AQA

ASSESSMENT and
QUALIFICATIONS
ALLIANCE

General Certificate of Education

Philosophy 5171/6171

PLY5 Texts

Mark Scheme

2006 examination –June series

Mark schemes are prepared by the Principal Examiner and considered, together with the relevant questions, by a panel of subject teachers. This mark scheme includes any amendments made at the standardisation meeting attended by all examiners and is the scheme which was used by them in this examination. The standardisation meeting ensures that the mark scheme covers the candidates' responses to questions and that every examiner understands and applies it in the same correct way. As preparation for the standardisation meeting each examiner analyses a number of candidates' scripts: alternative answers not already covered by the mark scheme are discussed at the meeting and legislated for. If, after this meeting, examiners encounter unusual answers which have not been discussed at the meeting they are required to refer these to the Principal Examiner.

It must be stressed that a mark scheme is a working document, in many cases further developed and expanded on the basis of candidates' reactions to a particular paper. Assumptions about future mark schemes on the basis of one year's document should be avoided; whilst the guiding principles of assessment remain constant, details will change, depending on the content of a particular examination paper.

Levels-of-Response Marking Criteria

Marks should be awarded in accordance with the levels-of-response marking criteria. Question-specific marking notes are provided for reference on the following pages.

Part (a)   **Total: 14 marks**

(i)   2 marks: A full answer in accordance with the mark scheme.

        1 mark: A partial answer.

        0 marks: An incorrect response.

(ii)   4 – 6 marks: The candidate will select and apply relevant aspects of the passage in a directed and coherent manner. There will be few, if any, errors of spelling, grammar and punctuation.

        1 – 3 marks: The candidate will select and apply some relevant aspects in a directed manner. Some points will be omitted and there may be lack of clarity at the lower end. Errors of spelling, grammar and punctuation may be present.

        0 marks: No relevant aspects are selected.

(iii)   4 – 6 marks: The candidate will select relevant material which displays a directed evaluative element. The central requirement of the question will be addressed in a coherent and well-expressed form.

        1 – 3 marks: Some relevant material will be selected but evaluation or criticism may be lacking or misdirected. There may be errors of spelling, grammar and punctuation.

        0 marks: No relevant knowledge will be displayed.

Part (b)   **Total: 11 marks**

Knowledge and understanding of text, showing an awareness of the arguments developed within it. The ability to identify, select and apply ideas and examples employed in the development of the philosopher's position, which involves a capacity to interpret text.

9 – 11 marks: The candidate shows detailed knowledge and understanding of the positions, concepts and argument, displaying an ability to select and apply relevant material in a sustained, coherent and well-structured form.

6 – 8 marks: The candidate displays either a detailed knowledge and understanding of limited aspects of the relevant material or a wide-ranging but non-specific grasp of the material. They will select and apply relevant information, but not draw on it fully, or leave important details out. The answer will be coherent and direct, but could contain passages that are not expressed clearly, or fail to sustain relevance.

3 – 5 marks: The candidate displays either a basic knowledge and general understanding of the material, or a limited grasp of at least one topical idea, selecting some relevant as well as some irrelevant material - but some knowledge will be effectively deployed. The answer will only partially address the question and could contain passages that are expressed very badly. There may be much repetition or assertion.

0 – 2 marks: This response is seriously incoherent or fragmentary, displaying little or no relevant knowledge.

Part (c)   **Total: 25 marks**

The ability to interpret, analyse and evaluate philosophical argument, showing awareness of weaknesses and strengths in the Philosopher's position, and demonstrating the ability to express and defend their own positions, offering reasoned and supported judgements, and appropriate examples. This engages candidates' knowledge and understanding and their ability to select and apply relevant textual information. The candidate's ability to organise her/his response coherently and in good English will also be assessed.

20 – 25 marks: The candidate displays an ability to analyse, interpret and critically assess the issues and relevant evidence, supporting their own judgements with reasoned and considered argument. The response will read as an integrated whole developing in a coherent and fluent way. There will be few, if any, errors of grammar, punctuation and spelling.

