** blank page.

These banding definitions address Assessment Objectives (AOs) 1, 2 and 4, and should be used in conjunction with the indicative content mark schemes for each question. Information about AOs can be found in the 2016–18 Cambridge Pre-U History syllabus.

Introduction

- (a) The banding definitions which follow reflect, and should be interpreted within the context of, the following general statement:

Examiners will give their highest marks to candidates who show a ready understanding of the relevant material and a disciplined management of the discussion the question provokes. They will be impressed more by critical judgement, careful discrimination and imaginative handling than by a weight of facts. Credit will be given for evidence of a good historical intelligence and for good use of material rather than for a stereotyped rehearsal of memorised information.

- (b) Examiners will use these banding definitions in combination with the paper-specific mark schemes.
- (c) It goes without saying that any explanation or judgement is strengthened if informed by the use of source material.
- (d) Examiners will also bear in mind that analysis sufficient for a mark in the highest band may perfectly legitimately be deployed within a chronological framework. Candidates who eschew an explicitly analytical response may yet be able, by virtue of the very intelligence and pointedness of their selection of elements for a well-sustained and well-grounded account, to provide sufficient implicit analysis to justify a Band 4 mark.
- (e) The Band in which an essay is placed depends on a range of criteria. As a result, not all essays fall obviously into one particular Band. In such cases a 'best-fit' approach will be adopted with any doubt erring on the side of generosity.
- (f) In marking an essay, examiners will first place it in a Band and then fine-tune the mark in terms of how strongly/weakly the demands of the Band have been demonstrated.

Band 5: 25–30 marks

The answer will be sharply analytical in approach and strongly argued. It will show that the demands of the question have been fully understood and that a conscious and sustained attempt has been made to respond to them in appropriate range and depth. It will be coherent and structured with a clear sense of direction. The focus will be sharp and persistent. Some lack of balance, in that certain aspects are covered less fully or certain arguments deployed less strongly than others, need not preclude a mark in this Band. The material will be wide-ranging and handled with the utmost confidence and a high degree of maturity. Historical explanations will be invariably clear, sharp and well developed and historical concepts fully understood. Where appropriate there will be conscious and successful attempts to engage with the historiography, to evaluate source material critically and to demonstrate an awareness of competing interpretations.

Band 4: 19–24 marks

The answer will be characterised by an analytical and argued approach, although there may be the occasional passage which does not go beyond description or narrative. It will show that the demands of the question have been very well understood and that a determined attempt has been made to respond to them in appropriate range and depth. The essay will be coherent and clearly structured and its judgements will be effectively supported by accurate and relevant material. Some lack of rigour in the argument and occasional blurred focus may be allowed. Where appropriate there will be a conscious and largely successful attempt to engage with the historiography, to evaluate source material and to demonstrate an awareness of competing interpretations. The material will be wide-ranging, fully understood, confidently deployed and well controlled with high standards of accuracy. Historical explanations will be clear and well developed and there will be a sound understanding of historical concepts and vocabulary.

Band 3: 13–18 marks

The answer will attempt an analytical approach, although there will be passages which do not go beyond description or narrative. It will show that the demands of the question have been understood, at least in large part, and that a conscious attempt has been made to respond to them. There will be an effective focus on the terms of the question and, although in places this may break down, standards of relevance will be generally high. Although it may not be sustained throughout the answer, or always fully supported, there will be a recognisable sense of argument. The material will be clearly understood, with a good range, and organisation will be sound. There will be a conscious attempt to draw conclusions and form judgements and these will be adequately supported. Some understanding of differing and competing interpretations is to be expected and some evaluation of sources may be attempted but probably not in a very sophisticated form. Historical explanations and the use of historical concepts and vocabulary will be generally sound but some lack of understanding is to be expected.

Band 2: 7–12 marks

The answer may contain some analysis but descriptive or narrative material will predominate. The essay will show that the demands of the question have been understood, at least in good part, and that some attempt has been made to respond to them. It will be generally coherent with a fair sense of organisation. Focus on the exact terms of the question is likely to be uneven and there will be a measure of irrelevance. There will be some inaccuracies in knowledge, and the range may be limited with some gaps. Understanding of the material will be generally sound, although there will be some lack of tautness and precision. Explanations will be generally clear although not always convincing or well developed. Some attempt at argument is to be expected but it will lack sufficient support in places and sense of direction may not always be clear. There may be some awareness of differing interpretations and some attempt at evaluating source material but this is not generally to be expected at this level and such skills, where deployed, will be unsophisticated.

Band 1: 1–6 marks

The answers will respond in some measure to the demands of the question but will be very limited in meeting these. Analysis, if it appears at all, will be brief and undeveloped. If an argument is attempted it will be lacking in real coherence, sense of direction, support and rigour. Focus on the exact terms of the question is likely to be very uneven; the answer is likely to include unsupported generalisations, and there will be some vagueness and irrelevance. Historical knowledge, concepts and vocabulary will be insufficiently understood and there will be inaccuracies. Explanations may be attempted but will be halting and unclear. Where judgements are made they will be largely unsubstantiated and investigation of historical problems will be very elementary. Awareness of differing interpretations and the evaluation of sources are not to be expected. The answer may be fragmentary, slight and even unfinished.

Band 0: 0 marks

No evidence submitted or response does not address the question.

Section 1: c. 1715–c. 1774

1 ‘An age of reform.’ How valid is this view of France under Orléans and Fleury?

AO1/AO2 – France was ruled by Philippe of Orléans from 1715 to 1723 as Regent, and he remained as minister until Fleury took over in 1726. Fleury would act as Louis XV’s chief adviser until 1743. Given the problems that Fleury inherited from the Regency, it is likely that candidates will associate reform more with his rule than with that of Orléans. The stabilisation of the currency and the balancing of the budget could be seen as essential reforms; there was expansion of roads and canals; trade increased. The authority of the crown was extended over religious matters. The counter view may focus on: the failures of the Regency to deal with rising prices; the Law affair; and religious persecution. However, some may challenge the scope of change suggested by ‘age of reform’ and point to continuing weaknesses and limitations to the development of both economy and society which continued through the *ancien régime*.

2 Can Frederick II of Prussia reasonably be called ‘an enlightened despot’?

AO1/AO2 – Candidates could argue in favour of the proposition that Frederick was an enlightened ruler: he was a writer, thinker and architect, who focused on duty before rights, on education, legal codification and a freer press. On the other hand it could be argued that he was a brutal militarist. Candidates should reach a definition of the term ‘enlightened despot’ and decide what ‘reasonably’ might mean in this context. They should have an awareness of the values of the period and avoid condemning Frederick inappropriately from a twenty-first century standpoint.

3 ‘Essentially a conflict over colonies.’ Discuss this view of the Seven Years War.

AO1/AO2 – Candidates might argue that this was just another part of the ongoing struggle between France and Britain over empire and trade. However, they should also consider other factors, such as: Prussia and its struggle for growth/survival; Austria, which was anxious to reduce the power of its growing neighbour and hostile to Silesia; Russia’s and Sweden’s plans to widen the conflict; and French ambitions on the Rhine and in the Austrian Netherlands. Colonies and commerce played a part, but they were by no means the only causes. Hanover was a concern for the British and the whole balance of power/diplomatic revolution issue might also be considered. The role of colonies and commerce should be assessed and balanced against the wide variety of other factors.

4 'It was a period of continuous decline, in spite of heroic efforts to prevent it.' How justified is this view of Spain in this period?

AO1/AO2 – The period from 1715 to 1788 did see attempts at reform, most notably in the reign of Charles III under the Marquis of Esquilache and Moñino. These attempts built on the reforms of Philip V and could be seen as 'heroic' in the context of the extended decline, economic problems and the effects of war from the late seventeenth century to 1715. The underlying tendency was towards greater central control and to follow the lead of France, both in terms of the powerful central monarchy and also in foreign policy. The adherence to monarchical power, the power of the Church – particularly over education – and the existing social structures could be argued to have inhibited the type of change that would have made Spain a major European power again. There was limited economic development and mercantile growth and the middle class remained small. Military defeats in the Seven Years War and the loss of Florida revealed Spain's inadequacies. There was some valuable reform and it could be argued that Spain's position had improved since 1715, but the 'Golden Age' did not return and in that sense decline continued. Much depends how the 'decline' is measured and whether the failures to engage with fundamental changes can really justify the use of the term 'heroic'.

5 'The reign of Louis XV demonstrated all of the bad features, and none of the good ones, of the *ancien régime*.' Discuss.

AO1/AO2 – As examples of the 'bad features' candidates could consider the following points: women and hunting dominated the King's life; factionalism dominated the court; the *ancien régime* continued; there was an absence of any real religious, social or economic policy; foreign policy remained depressingly the same. Other aspects of the reign to consider might be taxation and social rigidity. As examples of the 'good' features, candidates might mention the artistic, cultural and architectural – through to the grandiose and expansionist – achievements of the reign. Candidates should think carefully about what might constitute 'good' or 'bad' features of the *ancien régime*, and about the use of the word 'all' in the title. They should view the reign as a whole and consider it in the light of the question.

Section 2: c. 1774–c. 1815

6 How 'great' was Catherine the Great?

AO1/AO2 – Candidates should consider a range of factors including the following: how Catherine's initial insecurity was overcome; her work in education; the legislative commission; institutional reform; her work in government generally; and Catherine's foreign policy. Negative factors to consider might include Pugachev's rebellion and the costs of the wars. Candidates should consider the idea of 'greatness' and how it might be defined. They might consider other 'greats' for comparison, both within and outside Russia, and could take a short-term or longer-term view, or both.

