General Certificate of Education June 2006 Advanced Level Examination

PHILOSOPHY Unit 5 Texts

PLY5



Friday 23 June 2006 1.30 pm to 2.30 pm

For this paper you must have:

• an 8-page answer book

Time allowed: 1 hour

Instructions

- Use blue or black ink or ball-point pen.
- Write the information required on the front of your answer book. The *Examining Body* for this paper is AQA. The *Paper Reference* is PLY5.
- Answer one question.
- Do all rough work in the answer book. Cross through any work you do not want marked.

Information

- The maximum mark for this paper is 50.
- The marks for part questions are shown in brackets.
- You are reminded of the need for good English and clear presentation in your answers. All questions should be answered in continuous prose. Quality of Written Communication will be assessed in all answers.

Answer one question.

Total for this question: 50 marks

1 Text: Aristotle's 'Nicomachean Ethics'

Study the following extract and then answer all parts of Question 1.

With close reference to the extract above:

Again, it is unreasonable to suppose that a man who acts unjustly or licentiously does not wish to be unjust or licentious; and if anyone, without being in ignorance, acts in a way that will make him unjust, he will be voluntarily unjust; but it does not follow that he can stop being unjust, and be just, if he wants to – no more than a sick man can become healthy, even though (it may be) his sickness is voluntary, being the result of incontinent living and disobeying his doctors. There was a time when it was open to him not to be ill; but when he had once thrown away his chance, it was gone; just as when one has once let go of a stone, it is too late to get it back – but the agent was responsible for throwing it, because the origin of the action was in himself. So too it was at first open to the unjust and licentious persons not to become such, and therefore they are voluntarily what they are; but now that they have become what they are, it is no longer open to them not to be such.

Question 1

(a)

	(i)	what does Aristotle regard as an unreasonable supposition?	(2 marks)
	(ii) briefly describe how Aristotle tries to show that an unjust man is responsible actions;		nsible for (6 marks)
	(iii)	suggest and briefly develop a criticism of Aristotle's account of moral responsibility.	(6 marks)
(b)	Outline the meaning and importance of Aristotle's concept of 'contemplation'. (11 marks)		. (11 marks)
(c)	Asse	ess the role of habit in Aristotle's account of virtue.	(25 marks)

2 Text: Hume's 'An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding'

Study the following extract and then answer all parts of Question 2.

Every idea is copied from some preceding impression or sentiment; and where we cannot find any impression, we may be certain that there is no idea. In all single instances of the operation of bodies or minds, there is nothing that produces any impression, nor consequently can suggest any idea, of power or necessary connexion. But when many uniform instances appear, and the same object is always followed by the same event; we then begin to entertain the notion of cause and connexion. We then *feel* a new sentiment or impression, to wit, a customary connexion in the thought or imagination between one object and its usual attendant; and this sentiment is the original of that idea which we seek for. For as this idea arises from a number of similar instances, and not from any single instance; it must arise from that circumstance, in which the number of instances differ from every individual instance. But this customary connexion or transition of the imagination is the only circumstance, in which they differ. In every other particular they are alike.

Question 2

(a)	With close reference to the extract above:		
	(i)	how is every idea said to be formed?	(2 marks)
	(ii)	briefly explain why Hume thinks repetition is so important;	(6 marks)
	(iii)	suggest and briefly develop a criticism of Hume's account of how we a concept of cause.	acquire the (6 marks)
(b)	Outline Hume's distinction between belief and imagination. (11 mark		(11 marks)
(c)	Assess Hume's case for saying there is no real conflict between liberty and necessity.		ecessity.

(25 marks)

Turn over for the next question

3 Text: Mill's 'On Liberty'

Study the following extract and then answer all parts of Question 3.

The despotism of custom is everywhere the standing hindrance to human advancement, being in unceasing antagonism to that disposition to aim at something better than customary, which is called, according to circumstances, the spirit of liberty, or that of progress or improvement. The spirit of improvement is not always a spirit of liberty, for it may aim at forcing improvements on an unwilling people; and the spirit of liberty, in so far as it resists such attempts, may ally itself locally and temporarily with the opponents of improvement; but the only unfailing and permanent source of improvement is liberty, since by it there are as many possible independent centres of improvement as there are individuals. The progressive principle, however, in either shape, whether as the love of liberty or of improvement, is antagonistic to the sway of custom, involving at least emancipation from that yoke; and the contest between the two constitutes the chief interest of the history of mankind. The greater part of the world has, properly speaking, no history, because the despotism of custom is complete.