15 – 19 marks: The candidate demonstrates an ability to analyse and evaluate some relevant material and to form judgements relevant to the requirements of the question. The arguments and/or supporting material will lack the imagination, insight or penetration characteristic of the top band. There may be occasional errors in spelling, grammar and punctuation.

10 – 14 marks: The candidate will demonstrate a limited appreciation of the key issues. Supporting material may not always be well selected, but the ability to select some relevant material must be present. Lower marks may denote responses that are not always well integrated. Attempted evaluation must be present but will tend to lack penetration and/or depth. Some errors in spelling, grammar and punctuation may be present.

5 – 9 marks: The candidate displays an ability to analyse and interpret a limited range of relevant material. Reasoned criticism will tend to be replaced by the assertion of positions. The question may be read as one-dimensional. There may be errors of reasoning and understanding. There may also be errors of spelling, grammar and punctuation.

0 – 4 marks: The candidate demonstrates little or no ability to interpret, analyse or evaluate relevant material. Responses are likely to be incoherent in relation to the requirements of the question. They may be fragmentary. Errors in spelling, grammar and punctuation may be intrusive.

1   *Text: Aristotle's 'Nicomachean Ethics'*   **Total for this question: 50 marks**

NB   The following marking notes are not prescriptive and do not constitute 'model answers'; they are intended as an 'aide-memoire' for Examiners. Marks should be awarded in accordance with the levels-of-response marking criteria.

(a)   (i)   what does Aristotle regard as an unreasonable supposition?   *(2 marks)*

That a man who acts unjustly (or licentiously) does not wish to be unjust.   **2 marks**

(ii)   briefly describe how Aristotle tries to show that an unjust man is responsible for his actions;   *(6 marks)*

A person who is not ignorant and who acts in an unjust way is voluntarily unjust. Even in cases where he cannot stop being unjust, he remains responsible. He took the initial step and the origin of the action is in himself. Analogies of sickness and stone.   **6 marks**

(iii)   suggest and briefly develop a criticism of Aristotle's account of moral responsibility.   *(6 marks)*

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(1)   Plato inspired criticism: it is impossible to know what is good and yet do wrong. All wrong doing is through ignorance.

(2)   There might be some discussion of the concept of 'choice'. If this can no longer be exercised, should we speak of responsibility? Or, would 'choice' retain moral importance?

(3)   The doctrine is too severe. The initiating unjust action might be too remote from the behaviour in question.
        Or if an agent is prevented from a certain course of action, then it is not reasonable to blame them. The key point is the prevention rather than what might be a remote cause of that prevention.

(4)   Candidates might discuss Aristotle's notion of weakness of the will and its coherence, eg what it is to know something at the back of one's mind.

(5)   Do the analogies with sickness or the falling stone fit well with a man acting unjustly? They may serve to emphasise the impossibility of alternatives and thus call into question the appropriateness of responsibility claims.

(6)   Could the consequences of an unjust act in terms of the agent's character have been foreseen by the agent?
          6 marks

> (b) Outline the meaning and importance of Aristotle's concept of 'contemplation'.
>
> *(11 marks)*

Contemplation involves the exercise of our highest faculty, the intellect. This is man's distinguishing feature. Contemplation is theoretical reasoning, the contemplation of eternal truths. A life of contemplation will be the happiest. It resembles divine activity and thus it is through contemplation that we can become more like God (we may also be rewarded for this). We are more capable of continuous contemplation than any practical activity. The objects of contemplation are of the highest sort. Contemplation is mainly self-sufficient and it is an end in itself.

11 marks

> (c) Assess the role of habit in Aristotle's account of virtue. *(25 marks)*

Aristotle distinguishes between intellectual and moral virtue. The first is acquired through being taught and the second through habit. Moral virtue is not acquired through nature; it is only the capacity for such virtue that is provided by nature. Virtues are developed or cultivated though habit. We become virtuous through performing virtuous acts. This is how we develop a good character – good habits. Reference might be made to Aristotle's use of analogy, temperance/physical strength.

Virtuous acts must not be a matter of chance. They must proceed from knowledge within the agent (grammarian analogy). There are two further conditions for virtuous acts:

(i) the acts must be chosen for their own sake;
(ii) the acts must proceed from a firm and unchangeable character.