7 How wisely did Joseph II rule over his various dominions?

AO1/AO2 – Candidates might argue that Joseph ruled wisely in his own view but that more generally he is seen to have made mistakes. Among his more successful, and thus presumably wiser, policies were his participation in the partition of Poland, his visits to his various territories to see things for himself, his encouragement of religious toleration, his new legal code, his social reforms and his encouragement of primary education. But his war with Prussia over the Bavarian succession was unwise. He provoked opposition in both Hungary and the Austrian Netherlands by trying to enforce a more centralised government. Candidates might argue that this had much to commend it as an aim, but that Joseph went about it with a lack of wisdom. His efforts to abolish serfdom antagonised the nobles, which again showed his lack of grasp of practical politics. His worst error was his war against Turkey, which had the result that his final years were mired by a near collapse in his empire and an almost complete surrender to the power of the nobles. Candidates might conclude that Joseph was unfortunate in that his aims were good and morally justified for the most part, but, in terms of what was possible in his dominions, they were not always very wise.

8 Discuss the view that the Enlightenment played an insignificant part in causing the French Revolution.

AO1/AO2 – Candidates should discuss the possible links between the ideas of the Enlightenment and events and individuals. They should also be able to show some knowledge of the ideas themselves. Other causes of the Revolution, long-, medium- and short-term, can also be considered. Candidates should be able to provide a broad picture and a careful analysis of what role, if any, the Enlightenment played in the causes (and not the course) of the Revolution. A case should then be made justifying the answer and contrasting the role of the Enlightenment with other factors.

9 What best explains the political instability of France between 1793 and 1799?

AO1/AO2 – Candidates might consider a range of factors, including the background of war, ambitious personalities, the Terror and the lack of consensus. They should also be aware of the impact of massive social, economic, administrative and political changes being imposed on a system which had undergone such a radical change as the execution of the King and the termination of a long-established dynastic system. Candidates should be able to identify one or more central factors and then build a reasoned and well-argued case for them. There should be a definition of ‘political instability’.

10 ‘Napoleon was not a great general, just a lucky one.’ Discuss.

AO1/AO2 – Candidates might consider the issue of whether ‘war became of itself an affair of the people’. There were great changes in the size of Napoleon’s armies, the scale of his operations and the nature of his objectives, while, on the other hand, tactics and techniques did not change a great deal. In making the case for greatness, candidates might consider the following factors: Napoleon’s introduction of mass conscription; his opening up of careers to talent; the introduction of training based on national characteristics; the focus on morale; his ability to move large armies at speed; his foresight in separating his enemies and placing his troops; his decision making at critical moments; and his military tactics at Ulm, Jena and Austerlitz. Examples of luck could be: the unexpected recovery at Marengo; the lack of coordination between Austria and Russia prior to the victory at Ulm; the miscalculations of Alexander II at Austerlitz. The discussion might centre on the relative importance of the mistakes of Napoleon’s enemies and his ability to use them to his advantage. Napoleon might also be thought to be fortunate to inherit armed forces reformed and increased by Carnot and the revolutionary governments as well as technical and strategic improvements made in the eighteenth century.

Although Napoleon could be fortunate in his opponents at times, and benefited from their archaic methods, what he achieved over a long period of time, and so often, was indicative of perhaps much more than luck.

Section 3: Themes c. 1715–c. 1815

11 Assess the contribution made by women to the cultural and intellectual life of the eighteenth century.

AO1 – Although women contributed indirectly to intellectual and cultural life as patrons and through establishing salons, they were also creative artists. It was harder for women to work in the visual arts than in literature. Tradition limited women as painters because they lacked access to training and markets. Few could join academies or work from life models. Rachel Ruysch was a court painter in Dusseldorf but painted mostly flowers. Rosalba Carriere was a rococo artist who joined the French Academy in 1720 as did the portraitists Elisabeth Vigée LeBrun and Adelaide Labille-Guiard. They and the more famous Swiss artist Angelica Kaufmann aspired to larger-scale work but were more restricted by their markets to portraits. It was easier for women to pursue literature which needed less infrastructure. Women novelists could and did become best sellers. Madame de Graffiny's *Lettres d'une Péruvienne* (1730) and Madame de Tencin's *The Siege of Calais* (1739) are examples. Fanny Burney's *Evelina* (1778) was widely read. Women did also join the ranks of Enlightenment thinkers. Mary Astell produced rationalist works. However, the main contribution was through salons which supported the *philosophes*. Madame de Geoffrin gave a large amount of money to support the *Encyclopédie* and her salon was a sort of headquarters for philosophical discussion. Madame de Lespinasse supported d'Alambert and helped to edit the work of Diderot. Voltaire was given help and advice by Madame du Châtelet and the Marquise de Condorcet. Voltaire's wife also assisted in his work. Madame de Pompadour's salon popularised and gave weight to the ideas of the *philosophes* and she influenced the King to permit the sale of the *Encyclopédie* in 1759. It was harder for women to offer philosophical and scientific writing on their own but there were women intellectuals of some influence such as Hannah Moore and the historian Catherine Macaulay, and there were radical thinkers such as Mary Wollstonecraft and the feminists who emerged from the French Revolution such as Olympe de Gouges.

AO2 – The problems facing women who wished to gain recognition in the arts were formidable. In music they were admired executants, but few produced famous and accepted works of art. Similarly in the visual arts, it was very difficult for women to be accepted within the art establishment and have access to appropriate training. The most accessible art form was literature, but even here there were problems of acceptance and publication. In philosophical life, arguably the key to eighteenth-century culture, their influence tended to be indirect, if considerable. Candidates may take culture in a wider sense and look at changes in family life or attitudes to education and children but the answer should include an assessment of the contribution of women.

12 'Essentially static.' Discuss this view of European cultural life in the eighteenth century.

AO1 – Candidates could exemplify their analyses from the visual arts: rococo; the classic portraits of the century; the cultivated landscapes and cityscapes. They could consider: Palladian classical architecture and its imitators; the development of the classical style of music in the Viennese school or the classically-based operas of France, Italy and Germany; the classically-inspired poetry; the *Sturm und Drang* period of the 1770s; and the beginnings of Romanticism.

AO2 – The discussion could be between formalism and a love for classical balance and subject matter, which is often seen to have restricted individualism and expression, and the dynamic elements within the style that actually developed it and pushed it more towards the emotionalism and individuality of later centuries. There could be some distinction between the last elements of the Baroque in the earlier part of the century and the beginnings of a more Romantic sensibility at the end.

13 To what extent did the reasons for overseas colonisation change in the eighteenth century?

AO1 – From the mid-seventeenth century to 1800 the major change was the transformation of Europe into the major supplier of goods for the world rather than simply a consumer of colonial products. By the mid-eighteenth century the only substantial numbers of Europeans in colonies were the 650,000 Spanish; the other empires were largely trading outposts. There followed a substantial increase in colonial populations, sometimes as a result of plans devised by the home governments to exploit resources, such as the attempt to develop Louisiana. The discovery of gold in Brazil was a stimulus to emigration. The greater numbers meant changes in administration: Spain introduced local governors on the French model; Spain and Portugal tried to tighten control of colonial trade. In some overseas possessions, the development of key cash crops led to an increase in slave populations. There was limited interest in establishing direct control unless necessary, but the nature of the relations between trading companies and indigenous rule changed, for example in India, where France and Britain recruited local rulers in the wars. The activities of Dupleix in India mark a change in the nature of colonial activity. The British East India Company official Robert Clive virtually established British rule over Bengal as an independent initiative. Generally, there was a shift away from the old colonisers to the more vigorous maritime nations, which had a broader economic base and range of products.

AO2 – For all the developments, trade and profit remained at the centre of Europe's interests and there was less interest in political control, mission, or developing colonies. Governments tended to see colonies and colonists as existing for the benefit of the mother country much as they had in the earlier phases – hence the shock of the American rebellion.

14 How 'absolute' were absolutist monarchs in the eighteenth century?

AO1 – Candidates could consider the following: the theories of absolutism and the seventeenth-century backgrounds; the outward show of monarchy – the grand palaces, the mystique and ceremonial kingship; the weakness or lack of representative institutions; the military power (for example in Prussia); the alliance with the nobles (the service nobilities of Eastern Europe, for example) and with organised religion. In some cases the lack of a middle class restricted dissent. On the other hand, there were restrictions on the practical powers of the monarchs: Pugachev's rebellion shook Russia; tax riots and urban affrays were a constant feature; financial weaknesses brought about by the extensive wars of the period had a debilitating effect (e.g. France); regional variations undermined effectiveness (e.g. Spain); administrations, even in the enlightened despotisms, did not reach the levels attained by post-1789 regimes; communications remained a problem. Monarchs were sometimes seen as alien dynasties and much depended on the personalities of the rulers as to the extent and effectiveness of real power.

AO2 – Candidates should grapple with the concept of 'absolutist' in eighteenth-century terms and draw some distinction between states with limited urban development and a history of strong monarchy based on military power, and states facing greater social diversity and the impact of social and intellectual development which challenged traditional authority. There may also be a distinction between monarchies which attempted internal reforms to strengthen their power, and monarchies which were more static.

15 Assess the political importance of the Enlightenment in the eighteenth century.

AO1 – The Enlightenment was characterised by a belief in human progress if human nature was given the freedom to follow its rational pursuit of happiness and that of others. This had an impact on political thought. The most influential political philosopher was probably John Locke (1632–1704). However, the French *philosophes* who considered the problems of society and advocated reforms based on reason had considerable political influence. Montesquieu (1688–1755) and his *Persian Letters* and *The Spirit of the Laws* of 1748 offered a theory of checks and balances on government. Voltaire championed religious toleration and reform of abuses. The Encyclopaedists offered knowledge as an essential element in identifying abuses. Politically, Rousseau (1712–78) developed a contractual theory of government that was of profound political importance. French thinking influenced English utilitarian and reformist theory. Rationalist critiques influenced individuals urging rights for women – something that emerged strongly in the French Revolution.