Question 3

(a)	With close reference to the extract above:		
	(i)	how is the despotism of custom characterised?	(2 marks)
	(ii)	briefly describe why Mill thinks the spirit of liberty is so important;	(6 marks)
	(iii)	suggest and briefly develop a criticism of Mill's position on custom.	(6 marks)
(b)	Outline why Mill thinks there could be dangers within a democracy.		(11 marks)
(c)	Asse	ss whether Mill's Harm Principle achieves its purpose.	(25 marks)

4 Text: Nietzsche's 'Beyond Good and Evil'

Study the following extract and then answer all parts of Question 4.

What provokes us to look at all philosophers with a mixture of distrust and contempt is not that we are always uncovering how guileless they are – how often and easily they lose their grasp or their way, in short how childish and childlike they are. It is rather that they are not honest enough, however loud and virtuous a racket they all make as soon as the problem of truthfulness is touched upon, even from afar. For they act as if they had discovered and acquired what are actually their opinions through the independent unravelling of a cold, pure, divinely unhampered dialectic (whereas mystics of every order, who are more honest, and more foolish, speak of 'inspiration'); basically, however, they are using reasons sought after the fact to defend a pre-existing tenet, a sudden idea, a 'brainstorm', or, in most cases, a rarefied and abstract version of their heart's desire. They are all of them advocates who refuse the name, that is in most cases wily spokesmen for their prejudices, which they dub 'truths'; and they are *very* far from having a conscience brave enough to own up to it, very far from having the good taste to announce it bravely, whether to warn a foe or a friend, or simply from high spirits and self-mockery.

Question 4

(a)	With close reference to the extract above:			
	(i)	how does Nietzsche look at all philosophers?	(2 marks)	
	(ii)	briefly explain why Nietzsche compares philosophers with advocates;	(6 marks)	
	(iii)	suggest and briefly develop a criticism of Nietzsche's view of past philo	osophers. (6 marks)	
(b)	Outline Nietzsche's three stages of morality.		(11 marks)	
(c)	Assess Nietzsche's description of religious belief as an 'ongoing suicide of reason'		ason'	

c) Assess Nietzsche's description of religious belief as an 'ongoing suicide of reason'. (25 marks)

Turn over for the next question

5 Text: Russell's 'The Problems of Philosophy'

Study the following extract and then answer **all** parts of Question 5.

This question of the distinction between act and object in our apprehending of things is vitally important, since our whole power of acquiring knowledge is bound up with it. The faculty of being acquainted with things other than itself is the main characteristic of a mind. Acquaintance with objects essentially consists in a relation between the mind and something other than the mind; it is this that constitutes the mind's power of knowing things. If we say that the things known must be in the mind, we are either unduly limiting the mind's power of knowing, or we are uttering a mere tautology. We are uttering a mere tautology if we mean by 'in the mind' the same as by 'before the mind', i.e. if we mean merely being apprehended by the mind. But if we mean this, we shall have to admit that what, in this sense, is in the mind, may nevertheless be not mental. Thus when we realize the nature of knowledge, Berkeley's argument is seen to be wrong in substance as well as in form, and his grounds for supposing that 'ideas' – i.e. the objects apprehended – must be mental, are found to have no validity whatever. Hence his grounds in favour of idealism may be dismissed.

Question 5

	(i)	what distinction does Russell make in our apprehension of things?	(2 marks)
	(ii)	briefly explain why Russell thinks that Berkeley's argument can be dism	issed; (6 marks)
	(iii)	suggest and briefly develop a criticism of Russell's attack on Berkeley.	(6 marks)
(b)	Outl	ine Russell's account of what Philosophy can and cannot achieve.	(11 marks)
(c)	Asse	ss Russell's case for believing in an external world.	(25 marks)

With close reference to the extract above: (a)

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6 Text: Ayer's 'Language, Truth and Logic'

Study the following extract and then answer **all** parts of Question 6.

Having thus shown that there is no inexplicable paradox involved in the view that the truths of logic and mathematics are all of them analytic, we may safely adopt it as the only satisfactory explanation of their *a priori* necessity. And in adopting it we vindicate the empiricist claim that there can be no *a priori* knowledge of reality. For we show that the truths of pure reason, the propositions which we know to be valid independently of all experience, are so only in virtue of their lack of factual content. To say that a proposition is true *a priori* is to say that it is a tautology. And tautologies, though they may serve to guide us in our empirical search for knowledge, do not in themselves contain any information about any matter of fact.

Question 6

(a) With close reference to the extract above:

	(i)	how does Ayer characterise the truths of logic and mathematics?	(2 marks)
	(ii)	briefly explain how Ayer seeks to support empiricism;	(6 marks)
	(iii)	suggest and briefly develop a criticism of Ayer's treatment of a priori pr	opositions. (6 marks)
(b)	Outl	ine Ayer's distinction between explicit definitions and definitions in use.	(11 marks)

(c) Assess whether Ayer's verification principle achieves its purpose. (25 marks)

END OF QUESTIONS

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