These conditions distinguish virtue from arts and crafts. Virtuous acts must be done in the right way.

Critical Points

1. Aristotle provides a good training method for developing a virtuous character. Analogies can be drawn with practising in other areas of human activity. It might, however, be argued that what is distinctive about morality puts considerable strain on such analogies.

2. Aristotle's account implies that being virtuous involves more than the acquisition of good habits. To claim that this was just a matter of habit would alter the concept of habit beyond recognition. It may well be the case that when we have become virtuous, we perform virtuous acts automatically (flowing naturally from our character). However, the preconditions of such habitual actions are not themselves just a matter of acquiring good habits.

3. If moral virtue is just a matter of acquiring habits, then what is the role, if any, of reason and justification in the procedure?

4. Is Aristotle's account circular? In distinguishing virtues from eg crafts, Aristotle appeals to the concept of a firm and unchangeable character. We are, however, also told that character is formed by habit.

5. Can moral dilemmas be resolved or even properly understood through an appeal to the acquisition of good or better habits?

6. The above point might be expanded into a discussion of whether what we understand by 'morality' can be adequately captured by an appeal to the concept of a (good) habit?

7. Is the appeal to habit more appropriate for an account of good manners? Candidates may discuss whether Aristotle's conditions provide an adequate distinguishing feature.

8. Aristotle holds that exercising moral virtue is pleasurable. However, given that habitual behaviour is an automatic process, we may ask what kind of pleasure **could** be involved in this.

9. There is too much emphasis on the way acts are performed at the expense of what they involve or their consequences, or their motivation.

25 marks
[Maximum for question: 50 marks]

2 *Text: Hume's 'An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding'*

Total for this question: 50 marks

NB The following marking notes are not prescriptive and do not constitute 'model answers'; they are intended as an 'aide-memoire' for Examiners. Marks should be awarded in accordance with the levels-of-response marking criteria.

(a) (i) how is every idea said to be formed? *(2 marks)*

Copied from some preceding impression or sentiment. **2 marks**

(ii) briefly explain why Hume thinks repetition is so important; *(6 marks)*

In single instances of a phenomenon we do not get any idea of causal power. This applies equally to bodies and minds. When there are many instances we begin to feel a new impression or sentiment. The sole difference lies in the 'many'. Therefore this must be the ultimate source of the new impression of necessity or power. **6 marks**

(iii) suggest and briefly develop a criticism of Hume's account of how we acquire the concept of cause. *(6 marks)*

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(1) Repetition is not itself an impression. It could be argued that this is inconsistent with Hume's epistemology.

(2) The circularity problem, Hume is giving a causal account of how we acquire the concept of 'cause'. Or, Hume's concept of 'sentiment' needs further unpacking.

(3) Repetition is not sufficient for the idea; counter-examples, accidental conjunctions, might be given.

(4) Repetition is not necessary for the idea; causal connections might be made after single observations.

(5) How well does the account fit with Hume's remarks on secret causes?

6 marks

(b)   Outline Hume's distinction between belief and imagination.   *(11 marks)*

The imagination is free to form fictitious ideas – it re-arranges past impressions in various ways. It is not completely free as we imagine in a similar way to that in which we see things, eg dragons/lizards. The difference between belief and imagined fictions lies in some sentiment or feeling which is attached to the belief but not the fiction. The attachment is purely natural. We **feel** differently about belief than we do about the imagination and this feeling is due to custom. Belief is the name of this more vivid, firm and steady conception of an object. It arises naturally through constant conjunction. It is not a matter of the will attaching an idea to one and not the other, as that would enable us to believe anything.

11 marks

(c)   Assess Hume's case for saying there is no real conflict between liberty and necessity.
(25 marks)

Hume believes that longstanding philosophical disputes may be resolved by the clarification of the key terms. In the free will dispute the terms in question are liberty and necessity. Necessity is analysed in terms of regularity, constant conjunction. The same regularity is present in the operation of bodies and the voluntary acts of men. We just feel differently about the latter. This feeling, however, carries no implication for there being any real difference.

Liberty is seen as a power of acting or not acting according to the determinations of the will. Free actions are not subject to constraint. Freedom is distinguished from randomness. An action can be free (not subject to constraint) and necessary (regular) therefore they are compatible.