AO2 – There are many strains of Enlightenment thinking and it did influence monarchical reformism in the 'enlightened despotism' as well as underpinning movements for change in America and France. However, the extent of its influence and importance in comparison with grievances over taxation and finance may be disputed. It could be argued that undermining traditional ideas in church and state and offering critiques of traditional practices undermined the ancient regime, especially as it offered such attractions to the elites. On the other hand, it also boosted monarchical power if reforming monarchs used it to sweep away obstacles to change – for example, in the 'enlightened despotism' of Joseph II and Catherine the Great and perhaps Napoleon.

16 How significant were the effects of urbanisation on European society in this period?

AO1 – Towns were generally stagnant until the mid-eighteenth century. In Eastern Europe there was some contraction of urbanisation, with concentration in large centres like Moscow. Capitals grew fastest. London doubled in size; Paris grew, as did Madrid, Berlin, Vienna and St Petersburg – though Paris and Madrid had a smaller proportion of the population of their countries than London or Amsterdam. The growth of large urban centres, where the rich and famous gathered with their servants, had an effect on social life; they attracted services such as luxury manufactures and legal services. However, the growth of urban centres could be seen to have adverse effects on economic development, taking capital investment away from the countryside into unproductive luxuries and building. The impact of urbanisation on cultural life, for example in Vienna or Paris or the operas in London and Naples, might be seen as a lasting legacy of urban growth. There was less sustained growth in inland provincial towns. Influxes of population tended to strengthen the power of the guilds until reforms of the 1780s and 1790s. There was greater growth in cities and towns that benefited from overseas trade – Bristol, Liverpool, Cadiz and Marseilles are examples. Growth here weakened traditional guilds. Building boomed in new towns – such as Birmingham – and in many towns in the Southern Urals there was an influx of rural population which required adjustments. The effects might be seen as the growth of consumption – shops, luxury industries, fine houses, trades dependent on the rich. As urban growth was not accompanied by much in the way of compensating infrastructure, it led to over-crowding and problems with sanitation and disease. However, there were advantages: urban skilled wages were higher; opportunities were better than in the countryside; there were alms available from religious institutions, which were common in cities; and townspeople suffered less from seigneurial dues, forced labour, conscription and taxation than people in rural areas. However, there was also a great deal of urban poverty among incoming unskilled rural labour and a risk of unemployment. Many turned to crime and prostitution and begging was common. Candidates might write about social conflict and the lack of social controls, although this is not always the case. In some towns there was the growth of large-scale workshops – Barcelona, Moscow, Berlin are examples – with the danger of unrest in times of poor trade. Urban riots are a feature of the eighteenth century. It would also be possible to consider the expansion in numbers and wealth and influence of the urban bourgeoisie and the political effects in the Netherlands and France.

AO2 – Candidates might consider the economic, social and political significance as well as the different effects in capitals and in provincial cities. They might make a link between the social freedoms offered by growing cities, between the economic uncertainties and the political opportunities and between regions and periods. France in the 1780s stands out. Some candidates may consider the cultural significance to be greater than other factors and there is an opportunity to discuss the relative importance of the changes.

Section 4: 1815–1862

17 Assess the view that Nicholas I put the interests of the crown before the interests of the nation.

AO1 – Nicholas I (1825–55) faced a revolt on the day of his coronation, which he suppressed, and ruled as an autocrat, hoping by militarisation and discipline to defend his dynasty and protect Russian interests, probably seeing the two as inseparable. Police activities increased with the creation of the Third Department. The government closely controlled education and imposed strict censorship. Dissent was met with punishment and Nicholas opposed nationalism and change in Europe – as ‘the gendarme of Europe’ he co-operated with Austria. He limited Polish rights and when unrest broke out he repressed the Poles and ended Poland’s constitution and special status in the Empire, making it a province. He was active in opposing change in 1848–9 and intervened in Hungary to suppress the rebellion there against the Habsburgs. He supported the conservatism of the Holy Alliance, but not at the expense of Russia’s interest. He took advantage of the Greek revolt to fight Turkey in 1828 and 1829 and negotiated concessions at the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi in 1833. He pursued ambitions in the near East which led to the Crimean War in 1854. The failure to defeat and expel a Franco-British expeditionary force revealed the limitations of Nicholas I’s rule, and his son embarked on reforms. Nicholas I was not a total reactionary and contemplated land reform and also expanded education, but he was seen as rigid in maintaining an autocracy based on military power, a militarised civil service and support for the Orthodox Church.

AO2 – Nicholas would not have seen a distinction between the interests of the Crown and those of the people. To avoid the excesses of the French Revolution, the disunity that nationalism would have brought to a diffuse empire, to build up the armed forces and to promote Russian influence over the Turkish Empire and attempt to secure an outlet to the Mediterranean, would have seemed to him to be serving Russian as well as Imperial interests. In the perspective of the weaknesses shown by the Crimean War and the failure to compromise with Europe’s more dynamic forces, the reactionary policies can be seen to have weakened Russia. It could be argued that Nicholas failed to engage with Russia’s long-term interests and instead pursued the short-term interests of the dynasty in resisting change and modernisation. This can be seen in: the adherence to Austrian influence; the suppression of liberal criticism; the rigid censorship which made constructive criticism impossible; the over-reliance on a large army which relied heavily on serf-soldiers and outdated technology; and the failure to carry through plans to reform slavery and promote industrial modernisation. However, Nicholas did not put political ideology before the strategic needs of Russia; he was not blindly reactionary and his reign did see some agrarian and educational reform. It also saw quite a cultural flowering with Gogol, Pushkin and Glinka.

18 How valid is the judgement that Louis XVIII was the most successful of France's rulers in the period 1815 to 1848?

AO1 – Louis XVIII was restored and then once again deposed. After the failure of the Hundred Days he ruled until 1824. Charles X was overthrown in 1830. Louis was unable to resist the influence of the Ultras after the murder of the Duc de Berri, but the earlier part of the reign saw some reconciliation, despite the White terror of 1816. His brother restored the religious orders, increased penalties for sacrilege and revelled in symbols of divine right. The appointment of the arch-conservative Polignac caused opposition even within a generally conservative parliament. When the 1830 elections, even on the narrow electoral base of the Charter, proved unfavourable, Charles devised the Ordinances of St Cloud, imposing tighter censorship and restricting voting. A popular rising in Paris was not effectively suppressed and it was clear that Charles had lost elite support. Louis Philippe needed to try and reconcile the opposing elements in France and to reassure foreign powers; he wisely refused the offer of the throne of Belgium for his son and accepted the English nomination to allay fears of French domination. His forces defended Belgium in 1832 against the Dutch but he was careful to work closely with Britain. He was cautious not to pursue a nationalist or Napoleonic policy and did not help Polish or Italian resistance movements so as to avoid alienating Russia or Austria. He resisted Thiers' wishes to intervene in Spain on behalf of the liberals and had to accept international intervention against Mehemet Ali, France's near East ally, in 1840. He withdrew an annexation of Tahiti when England objected. There had been some gains – Algeria was conquered and Guizot and Louis outmanoeuvred Palmerston in the affair of the Spanish marriages. Domestically there were only limited attempts to meet the challenges of growing industrialisation although there was economic growth in railways, coal and iron. By 1848 there were signs of social and economic unrest and calls for parliamentary reform – the system allowed only a small electorate and the ministries were responsible to the King. Louis Philippe was faced with demonstrations that the National Guard did not disperse in 1848 and he abdicated.

AO2 – Some candidates might argue that this is an unfair comparison. An elderly and somewhat infirm Louis XVIII inherited the divisions of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic periods and the suspicions of the Allied powers. He returned not because of enthusiasm for the Bourbons but because of Napoleon's defeats. He did not entirely resist unwise repressions, but he did not like the attempt by the King of Piedmont, for example, to turn back the clock completely. The Charter was not less democratic than Napoleon's Year X constitution; the administrative structure and legal reforms of the Napoleonic period were kept; the middle classes kept their property; and the notables were not ousted by 'ultra' royalists. The indemnity was paid off and France became one of the leading powers again, playing an important role in Spain. Louis was the only one of these three rulers not to be removed without coming back. Charles X has few defenders, although his Ultra supporters did see him successfully meeting the threat from impious republicanism. Louis Philippe stayed in power for a longer period and, it could be argued, had a shrewd foreign policy, and overcame opposition until social unrest and political discontent built up in the 1840s. The bourgeois monarchy might appear to be modern and there was some economic development. When considering the three rulers, candidates may decide that Louis XVIII did well to re-establish the monarchy both nationally and internationally, but that Charles X threw away the hard work. Although Louis Philippe was unable to establish much that was positive, it could be argued in his favour that he did not make disastrous appointments like Charles X; he was not a warlike and demanding figure like Napoleon and he stood against forces of dangerous and radical change.

19 How important were economic factors in the creation of a united Germany in the period 1862 to 1871?

AO1 – The economic factors are likely to be: the Zollverein; the economic growth of Prussia encouraged by the Rhineland acquisitions of 1814–15; railways; the urban middle classes and industrial interests needing the market opportunities of a united Germany; and the wealth that allowed Prussia to create a well-equipped army. Candidates may quote Keynes's famous view that 'Coal and Iron' rather than 'Blood and Iron' were the key factors. Other factors that also explain unification are the skill that Bismarck showed in weakening Austrian domination and then ensuring that the other powers did not intervene to prevent the expansion of Germany. Denmark was not defended by other European powers in 1864. Austria was left without international allies in 1866 (although most of the German states sided with her). France fought and lost alone in 1870. Another key factor is that the international situation after the Crimean War was favourable, although Bismarck still had to exploit both this and Prussia's military superiority (the power of the Krupps artillery in 1870 and the needle gun in 1866). The superior Prussian military organisation was aided by the railways which reflected, as well as being a factor in, economic development.