Critical Points

1. Hume's analysis of a free action is inadequate. He seems to be saying that no other action would have been possible in given circumstances unless there was a change in those circumstances. This conflicts with the libertarian claim that the agent could have acted differently. Kant's 'ought implies can' might also be discussed.

2. Hume's account of necessity in terms of regularity might be questioned. If there are deficiencies/ counter-examples, then it is inadequate as an account of what we mean by 'necessary'.

3. Hume's account of liberty can also be questioned. The absence of felt constraint is not sufficient for describing an act as free, eg certain drug induced states, hypnotic trances. If we drop the reference to 'felt', then we face the problem of how we know when unfelt constraints are operating.

4. A distinction needs to be made between reasons and causes, a rational framework as opposed to a causal network. Even if both result in regularity, it does not follow that 'regularity' is all we mean when we talk in these different terms. This discussion might centre on what Hume says about the operation of contrary causes.

5. If there are no real differences between the operations of bodies and the voluntary acts of men, then can Hume explain **why** we should feel differently about them?

6. The status of the will in Hume's account of liberty might be discussed.

7. Punishment is not just a link in a causal chain. Reference needs to be made to what is deserved. The discussion can be approached from the angle of moral responsibility in general.

8. The claim that all necessary connections are regular does not imply that all regularities are necessary. Human actions might be discussed in this context.

25 marks
[Maximum for question: 50 marks]

3   *Text: Mill's 'On Liberty'*   **Total for this question: 50 marks**

NB   The following marking notes are not prescriptive and do not constitute 'model answers'; they are intended as an 'aide-memoire' for Examiners. Marks should be awarded in accordance with the levels-of-response marking criteria.

(a)   (i)   how is the despotism of custom characterised?   *(2 marks)*

The standing hindrance to human advancement.   **2 marks**
Antagonism to improvement.   **1 mark**

(ii)   briefly describe why Mill thinks the spirit of liberty is so important;   *(6 marks)*

It aims at something better. Although it does not always coincide with the spirit of improvement, but these localised exceptions notwithstanding, it is the only permanent source of improvement. It applies to all individuals. It is opposed to custom/creates history through its opposition to custom.   **6 marks**

(iii)   suggest and briefly develop a criticism of Mill's position on custom.   *(6 marks)*

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(1)   Custom provides stability and this has social utility. It contributes to a cohesive society.

(2)   The above point may be used to suggest a possible conflict between Mill's utilitarianism and his libertarianism, ie a conflict between two absolute principles.

(3)   Customary behaviour has survived because it has stood the test of time. Mill uses a similar argument in regard to moral rules.

(4)   Custom should be condemned for what it might involve, not just because it is a custom.

(5)   Mill is too idealistic. There are people who need the guidance of custom. It provides firm expectations.

(6)   Liberty itself can only be effectively and progressively exercised within a stable framework and custom provides such a framework.

(7)   Can all socio-economic evils be attributed to custom in the way Mill suggests? Credit should be given for counter-examples.

(8)   Does Mill see too close a relation between custom and despotism?

                                                             6 marks

(b)   Outline why Mill thinks there could be dangers within a democracy.   *(11 marks)*

Democratic government appears to enact the will of the people so why should there be any dangers involved? The will of the people may turn out to be the will of the numerically greater or the will of the most politically active. They may seek to suppress minorities. Therefore, in order to protect minority interests, government powers need to be limited. This will help to prevent a 'tyranny of the majority'. Safeguards are also needed to prevent a social tyranny being exercised through current opinion, prejudice and superstition. The majority must be prevented from dictating on moral issues. They may not be right.

11 marks

(c)   Assess whether Mill's Harm Principle achieves its purpose.   *(25 marks)*

There should be a clear statement of the Principle – the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. The agent's own physical or moral good is not a sufficient reason for interference. The purpose is to mark off the area in which the state can legitimately interfere with personal liberty.

Critical Points

1. There may be a difficulty in distinguishing self-regarding acts from other-regarding acts. Donne's claim that no man is an island might be discussed.