AO2 – Without the rapid economic growth Prussia could not have dominated the Zollverein, which certainly established the ideas of Prussian leadership. However, most of her free trade partners declared for Austria in 1866 even though Austria was not a member. Economic power could produce anxiety, especially when linked to Prussian military growth and traditions. The railways certainly not only boosted Prussian power but played a role in bringing the nation together; however, national feeling, communications and cultural nationalism did not necessarily point to the actual way that Germany was unified. Economic growth did assist Prussian military victories and it is often pointed out that Austrian industry and railways were inferior. Against this, the actual fighting was dominated by severe military errors on the part of the Austrian leadership in 1866 and by France. Railway logistics played their part, but railways did not win battles by themselves and the needle gun was not the war-winner that it has been made out to be. Economic historians have tried to write Bismarck out but, even though economic growth may well have made some sort of greater unification more likely, the particular course that unification took may well be seen as a result of Bismarck exploiting the opportunities that long-term shifts in international relations made possible.

20 'The importance of Cavour and Garibaldi in achieving a more united Italy has been exaggerated.' Discuss.

AO1 – Italy was not fully united by 1861 and there are other elements which might explain the creation of the Kingdom of Italy. Cavour has been seen as offering the model of Piedmont as a progressive modern industrial state which was attractive to western Europe and to nationalist elements in Italy. After the failures of 1848, Piedmont was the only Italian state to retain constitutional rule and Cavour helped to make this a greater reality than before. He took advantage of the Crimean war to bring Italy onto the European agenda; the key policy was the agreement with Napoleon III – 1848 had showed that Italy could not go it alone. With the French defeat of Austria and the sympathetic outlook of Britain, key elements were put in place for a more united northern Italy and the destruction of Austrian power. However, Cavour did not seek a united Italy and France's unilateral defection meant that what emerged was limited – Venetia remained Austrian; Austria actually lost Nice and Savoy. It was Garibaldi who ensured that Italy was more than a northern Italy by his heroic expedition to Sicily and by his policy of declaring his gains for the benefit of Victor Emmanuel and Italy, and not for regional independence or a republic. Many saw the alliance between the clever diplomat and progressive statesman and the heroic man of action as a sort of marriage between head and heart that brought about a 'resurgent' Italy.

AO2 – The debate is about whether either of these 'heroic' leaders really can be credited with success out of context. The economic development of Piedmont and the willingness of Victor Emmanuel to be flexible about the constitution depended on more than just Cavour. He was fortunate in the context of the 1850s, where Austria lost support from Britain and France by not taking part in the Crimean War, while alienating her fellow conservatives in Russia by offering a diplomatic alignment against her. Austria's less successful rule of her Italian regions had created discontent; Italian nationalism had been stimulated by heroic revolts and by the relentless rhetoric of Mazzini and his followers. In the end, France's willingness to pay the military price for Italy, though exploited by Cavour, was not created by him. The state that he created by 1860 was far from being a united Italy and he was unenthusiastic about Garibaldi, trying to stop him and being concerned about his successes. Garibaldi for his part reacted to unrest in Sicily that went back some years and was part of a longer tradition. Candidates should assess: the role of Crispi in stirring up the unrest; the benevolent neutrality of Britain; the weakness of the Neapolitan opposition; as well as the heroic leadership of Garibaldi. However, the rapid moves by Cavour and the King to annex the territories in the South, as well as Garibaldi's loyalty in declaring his conquests to be for the King, are key elements, even if Rome and Venetia were added without input from either Cavour or Garibaldi as a result of Prussian expansion, and the kingdom created by Piedmont's annexations was hardly united.

21 What best explains the failure of the 1848 Revolutions?

AO1 – There were revolts in France with the fall of Louis Philippe and the proclamation of the Second Republic, leading to the presidency of Louis Napoleon and the Second Empire. Metternich was forced out by revolts in the Austrian Empire in Vienna, Prague and Budapest. There were revolutions in Germany which led to experiments in constitutional governments and also the formation of a national parliament in Frankfurt. In Italy, Lombardy and Venice rose, and Piedmont intervened to support them before being defeated. Revolutions in Naples and Sicily and in the Papal States occurred. Resistance was prolonged in the Roman Republic and also in Venice before Austrian troops restored control. The lack of revolution in Russia gave the rulers in Europe an ally while the armies of Prussia and Austria remained generally loyal.

AO2 – Candidates should identify several common elements in the Revolutions. Firstly, Europe in 1848 was predominantly rural; the revolutionary middle classes and progressive liberal nobles did not secure the enthusiasm of the rural masses. Secondly, the aims of the rebels were often quite disparate and the increasing fears of the propertied classes of popular revolution and socialist ideas made it possible for the rulers to seem to offer safeguards for property which led to splits in the movements. In many cases, regional differences prevented a united front, for example in Italy and Austria, where Magyar nationalism did not embrace other discontents and where there was little common ground between the North and South. The Papal Allocution ended hopes of religious unity for change in Italy. Where a national assembly did emerge, for example in Germany, regional differences were not overcome by a strong and charismatic leadership. Charles Albert of Piedmont proved a broken reed and Frederick William of Prussia lacked the nationalistic vision. In France the emergence of a strong man in Louis Napoleon turned the course of revolution. However, military factors may have been crucial – the loyalty of Radetzky's armies, the strength of the Quadrilateral, Russian forces and the military inadequacies and organisation of the rebels, and the deployment of heavy artillery in Paris in June 1848.

Section 5: 1862–1914**22 Who gained most from the domestic reforms of Alexander II?**

AO1 – The 'Tsar Liberator' feared that emancipation of the serfs would come from below if not from above and was conscious of serfdom as a bar to the reforms that the Crimean War had indicated were necessary. Candidates may give this major reform the greatest prominence. However, the creation of Zemstva, legal reforms including the introduction of jury trial, and the relaxation of censorship and greater education freedoms, together with army reforms including a reduction in the very long period of service, all amounted to a considerable change after the reign of Nicholas I. The reforms were not given without soul-searching: the Polish revolt and the development of internal opposition raised concerns and there was some reconsideration. Nevertheless, despite the rise of terrorism and assassination attempts, the Tsar was considering extending political change when he was killed in 1881. The categories of those most affected by the reforms could include the serfs, the liberal aristocracy and middle classes, the students, the soldiers, local communities, the intelligentsia, the Tsar's bureaucracy, and the ruling elites.

AO2 – Candidates might consider that for all the limitations in terms of redemption payments and land redistribution, the peasants were the greatest gainers. The move from unfree to free was one of the most significant changes in Russian history. Some candidates might argue that in fact the landowners gained more and the continuing peasant unrest is evidence that the peasants were discontented with the partition. It could be argued that the middle classes in Russia gained more from the greater educational freedoms, the growth of the opposition movements, the legal changes and the hopes that Russia was moving away from a narrow autocracy. However, given the failure to maintain all the freedoms given and the limited powers of the Zemstva, this could be challenged. It could be argued that change and modernisation actually strengthened the Tsarist state, that military reform gave its armies more power and that the overseas image of Russia was reformed for the benefit of the ruling classes. However, against this can be set the growth of terrorism and opposition and the retraction of some changes, which made the regime look uncertain and weak. The conditions for the soldiers may have improved, but the Turkish War of 1878 was not a vast improvement on the Russian performance in the Crimea. The Tsar paid a heavy price for stimulating demands for change that his regime was not prepared to meet.

23 How liberal was the German Empire between 1871 and 1890?

AO1 – Candidates might focus on the nature of the Constitution, which made the federal Chancellor responsible to the Emperor, which counteracted the power of the universally (male) elected Reichstag with the Bundesrat, and which took the key element in the budget, the military spending, out of discussion for seven years at a time. Candidates might refer to: Bismarck's dealings with parliament; the 'liberal' policies of free trade; attacks on the Catholic Church followed by the realignment from the National Liberals towards a more conservative orientation; and the illiberal persecutions of Socialism.

AO2 – The debate here is about: whether the constitutional limitations meant that the constitution was 'the fig leaf of absolutism'; whether Bismarck cynically used the National Liberals; whether he despised the whole idea of political discussion; whether his repression of his 'enemies', the Catholics and Socialists, prefigured the anti-liberal tendencies of the Nazi regime; whether his true preference was for the Austrian alliance, protective tariffs and association with the right; and whether he pondered a coup against the constitution later in his period of office, making the Empire less than liberal. Against this can be set: the efforts Bismarck made to secure parliamentary support; the federal nature of the Empire; the anticlericalism that was a hall mark of nineteenth-century liberalism; the relatively limited repressive apparatus deployed in comparison with later regimes or indeed the Metternich era; and his concern for popular causes such as imperialism. The whole issue of universal suffrage is often problematic – being 'liberal' in a modern sense but not 'Liberals' in terms of the beliefs of the National Liberals, who saw universal suffrage as akin to reaction. Much depends on definitions of 'liberal' and also which period is being discussed. Before 1879 the creation of a federal constitution, with the Chancellor appearing before the lower house and attempting greater national unity while attacking Catholic ultramontaniam, might have been more or less what the pre-1870 Liberal programme had hoped for. Problems came with the more authoritarian nature of the regime and the spirit of the new Germany.

24 'The French Third Republic survived only because there was no realistic alternative.' Discuss this view with reference to the period 1871 to 1914.

AO1 – Candidates might state that the Republic was the regime which divided Frenchmen least – previous republics had been associated with Thiers' phrase 'with blood and imbecility' but the suppression of the Commune showed that the conservative Republic would not threaten property or return to the ideals of 1793. Candidates may consider that the Third Republic could be associated with the ideals of Frenchmen who 'kept their hearts on the left but their wallets on the right'. It was not proclaimed in any frenzy of opprobrium for Napoleon III but because of unexpected military collapse. The alternatives were not enticing – the monarchists could not agree among themselves and the issue of the flag showed that their claimant was out of touch. The previous experience of kings was not encouraging. Bonapartism was associated with the failed 'glory' of Napoleon I and Napoleon III. The left-wing alternatives could not find support in a conservative peasantry. However, the humiliations of defeat, the recurrent scandals, the lack of inspirational leadership and the undercurrent of opposition meant that the Third Republic seemed quite precarious. The problem was that alternatives seemed even more so – the most dangerous period was probably the early 1870s and candidates could consider the weaknesses of conservative opponents and the gradual rallying of republicans to the cause. The Boulanger episode showed that 'the man on the white horse' could not rally the type of support that was true of 1799. The Panama scandals and Dreyfus Affair rocked the Republic, but there was little in the way of a plausible alternative.

AO2 – Candidates might consider whether the failures of the Republic's enemies – from the 1870s royalists and MacMahon to Boulanger and to the Dreyfusards – were simply due to their lack of credibility. On the other hand, they might consider that other factors prevented any serious challenge to the Republic: the vital and skilful leadership of Gambetta and Clemenceau, for example; or the need to avoid a repetition of the splits of 1870–1 in face of the desire for 'revenge' and national regeneration to deal with Germany and regain Alsace and Lorraine. The Republic did adapt to the changing times, as can be seen in the Russian alliance, the recovery from the splits of the Dreyfus period, and the way that the Radicals dealt with Boulanger.

25 To what extent were the problems facing Italian governments in the period 1871 to 1914 of their own making?

AO1 – Candidates might provide evidence and knowledge of the problems inherited from the Risorgimento period, the problems brought by population pressure, uneven economic development, the rise of a greater urban population and political discontent, and the problems of pressure for world status and imperial greatness. Candidates' may demonstrate knowledge of the political system of *trasformismo* and the restricted and unrepresentative nature of Italian political life. They may assess key figures like Depretis, Crispi and Giolitti for their response to Italy's problems.

AO2 – Candidates might argue that the whole nature of the Risorgimento, which had placed the Papal States and the South unexpectedly under Piedmontese control without real debate and choice, engendered problems. The major resistance and subsequent repression of the South left scars and a sense that the *mezzogiorno* was hostile and occupied territory. Italy in the 1870s suffered from poverty, overpopulation, regional inequalities, poor health and agrarian backwardness. The Piedmontese ruling class was left with problems which their Neapolitan, Tuscan and Papal predecessors had not begun to deal with. To these were added the strains of rapid industrial growth in the 1880s, the spread of anarchist and socialist ideas and the alienation of Catholics from the state. However well the politicians had ruled Italy, these largely inherited problems would have been overwhelming. However, the alternative view is that the political system made matters worse and perpetuated abuses. The *trasformismo* politics debased parliament and led to accusations of scandal and corruption, confirming the view that the new kingdom was alien rather than organic. The attempts to make Italy a great power strained resources and took capital and attention away from issues such as land and social reforms. Candidates might argue that Giolitti's attempts to deal with socialism were more successful but created problems of their own. It could be further argued that the emergence of radical agrarian politics and urban discontent was not dealt with by the adoption of reforming measures as had been the case in other European countries facing similar situations, and that domination by a northern ruling class perpetuated regional alienation.

26 Assess the view that the military planning of the great powers, rather than their long-term rivalries, best explains the outbreak of the First World War in 1914.

AO1 – Candidates may refer to Taylor's War by Timetable. The key idea is that the massive military build-up before 1914 and the detailed plans, such as the Schlieffen Plan, involved the mobilisation stage and that once this had begun it was difficult for the powers to wind down in 1914. The wider view is that the plans made war seem a viable option to fulfil longer-term ambitions or remove long-standing anxieties. Countries went to war with the view that there was a good chance that they could win. However, there were of course long-term rivalries – the French resentment about Alsace Lorraine and the defeat of 1870; the Russian concern for the Balkans and the dangers of a German-supported Austria; the Austrian fears for the long-term security of the Empire; Germany's and Austria's fears about Russian economic and military growth; Britain's economic, colonial and naval rivalry with Germany; and Germany's fear of encirclement. The issue is whether these longer-term rivalries would have by themselves led to a war had not statesmen had the confidence of military advice promising victory.

AO2 – Some candidates may take the view that the war arose out of a short-term crisis and developed because of short-term elements such as the mobilisation. It could be argued that when a major crisis came the planning offered the prospects of a short war and victory, even though any study of campaigns such as the US Civil War might have indicated the opposite. The Schlieffen Plan offered a rapid campaign against France similar to that of 1870 and used Russia's sheer size and anticipated slowness of response to argue that a war on two fronts could be avoided. French concepts of high morale and rapid advance being able to overcome the effect of rapid firing weapons and heavy artillery offered a tempting vision. British belief in its naval superiority and the sheer size of the armies of Russia and France encouraged a view of a short campaign without large-scale land fighting. Few military leaders set out what were to be the realities of a long war of attrition for the politicians. However, some may feel this is a shallow view – the war was a culmination of a build-up of long-term resentments, economic and colonial rivalry, strategic issues and the development of mass nationalism. This was the context in which the decisions of 1914 were taken.

Section 6: Themes c. 1815–1914

27 Account for the importance of the Eastern Question in European diplomacy between 1815 and 1878.

AO1 – The decline of the Ottoman Empire from the eighteenth century led to Balkan nationalities trying to break free and encouraged the ambitions and interests of Austria, Russia, France and Britain which led to rivalry. Britain saw it as a cardinal interest to keep Russia out of Constantinople to protect her trade routes and her Asian possessions. Russia sought to protect her co-religionists and also to exploit opportunities to control the routeway to the Mediterranean and her Asian and Balkan influence. Austria was eager to prevent Russian expansion and to defend her own Empire in South-east Europe. Candidates might follow these rivalries by considering the question of Greek independence which set the nationalism of the Greeks against the post-Napoleonic Congress system and its monarchical commitment to the status quo. It was England, France and Russia who accepted Greek independence in 1827. Full independence depended on Britain and Austria being fearful of a Russian-dominated semi-independent Greece.

The interests of the powers in the conflict between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali could be discussed – with Russia as the protector of the Sultan in return for the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. France's sympathy for Mehemet Ali introduced a new element following the Turkish invasion of Syria in 1839. There was danger of conflict between France and Britain and the British policy in securing the Straits Convention. The Eastern Question led to war between Russia and Turkey in 1853 and the Crimean War in 1854. The demands that Russia withdraw from Moldavia and Wallachia and return her fleet to Sebastopol had already been met, so this 'last crusade', as Figes calls it, had wider objectives and the entrance of Piedmont showed that the Eastern Question could be a kind of peg to hang other European issues on. The Treaty of Paris proved hard to enforce and the Balkans were an ongoing problem, culminating in the risings in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1875 and the subsequent war between Turkey and Russia, the Treaty of San Stefano and the Congress of Berlin.

AO2 – Candidates might consider Russia's interests and how they became influenced by pan-Slavism as well as strategic concerns. Austria's interests did not lead her into conflict in the way that Britain and France were drawn into war in 1854. The changing role of the Eastern Question in Franco-British relations might be considered as questions of prestige arose by 1854 which linked domestic and foreign policy. British interests were to protect the Mediterranean; but in 1856 domestic pressures and concern for prestige were important. Candidates might analyse the role of Balkan nationalism.

28 Why was there a greater commitment to imperialism among European powers after 1870?

AO1 – The New Imperialism was predominately centred on Africa and Asia and involved European powers in greater formal control. It was made possible by better technology – the Suez Canal and steamships. The new telegraph allowed better links with the home country and new medical knowledge reduced the risk from tropical disease. As the new ‘scramble’ for colonies lacked effective regulation, it created conflicts which in turn encouraged imperial expansion for protection of borders. Some areas were developed and defended for reasons of trade and economic gain; others, like British Egypt, because it dominated a key communications route – the Suez Canal. The Belgian Congo was developed predominantly for economic profit. Countries valued fuelling bases on strategic routes. In some cases colonisation was a result of powerful pressure groups. Domestic considerations, such as with Bismarck’s colonial acquisitions, could be important; Disraeli’s imperialism was seen as popular but was also dominated by ‘the men on the spot’ who forced their government’s hand. The desire for international prestige could also be a factor – such as French and Italian colonisation. Colonisation in areas seen as ‘primitive’, such as the African interior, took different forms from foreign domination of China or British rule in India and her willingness to share power with white colonists in Australia. Possible explanations can be: a sense of civilising mission, often linked to religion; the desire to control resources; strategic considerations; the need for capital investment outlets; the impact of the 1873 downturn in the European economy; enthusiastic local imperialists; mass communications informing a nationalist public of colonial adventures and opportunities; greater weaponry, such as the machine gun, which facilitated victories. Sometimes there were special circumstances such as the discovery of gold in the Witwatersrand in 1886, which transformed relations between imperialist powers and indigenous peoples. Rivalry between powers could be a powerful stimulant, as in South Asia, where the French established control of Indochina; and the British carved out colonies in Burma, Hong Kong and Kowloon. Russian, British, French and German concessionary ports were forced on China.

AO2 – Contemporaries like Hobson and Lenin saw imperialism linked to the development of capitalism; but the economic arguments cannot always explain the considerable sums spent on imperial acquisitions with limited payback in terms of trade and investment opportunities. Often the less formal imperialism yielded far more than the more costly annexations. Imperialism was not always popular – the French interest in Indochina by political leaders was not shared by a public more interested in European concerns. Attacks on ‘Beaconsfieldism’ won the Liberals the election of 1880. The Boer War became unpopular. Leopold of Belgium’s depredations in the Congo gave colonialism a bad name.