2. Defence of Mill in terms of what Mills calls 'social acts'. Will this defence work as society becomes more interdependent? There may be a level of description at which there is always a risk to others. Credit should be given for realistic examples.

3. The problem of what counts as 'harm'. Physical harm is easy to identify in many cases but what about psychological damage? Clearly this has to be distinguished from causing offence. Laws applying to what can and cannot be said about religious beliefs might be discussed here. There is also a difficulty in establishing the causation of psychological damage.

4. Does the harm principle cohere with the connection between morality and law? Incestuous relationships between consenting adults or the generation of certain computer images may not harm anyone else but they are still regarded as legitimate targets for state interference.

5. There are possible clashes between the principle and Mill's utilitarian principles. Credit should be given for intelligent counter-examples which illustrate possible conflicts.

6. Mill's applications of the principle might be discussed. Is Mill consistent with his remarks on slavery? Other applications include drug-taking, gambling, women's rights. Attempted suicide could also be discussed and whether the social circumstances of the attemptee should make a difference.

7. Financial harm incurred in a competitive market requires further consideration.

8. Mill avoids paternalism, allows people moral growth, individuality and responsibility. Mill's appeal to 'maturity of faculties' can be discussed.

25 marks
[Maximum for question: 50 marks]

4 *Text: Nietzsche's 'Beyond Good and Evil'* **Total for this question: 50 marks**

NB The following marking notes are not prescriptive and do not constitute 'model answers'; they are intended as an 'aide-memoire' for Examiners. Marks should be awarded in accordance with the levels-of-response marking criteria.

(a) (i) how does Nietzsche look at all philosophers? *(2 marks)*

With a mixture of distrust and contempt. **2 marks**

(ii) briefly explain why Nietzsche compares philosophers with advocates; *(6 marks)*

They pretend to be virtuous; they would have us believe they were pursuing truth - that this is what they value. They pretend they are using reason to achieve truth. In reality they are using reason to support their prejudices. They label these pre-existing beliefs 'truths' but the whole process is a dishonest charade. **6 marks**

(iii) suggest and briefly develop a criticism of Nietzsche's view of past philosophers.

(6 marks)

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1. Some philosopher(s) might be used as a counter-example; eg sense-data theorists attempting to secure uniqueness of reference.

2. Is it not possible for a philosopher to reach a repugnant conclusion?

3. The account is too motivational and fails to establish the falsity of any philosophical conclusions.

4. The account must apply equally to Nietzsche's own philosophising.

5. The problems of giving a true account that undermines truth.

6 marks

(b) Outline Nietzsche's three stages of morality. *(11 marks)*

The first stage may be called the pre-moral. Here the value of an action was determined by its consequences. The action itself or its origin were of little or no importance. The second stage is marked by an interest in origins rather than consequences. This is the moral period and marks the first attempt at self-knowledge. Origin is traced to intention; it is the intention that now determines the value of an action. The third stage comes with deeper self-knowledge. This is called the extra-moral stage. The value of an action lies in that part of it that is non-intentional. It is what lies beneath the skins of consciousness that matters; that which is hidden. The moral stage is to be overcome by the extra-moral much in the way that astrology is something to be overcome.

11 marks

(c) Assess Nietzsche's description of religious belief as an 'ongoing suicide of reason'. *(25 marks)*

Nietzsche describes religion as an ongoing suicide of reason clearly implying its irrationality. It involves the sacrifice of freedom, pride and spirit. It is described as a neurosis and involves a denial of the world and the will. Superstition and nonsense feature strongly in religion. The lurid descriptions of saintliness might be used. Religion, especially Christianity, is responsible for the reversal of natural values. Religion can be used as a means but is a danger when regarded as an end in itself. It can be used by the new philosophers, the strong, to overcome obstacles.

Critical Points

1. It seems that Nietzsche's perspectivism allows him to make rationality judgements in regard to entire belief systems. The consistency of this approach might well be questioned.

2. Attempts have been made to render religious faith rational, or at least, not irrational. Nietzsche neglects any philosophical critique of such attempts. They are not to be dismissed by merely appealing to the motives of their proponents.

3. Religious belief can provide a unified world picture, give a meaning to one's life, and provide a fundamental reason for why there should be anything at all.