29 Assess the importance of music in the development of nationalism in this period.

AO1 – Eighteenth-century music was mainly international in style – the classical sonata form did not lend itself to folk songs, although they do appear in Haydn symphonies for colour and interest. Italian opera was enjoyed throughout Europe. Mozart was a multi-lingual artist, at home in London, Paris, Prague and Vienna. With Romanticism there was more interest in exploring national characteristics. Weber's operas used German folk tales and explored German history for themes. Glinka welded some Russian elements on to the standard Italian opera style of his day. However, as the 'national' schools developed, they did become focal points for national feeling. German nationalists were united by German music in the 1840s – even though composers were not especially 'Germanic' – but with Wagner 'Germanness' was celebrated in music. *Die Meistersinger* is a hymn to German virtues and there are anti-foreign sentiments in the last scene. Germanic folk lore permeates The Ring Cycle even if its message is universal. The Czechs, though under Austrian rule, delighted in the growth of a Czech musical school expressing Czech culture. With a distinct 'national' turn of phrase, Smetana's Czech subjects – village life or episodes from history and mythology – were used to combat German influence in culture. Chopin was adopted as an expression of Polish nationalism; Erkel – more than the more cosmopolitan Liszt – wrote national Hungarian operas. French composers were seen as having specific national characteristics of lightness and sophistication as opposed to the heavier German style after 1870. The Russian nationalist composers – the Mighty Handful – celebrated folk music. Some musicians went into the countryside to collect traditional melodies. By the 1880s there was no longer an international style but different expressions of nationalism in music, and there was a decline in interest in the more cosmopolitan composers of the past who did not reflect this.

AO2 – Some people have seen music as a major factor in the sense of national identities but its impact varied. It was greatest when actually taken and used by a nationalism that had evolved independently of it – such as the association of Verdi with anti-Austrian feeling as crowds shouted and chanted 'Viva Verdi' as an acronym of Vittore Emmanuele Re d'Italia. There is little evidence of Verdi's operas inspiring nationalism. In the bitter struggles between Czechs and Germans in the Austrian Empire, struggles to get Czech music and opera performed might result in a victory for nationalists and there is perhaps more expression of national feeling here. Wagner was taken up by German nationalists with different degrees of enthusiasm – he was not to Bismarck's taste, but the Kaiser and later Hitler saw his works as expression of the superiority of German *Kultur*. No doubt national music stirred the patriotic middle classes, but did little for the peasant masses who would have found the sentimentalising of rural music incomprehensible, had they ever been able to hear it in the concert hall or opera house.

30 What best explains the growth of socialism in this period?

AO1 – Having its roots in the French Revolution, socialism developed from a doctrine into a more organised political movement. Some historians have seen the years 1830–48 as crucial with Blanc, Saint Simon and Fourier as the key intellectual movers. Thereafter, Marxism and Anarchism developed and ‘socialism’ in a broad sense developed intellectually. Marxism in particular gave socialism a pseudo-scientific authority and appeal, whereas anarchism and syndicalism broadened its appeal to the developing industrial masses. Organisationally, the Internationals saw a new departure and socialist parties emerged within countries. The link with trade unionism was also a vital element in growth with the powerful CGT in France and CNT in Spain. The German SPD had become the largest party in the Reichstag and French and Italian socialists had entered government by the end of the period.

AO2 – Candidates might focus on the development of socialist theory, particularly that of Marx, which offered not merely anti-capitalist feeling but a ‘scientific’ theory of historicism and closely argued economic theory to counterbalance the prevalent free market liberal economics. Marx offered less in terms of how the revolution would come about in practical terms, but with the aid of Engels he offered well-supported analyses of the inevitable decline of capitalism. Lenin developed the theory in a way that offered hopes to Russia’s predominantly agrarian society and the political organisations developed in Germany, inspired by theoretical Marxism, seemed to show that socialists could organise and gain support on a large scale. This essentially urban world view was helped by the rapid industrial growth of the later nineteenth century and the often poor working and living conditions that accompanied it. Attempts at persecution, as in Germany and Russia, often strengthened the movements and gave them heroic status. The cyclical depressions of capitalism seemed to prove socialism was right, and the greater interest in social matters supported their theoretical claims. The role of individuals must not be forgotten, with socialists such as Jaures, Lassalle and Keir Hardie achieving respect and prominence. Mass communications and rising literacy and education, together with the parallel growth of organised labour, meant that ideas spread.

31 Why was there more industrial growth in Western than Eastern Europe before c. 1880?

AO1 – The trading economies of Britain Belgium and France had a strong capital base and the profits from agriculture were invested more in Western Europe than was the case in the centre and east. The less rigid class distinctions made commerce and industry more socially acceptable in Western Europe although Russian nobles did develop industries. However, the serfdom in Eastern Europe inhibited development of demand-led internal markets, a flexible skilled labour force and scientific progress. There were particular factors involved: the development of the dismembering of Poland; the high level of military expenditure in Russia; fear of speculative thinking; and the imbalance between town and countryside. The free market capitalism that developed railways and steamships was not a feature of Eastern Europe. Political absolutism often retarded education and new ideas. By the end of the period there were signs of a rapid growth rate in countries hitherto dominated by a backward agrarian-based agriculture, such as Russia and Italy. However, smaller Eastern European states like Serbia lacked the infrastructure, urban development and markets to emulate smaller Western European states like Belgium. There was also no Eastern European equivalent to the Zollverein in central Europe. Candidates might discuss transport development, heavy industry, high farming – both east and west shared population growth and new technology but there were considerable differences in capital formation, the availability of skilled labour, the growth of a resilient urban market and the role of international trade.

32 'Women gained more than they lost from economic change in Europe between 1850 and 1914.' Discuss.

AO1 – Economic change would include urbanisation and industrialisation, mass production and in some areas greater agricultural diversity. In some countries this involved migration, particularly as it was accompanied by population growth. In Italy and Russia there was a high level of economic growth in the later part of the period which had considerable impact on the workforce. There was a growth in communications, for example railway development which impacted on women as workers and consumers. With economic change came social developments in literacy, in the range of economic opportunities, and in political awareness, particularly in Germany. In more rural areas in South-east Europe the degree and pace of change was less.

AO2 – Gains might include more opportunities in a developing economy with greater tertiary sector growth, including the development of retail trades, the need for secretaries and teachers and opportunities in the growing cultural life brought about by the growth of towns and better communications. The relative balance of town and country affected women and perhaps offered more chances for independent living. Economic development might be linked to greater educational opportunities, more social and political awareness, more consumer choice, better facilities within the home, and more access to information. Emigration might be seen as offering a chance for a new life and an escape from traditional and oppressive rural social norms. On the other hand, cheap factory labour in developing industrial economies brought hardships; living conditions in newly growing cities like Berlin, industrial parts of St. Petersburg or Turin brought hardships, especially as women were often expected to continue their traditional roles as mothers and housekeepers. Burgeoning cities and industrial areas saw the growth of prostitution as population pressure fell on rural areas. Changes in agriculture often had an adverse impact on traditional staple farming.

Section 7: 1914–1945

33 How far does poor military leadership account for the high casualty rate of the First World War?

AO1/AO2 – The case for this proposition is: the reliance on frontal assaults; use of mass attacks; the failure to see logistical problems (Gallipoli); the failure to modify tactics sufficiently (Haig at Passchendaele perhaps a classic example); the failure to learn from the experience of others (Pershing, for example); the tendency to keep going when victory was clearly impossible (the Somme); the persistent belief in morale and élan (Nivelle, 1917); bloody and unimaginative tactics (Falkenhayn at Verdun); and over-reliance on plans that could not be adapted. The case against would be: the limitations of the heavily defended front lines; the impact of heavy weapons and new technology; the insistence by politicians and the public on victory at all costs; the sheer size of armies. The generals can be defended and there were efforts to avoid high casualties, for example: Vimy Ridge; the German storm troops in 1918; and the rapid adoption of tanks. Candidates should focus on casualties, not the general effectiveness of leadership. The Allied tactics in 1918 were more successful in using combined operations but casualties were still high.

34 Assess the view that the League of Nations never had a realistic chance of success.

AO1/AO2 – Candidates might argue that: the League of Nations was seen from the outset as being associated with the victors of the war; the USA and USSR were not originally members; there was domination by Britain and France but these countries lacked real commitment to it; the post-war world was so disturbed that any international body like this would have been challenged; there was no military force; and nationalism was too strong for the League to have much chance. The case against is that: the effects of war had been so terrible that public opinion was prepared to support the League; it did enjoy some successes in the 1920s which pointed to it not necessarily having no chance; too much can be made of US absence – the USA sent observers and was not totally isolationist; and it was remarkable that it established an infrastructure and did good work in its various commissions, e.g. on refugees and health. The cataclysmic effects of depression and the rise of dictators did undermine it, but that did not mean that at the time of founding it was necessarily unrealistic. Candidates should provide an analysis of what its prospects were rather than a list of reasons for failure.

35 How valid is the judgement that Stalin sacrificed ideals for power in the years 1929–45?

AO1/AO2 – Candidates might argue that Stalin became increasingly dictatorial and undermined communist ideals which never envisaged a ‘cult of personality’. Instead of ruling in the interests of the people, he imposed a ruthless discipline to build up industry for the good of the state; his purges had little relation to ideology and were more concerned with power or even paranoia; he was prepared to deal with his ideological enemy Hitler; when war came, older ideas of patriotism and the motherland were invoked and the churches re-opened in order to survive. The acquisition of the old Tsarist Empire and the domination of eastern Europe had more to do with Russian power politics than ideology. The case against is that by 1929 the original ideals of the Revolution had been undermined by the pseudo-capitalist NEP and that by collectivisation and mass industrialisation Stalin was back on ideological track. If the communists were the party of the proletariat, then a proletariat had to be built up. The discipline needed for this major piece of social engineering was consistent with Marxist ideas of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The social changes of the 1930s were truly democratic even if not in the bourgeois sense, with industry being highly valued; peasant proprietorship being abolished; and all working for the good of the greater socialist community. Some candidates may know the revisionist view that Stalin was pushed from below by activists who wanted greater ideologically-based change. The War was won by the effort of the whole people and communist ideology spread after it. The regime might have been brutal but it was not inconsistent with ideology. Candidates should demonstrate an understanding of the ideology and relate policies to it.

36 How great a part did luck play in the rise of Hitler to power as Führer by 1934?

AO1 – Candidates might argue that Hitler was lucky not to have been ruined by 1923 and to have been allowed to become a national figure by sympathetic elements in the judiciary. He was lucky that economic circumstances turned in his favour; and that, when he had reached the furthest point in electoral success in 1932 without gaining office, splits in Weimar’s ruling elite allowed him to negotiate his way into power. He was lucky that the radical wing of his party did not press their opposition to compromise; and that the army was willing to do a deal in 1934. Candidates might also argue that Hitler made his own luck and exploited circumstances. It was not luck to switch to a policy of legality or to organise the party to be in a position to exploit the economic crash. The studiously effective ‘message’ and the brilliance of its delivery were not matters of luck. The way that Hitler kept his nerve and did not give in to demands for radical action in 1932; the way that he saw that entrance to government could be the way to power and how he outmanoeuvred Von Papen and the *Reaktion*; the Realpolitik in abandoning the SA and compromising with the army, knowing that he could in the long run control them as well, all amount to a high level of political skill.

37 Who should bear the greatest responsibility for the outbreak of civil war in Spain in 1936?

AO1 – Candidates might argue that Franco and the generals who launched a military coup in 1936 should bear the greatest responsibility. However, the coup was quite widely supported and the rise of right-wing political extremism may be linked to this – not just the Falange and Spanish fascism but more mainstream Catholic organisations. The church was also supportive of the nationalists and could be blamed for political interference. Against this, candidates might argue that responsibility rests with the rise of the extreme left: syndicalism and anarchism; the rabid anticlericalism which threatened traditional religion; the Popular Front which threatened stability (or offered justice according to political persuasions). Candidates might also consider that the international context should be blamed; or long-term factors like the dictator Primo de Rivera; or the politicians' failure to achieve reconciliation and consensus; perhaps the army 'africanistas' who developed an outlook hostile to democratic government. Perhaps the world depression rather than particular groups and individuals could be blamed; or localists in Spain who threatened to revive traditional autonomy and pull the country apart.

38 How important were economic factors in bringing about the Second World War?

AO1/AO2 – The idea behind the question is that the expansionist nationalism of Germany, Italy and Japan was linked to economic conditions. There was a desire to create closed economic systems – especially in the case of Germany and Japan – which would be isolated from the economic vicissitudes that had brought hardships in the inter-war period, and which would provide markets and raw materials, an outlet for surplus population and national security. Rearmament and expansion would ease economic pressures at home; the rise of Mussolini and Hitler had been brought about by economic discontent and their warlike policies were linked to offering economic gains. In terms of the Allies, the domination of Europe by the dictators offered economic challenge; the threat by the Japanese to the Far East Empire had economic repercussions; and candidates might argue that economic factors led Britain and France into appeasement and the USA into isolation and so helped to bring about war. The counter-argument is that ideological and strategic interests were far more important. The desire for Japanese expansion and a Thousand Year Reich were cultural/political/ideological rather than merely being for economic advantage. Economic gains were more a means to an end – to impose racial policies, for instance. In Mussolini's case the decision to invade Ethiopia was more political than economic and Italy had little to gain economically from joining the war in 1940.

Section 8: 1945–2000**39 How far was the USA to blame for the development of the Cold War from 1945 to 1949?**

AO1 – Candidates may put forward the revisionist view that Truman and US policy makers were unable to see Stalin's genuine defence concerns and interpreted the policy in Eastern Europe not as part of wartime agreements (e.g. the percentages agreement) and recompense for the huge sacrifice of the USSR – much greater than that of the West – but as ideologically motivated. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan are part of a US desire for strategic domination and to protect markets in Eastern Europe at the expense of legitimate Soviet concerns. Greece confirms that Stalin did keep to agreements and his defenders do not see a betrayal of Yalta and Potsdam. Instead, Candidates might argue that US misunderstanding led to criticisms about reparations, unjustified fears about the Middle East and a crisis in Berlin brought about by the currency reform. The USA, with the provocative threats of nuclear war during the Blockade, itself an offshoot of the failure to share nuclear secrets with an ally, made the USA responsible and the creation of NATO could be seen as aggressive containment.

AO2 – Candidates should assess whether the humanitarian outrages of the imposition of Soviet rule in Eastern Europe, the Czech coup, the strains of the Allied control commission in Germany, Soviet espionage, the Blockade, Cominform and Comecon can be seen as provoking a West anxious to fulfil the promises of Yalta and Potsdam. Stalin could be seen as exploiting fears – the West was not the manic and aggressive Hitler regime – with which he had actually done business in the pact of 1939.

40 Assess the importance of Adenauer's leadership in bringing about a stable West Germany.

AO1 – Adenauer was a conservative politician who had clear anti-Nazi credentials and who helped to found the very influential CDU in 1946, combining the old Centre Party with moderate liberals. It was clearly anti-Communist, and a credible alternative to the SPD with whom the Allies could deal. He was chairman of the constituent council and helped to establish the West German Basic Law. The CDU and their Bavarian Allies the CSU emerged as the largest parliamentary group in the 1949 elections and Adenauer set the pattern of coalition politics in post-war Germany by his agreement with the FDP – showing that it could work better than Weimar politics and offering dignified leadership. He worked with the Allies and gained the right to conduct foreign relations in 1951. The aim was to rehabilitate Germany and to make a fresh start. He worked with France on the Coal and Steel Community, accepted the Saar being separated and offered restitution to the Jews. He also made a defence contribution and by 1955 West Germany had its own armed forces – a measure of the trust the Allies had in the new regime and of how Adenauer stood as a democratic opponent to the East. The Saar was returned in 1957 and West Germany was a leading member of the EEC. Stability came not only through Allied help but also through the economic prosperity promoted by Adenauer's governments and his economics minister Erhard. The state helped groups who had fled from the east and integrated former Nazis into the new state. Bourgeois stability – never a strong feature of Weimar – ensured electoral success in 1953 and 1957. In place of the pre-war instability the ruling party achieved an overall majority. The reliance on the West and the lack of interest in unification reassured Germany's defenders, but the building of the Berlin Wall shook confidence. Adenauer condemned this as he had condemned the crushing of the Berlin risings of 1953, but relations with the USA declined and Adenauer became closer to de Gaulle in 1963. The *Der Spiegel* affair in 1962 seemed to reveal authoritarian tendencies and Adenauer was criticised for making West Germany a 'chancellor democracy', and for not doing enough to promote unification – he rejected the Stalin Note of 1952 and aimed to integrate West Germany into Western Europe in defence and economic terms.

AO2 – Candidates might argue that Adenauer was more significant in building West Germany in the late-1940s and mid-1950s when people still looked back at Weimar and its problems than he had become by 1963, when it was clear that new Western leaders lacked the commitment to roll back the Soviet threat and that a new approach set out in Brandt's *Ostpolitik* was emerging. However, candidates might argue that Adenauer's main significance lay in achieving the balance between democracy and order – showing that proportional representation and a federal system need not mean the instability, especially in the context of prosperity, that had been the case earlier. He was not a cabinet man – the role of the Chancellor became crucial; but his democratic credentials were sound.

41 What best explains the lack of effective opposition to either Franco in Spain or Salazar in Portugal after 1945?

AO1 – Salazar's 'estado novo' regime continued after his death and he enjoyed a long period as prime minister from 1932 to 1968. Like Spain, the republican government which preceded his authoritarian rule was associated with unrest and divisions and even after 1945 this was a major justification for his regime. Like Franco he benefited from the Cold War – as an anti-Communist who had assisted the Allied war efforts by leasing bases in the Azores and exporting minerals, his state became a member of NATO in 1949 and received Marshall Aid. Thus internal opposition received little foreign support. Salazar did not suffer until the 1960s the disgrace of colonial failures which might have provoked internal dissent. His non-doctrinaire corporatism separated him from Italian fascism and his relations with church and army may well be the key explanation. Portugal's largely rural economy did not give rise to the leftist opposition seen in 1930s Spain and the regime seemed more like traditional Iberian Catholic conservatism. The post-war era, though fairly stagnant, did see some economic growth and development and some social developments such as the growth of education. The example of bitter civil war in Spain tended to discourage opposition and the political police (the PVDE) were effective. Mass tourism did not affect much of Portugal in the same way as it did Spain and so did not encourage change. Candidates might argue that Salazar's own political skills and his careful distancing of the regime from ideology, together with the limited parliamentary tradition, were also factors.

Spain's Civil War produced brutal repression of Franco's enemies which continued well into the post-war era. Despite some talk of the Allies ending the regime, Spain was too important a Cold War ally and so internal unrest did not receive international support. The various ethical boycotts and protests were ineffective. The regime did offer some change and modernisation, especially with the investment in mass tourism. The same divisions between its internal enemies that hindered the victory of the Republic were present after the War. There were some nods to constitutionalism and the wise decision to appoint Juan Carlos as successor offered the hope of eventual change. Decolonisation did not provide the stimulus for change that it did in Portugal in the 1970s. Franco had very strong links with the Church and the army and was not interested in a full ideological implementation of fascism. Localism tended to help the regime as his conservative supporters feared the regional disintegration threatened in the Republic, and the post-war western consumer boom helped the regime in its later stages. As with Salazar, astute leadership, a certain mystique, a powerful police and repressive apparatus and an association with traditions threatened by unstable republicanism all contributed to a lack of effective opposition.

42 How justified is the view that Gorbachev was 'a failure'?

AO1 – Externally, Gorbachev was regarded favourably and as a success, above all in helping to end the Cold War, but internally, he came to be viewed as a failure, weakening both communism and the USSR as a world power. Candidates should assess Gorbachev's aims in and after 1985, set against outcomes by 1990–1, and provide a strong focus on *glasnost* and *perestroika*. Gorbachev aimed to keep the USSR united and strong; he did not intend the reverse; nor did he intend the weakening of the Communist Party. Openness in a range of areas and freedoms (press, media, speech, arrests, policy roles, archives) were linked to economic restructuring, based on a mix of communist and capitalist ideas. He hoped to attract substantial Western help and ideas and investment. In part, this was linked to his changed attitude towards the USA and the reduction of Cold War tensions. But candidates might argue that he tried to do too much, too fast, without real thought and planning. The economic infrastructure was changed and a more balanced economy emerged (a key goal) but at great cost.