4. If adopting religious belief helps the weak escape Nietzsche's new morality, then as a matter of rational self-interest, they should pursue it.

5. Religion has to be regarded as an end in itself; otherwise the entire situation collapses/it is no longer religion.

6. Nietzsche is primarily concerned with the psychology of religious belief and it is not clear how one moves from this approach to philosophical judgements regarding rationality. Appeals to instincts raise the problem of independent evidence for the instincts.

7. Nietzsche removes religious practices from their appropriate contexts in portraying them as absurd. This move, however, does not show that the context is itself absurd.

8. Any belief system is only irrational/absurd from another viewpoint. Is Nietzsche's viewpoint itself open to rational criticism? This is not to be answered by claiming that all his system requires is to be life-enhancing. This can also be claimed by the religious who reject the new values and there would be nothing else to say.

9. Neo-Wittgensteinian/Winch type criticisms of describing entire belief systems as irrational might be used.

25 marks
[Maximum for question: 50 marks]

5   *Text: Russell's 'The Problems of Philosophy'*   **Total for this question: 50 marks**

NB   The following marking notes are not prescriptive and do not constitute 'model answers'; they are intended as an 'aide-memoire' for Examiners. Marks should be awarded in accordance with the levels-of-response marking criteria.

(a)   (i)   what distinction does Russell make in our apprehension of things?   *(2 marks)*

The act of apprehension and the object apprehended.   **2 marks**

(ii)   briefly explain why Russell thinks that Berkeley's argument can be dismissed;

(6 marks)

Berkeley fails to realise the significance of the distinction between being in the mind (act) and being before the mind (object). He blurs this distinction (use of the term 'idea'). The main feature of mind is to know things outside itself. To deny this unduly limits the mind's power to know. Even if we confuse 'in the mind' with 'before the mind', we shall have to say that what is in the mind in this sense need not be mental.   **6 marks**

(iii)   suggest and briefly develop a criticism of Russell's attack on Berkeley.   *(6 marks)*

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1.   Berkeley does not unduly limit the power of the mind as the objects can be mental but not part of any human mind - they are still outside any human mind.

2.   Related to the above, is it a limitation on our minds to say they are acquainted with the contents of God's mind?

3.   For Russell, the objects of apprehension are sense-data and it could be argued that this thesis will create similar problems, eg are sense-data mental, physical or something else?

4.   Berkeley's thesis avoids the problem of connecting the ideas to something we know not what.

5.   To be fair to Berkeley, Russell should have discussed Berkeley's rejection of Locke's material substance along with his claim to be a more consistent empiricist.

6 marks

(b)   Outline Russell's account of what Philosophy can and cannot achieve.   *(11 marks)*

Philosophy cannot answer questions concerning the ultimate nature of things (criticism of Hegel). *A priori* reasoning cannot be used to determine what must exist. Whether we are in the realm of ideas or things the same applies. Discoveries are made through a piecemeal investigation of the world, not through the exercise of pure reason. The positive aspect of Philosophy (logic) is that it can free us from mental prejudices, eg Zeno's paradox/infinite sets. It reduces the risk of error and can be constructive in the analysis of the suppositions of science and common sense.

11 marks

(c)   Assess Russell's case for believing in an external world.   *(25 marks)*

There should be some discussion of the sense-data theory - Russell's table, the dead star argument. This is held to establish that what we are directly aware of are sense-data not physical objects. The existence of the external world is seen as a hypothesis that most economically and systematically explains the occurrence of the sense-data.

The sense-data represent objects in the world much like the items in a catalogue represent the objects themselves.

Critical Points

1. Russell treats the external world's existence as a kind of scientific question, but the possibility of science presupposes the world.

2. Similar to the above, the existence of the world is treated as a hypothesis, but this cannot be a 'hypothesis' in the scientific sense of that term. There are hypotheses within the world, but not that there is a world.

3. The hypothetical status of the world implies that we can never know that there is an external world. The use of the concept of 'knowledge' might be explored in relation to this issue.

4. The above point might be discussed in relation to the sense-data theory, ie if all we can be aware of (directly) are sense-data, then we can never know that they are caused by physical objects - or even that they are caused!