AO2 – Although the achievements of Gorbachev in his period of rule may seem limited (and are still viewed as such by many inside Russia), it is possible to argue for some successes, and the context, the inheritance he faced, the legacy he left, are all worthy of analysis. Candidates could make the case that the collapse of the USSR cannot be blamed entirely on Gorbachev. Short- and long-term perspectives are important as also are Western and non-Western views of his status, motives and actions.

43 What best accounts for the survival of parliamentary democracy in Italy after 1945?

AO1 – Italy may have been helped by losing the burden of colonies and ending the monarchy in 1946, as it was a break from a past associated with futile efforts at international power and a Piedmontese monarchy imposed on the different regions after 1861. The death of Mussolini and the period of suffering under German occupation gave Italy the status less of a defeated enemy than of a victim. There had to be a reconstruction of political life and the emergence of the Christian Democrats under the veteran de Gasperi offered some stability. Initially the willingness to work with the Communists may have helped to establish the new Republic as politically inclusive. The support from Marshall Aid helped to rebuild Italy and her association with NATO, the EEC and the UN meant that she was integrated into international organisations. The settlement of the Trieste issue by 1954 prevented the development of extreme nationalism such as had characterised the disputes over *Italia Irredenta* after 1918. As with Germany, a degree of economic prosperity cushioned the new republic although regional inequality was still a problem. Some of the achievements of the fascist era continued and there was some land reform. In a version of *trasformismo* the political parties showed themselves able to deal with coalitions – although the dominance of the Christian Democrats and the permanent opposition of the Communists proved divisive. However, there was no reappearance of the major political unrest of the post-1918 era and Italian Communism was not revolutionary. The extreme right had been discredited and there was a broad democratic consensus. Unrest had grown by the 1960s, but there was some response in decentralising policies. Some went outside conventional political discourse into terrorism; but the system broadly contained disputes. The growing economic problems imposed more pressures by the 1970s but Italy, though faced by kidnappings, bombings and shootings, was a country within the democratic framework of Western Europe and a re-emergence of dictatorship was unlikely despite all the problems. The dominance of the Christian Democrats did begin to give way in the 1980s, showing that the system could adapt. However, not until 1996 was there a coalition which included the Left Democrats. The system for good or ill had marginalised the extremes while allowing for a former Communist to become prime minister by 1998.

The considerable problems of Italy – regional nationalism, crime, corruption, inflation, the gap between North and South – nevertheless did not destroy the basic system. Perhaps the lessons of the 1920s and 30s were too recent, or perhaps an underlying cynicism about political life was not joined to enthusiasm about replacing it. The greater prosperity of the 1950s, the support from the USA, the Cold War discrediting the Communist alternative and the development of Euro-Communism, participation in the EEC, a flourishing cultural identity, especially in post-war cinema, and social and economic reforms may have made a flawed system acceptable, or at least made alternatives less palatable.

Section 9: Themes c. 1914 to 2000

44 To what extent did industrial expansion create more problems than it solved in the period 1914 to 2000?

AO1 – In terms of problems created, candidates may consider the considerable industrial growth in Russia in the inter-war period. This meant long hours and poor conditions, high levels of discipline, over-ambitious targets and possibly an increase in repression. In the industrial expansion of Nazi Germany, the four-year plans created an over-heated economy with shortages of skilled labour and possibly the need for war and expansion to create markets and to provide a use for the massive rearmament. Wartime growth in industries in the democracies caused problems when demand fell after the war and there was excessive capacity. The rapid pace of Eastern bloc industrialisation created problems of pollution. New industrial expansion after the war in the West meant a shift from traditional industries and old centres – new types of industry created problems of adjustment for the workforces.

AO2 – Industrialisation did also produce advantages which solved problems – Russian industrialisation solved the political problem that the Communists had taken power on behalf of the industrial workers, yet these were a minority. It also solved the problem of Russia's defence vulnerability, and industrial expansion did allow survival in the war years and post-war expansion. German industrialisation allowed the regime's geo-political aims to become a reality although this in the long run created more problems. The wartime industrial expansions allowed the West to emerge victorious and post-war industrial change meant a more flexible economy.

45 Assess the impact of totalitarian regimes on the arts and culture of the inter-war period.

AO1 – Candidates might consider the aims of totalitarian regimes in relations to the arts – to promote support for the ideals of the regime, to condemn enemies, to promote the image of the leaders, and to unite people behind internal and external struggles. Stalin's Russia and the dictatorships of Hitler and Mussolini promoted distinctive neo-classical architecture to represent power. Artists, writers and composers were recruited to glorify the regimes to varying degrees. Candidates may also consider the negative impact – the condemnation of 'formalism' and artistic experiment in the USSR or the banning of Jewish and left-wing art in Nazi Germany. Much of the art produced seemed to revert back to anodyne realism. Innovation was possible, for example in the brilliant cinema of Eisenstein and Riefenstahl and in the music of Shostakovich; but political control often stifled or compromised real creativity.

AO2 – Candidates might argue that the arts were enriched by sponsorship of work which needed to touch emotions and bind people to ideals or they might argue that the impact was largely negative, with experimentation discouraged and conformity enforced.

46 How important was the Second World War in ending colonialism?

AO1 – Candidates might argue that pre-war trends – the growth of nationalism, the weaknesses of many powers after the First World War and the changing economic patterns paved the way for an end to traditional colonialism. Or they might argue that the Second World War ended colonialism: the humiliation of France and Great Britain and the Dutch and Americans and Portuguese at the hands of Asiatics in the Far East as Japan conquered the colonial territories of the west; the economic damage that left fewer resources available to defend colonies; the discrediting of racialism and of assumptions about racial superiority; and the example of British decolonisation in India. Candidates might put forward a counter-view that in some cases the War reaffirmed the desire to maintain colonies – this may be true of France and it was only the determined resistance of the Vietnamese and the Algerians that led to decolonisation. The war did not always weaken European resolve as was shown by the British in Malaya, and the emergence of the Cold War may have given some stiffening to colonialism as a barrier against communism.

47 What best explains the increasing economic co-operation between states in Western Europe after 1945?

AO1 – Post-war co-operation had its roots in wartime decisions such as the creation of UNRRA after 1943. This provided relief to liberated countries. The Bretton Woods Conference produced the IMF and World Bank, and Marshall Aid involved an extensive organisation. Out of a 16-nation Committee of European Economic Cooperation came the OEEC of 1948. The success of economic growth encouraged the idea of co-operation. Pan-European ideas were discussed before and during the War but circumstances encouraged their implementation after the War. Benelux had its origins in decisions taken by the exiled government in 1944 and was implemented in 1946. By 1948 the three countries formed a free trade area. Britain and France signed the Dunkirk agreement in 1947 and this was widened to include Benelux in 1948. The OEEC extended beyond the distribution of US aid to reduce tariffs and to set up a European Payments Union. Britain, Norway, Sweden and Denmark formed Uniscan in 1950 and the Scandinavian countries created the Nordic Council in 1953, but the most significant development was the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952, coming out of coal and steel co-operation between France and Germany. The High Authority was a supra-national ruling body and economic unity encouraged greater interest in political unity. The Treaty of Rome in 1957 set up the EEC and in 1958 this and Euratom came into being. The key element was a common tariff policy, but it also covered investment banks and common agricultural and transport policies. The EEC was accompanied by high growth rates among its members in the 1960s and created a market of 170 million people. Parallel to this was EFTA, set up in 1960, consisting of the 'outer seven' – Britain and six non-EEC European countries with a population of 92 million – but this could not compete and gradually the European states came into the EEC by 1973.

AO2 – Explanations may be based on the desire not to allow economic rivalries in Europe to provoke another war and to take measures to avoid the closed economic systems that the dictatorships instituted, which helped to lead to war. The need for co-operation was evident in the immediate needs of war-torn Europe, but there were longer term ideals and the visions of statesmen like Monnet and Schumann. The market-driven prosperity of the 1950s encouraged greater trade and development of larger markets and the decline of colonialism ended the alternatives of overseas markets. Candidates might distinguish the immediate post-war situation and developments such as Marshall Aid with the longer-term developments; they may weigh purely economic imperatives and the need to see economic co-operation as part of a wider vision for peace in Europe and the development of wider cultural links.

48 To what extent has the degree of change in the status and role of women between 1914 and 2000 been exaggerated?

AO1 – Candidates should analyse: the obvious increase in political equality in the sense of the franchise; the end to legal disabilities; the equal rights legislation in many countries; the emergence of women in leadership roles in the workplace, the professions and in political life; the problems that persisted in social attitudes to women; the role of women in key institutions such as the Catholic Church; the gap between pay and opportunities between men and women; the problems of combining motherhood with career development; and sexual double standards and sexist attitudes in many spheres.

AO2 – Candidates may focus on wartime changes and consider whether they extended to peace; they may look at post-war prosperity and consider its impact; they may make a distinction between Western Europe and Communist Europe; they may look at exploitation/collaboration under dictatorships to see if these limited or extended the role of women.

49 Assess the view that the rise in information technology was the greatest development in communications in this period.

AO1 – Communications could include radio, TV, cinema, the press, advertising and political propaganda as well as email and internet. Information technology (IT) might be seen as opening up knowledge on a major scale and also global communication. The impact on regimes which want to control information flow has been considerable. It has also had significant impact on consumerism and buying and selling, on creating focus groups which influence all sorts of organisations, on advertising and forming public opinion, and on moral standards with the increased availability of pornography. Against this could be set the impact of other media – especially earlier in the period: radio helped to create greater national unity and keep people much better informed; then cinema and TV changed cultural habits and awareness. All these had political, cultural and economic impacts.