5. If all we are aware of are representations, then we would not have the concept of a representation. This point might be made in regard to Russell's catalogue analogy.

6. Russell fails to establish the claim that what we are aware of are sense-data. For example, the argument from phenomenal variability reifies appearances or the dead star argument requires a premise referring to physical objects.

7. The alleged correspondence between private and public space could only be known by a being outside them.

8. There might be a discussion of Russell's claim that it is false to say that we cannot know that there are things we do not know. This might be false but there is a problem for a sense-data theorist to say how we could ever know this.

25 marks
[Maximum for question: 50 marks]

6   *Text: Ayer's 'Language, Truth and Logic'*   **Total for this question: 50 marks**

NB   The following marking notes are not prescriptive and do not constitute 'model answers'; they are intended as an 'aide-memoire' for Examiners. Marks should be awarded in accordance with the levels-of-response marking criteria.

(a)   (i)   how does Ayer characterise the truths of logic and mathematics?   *(2 marks)*

They are all analytic…or tautologies   **2 marks**
a priori   **1 mark**

(ii)   briefly explain how Ayer seeks to support empiricism;   *(6 marks)*

There is no paradox involved in regarding logic and mathematics as merely unfolding definitions. This is how to explain their necessity. There is no *a priori* knowledge regarding matters of fact. Truths of reason are devoid of factual content. *A priori* propositions are tautologies which may assist the search for knowledge of the world but do not themselves constitute such knowledge.
          6 marks

(iii)   suggest and briefly develop a criticism of Ayer's treatment of *a priori* propositions.
          (6 marks)

1.   Candidates may select a rationalist philosopher as a counter-example and offer a reason for supposing that *a priori* reasoning has provided genuine knowledge, eg Descartes/cogito.

2.   Mathematics is *a priori* **and** provides knowledge about the world. Geometry might be used as a possible counter-example.

3.   Ayer owes us an explanation of how tautologies can assist in the search for empirical knowledge.

4.   Is it correct to claim that there are no necessary truths regarding matters of fact? *Could* we have had different parents?

5.   There might be some reference to the invention/discovery debate regarding the nature of mathematics.

6.   What status would Ayer afford to an unproven mathematical supposition and how convincing would that be? Alternatively, a particular proof might be selected to emphasise the sense of discovery/detract from conventionalism, eg Wiles' proof of Fermat's last theorem. The state of our *knowledge* prevented a proof in Fermat's time.
          6 marks

(b)   Outline Ayer's distinction between explicit definitions and definitions in use.

(11 marks)

Ayer's distinction is tied up with his conception of Philosophy as an analytic discipline. Philosophical problems are seen as demands for definitions.

Explicit definitions are the concern of the lexicographer. A symbol/symbolic expression can be replaced with a synonym. The different sentences will be equivalent in terms of their entailment properties. An example should be given, puppy/young dog, etc.

Definitions in use do not involve synonymous replacement symbols. A symbol in a sentence is replaced by a symbol which is different and not a synonym for that symbol. The resultant sentences will be equivalent. Examples might include Russell's theory of descriptions or Ayer's logical constructions.

11 marks

(c)   Assess whether Ayer's verification principle achieves its purpose.   *(25 marks)*

There should be a statement of the verification principle: a non-analytic proposition is meaningful if and only if there is some sense-experience relevant to determining its truth or falsity. It must be possible in principle, if not in practice, to verify it. The purpose is to mark off the area of meaningful discourse, to distinguish sense from nonsense. Metaphysical and religious statements are rejected as meaningless. Ethical statements express feelings and arouse actions in others. Dismissal of conclusive verification.

Critical Points

1.   The verification principle is neither analytic nor empirically verifiable and thus fails within its own terms/self-defeating.

2.   Attempts to regard the principle as analytic face various problems, eg it is not self-contradictory to deny it, it makes sense to look for possible counter-examples, or the meanings of the words do not in themselves guarantee its truth.

3.   Meaning is determined by how language is used/different reactions. It is not something laid down in advance.

4.   The verification principle works as a theory of factual meaning, but it does not follow that factual meaning is the only kind of meaning.

5.   It fails as an account of factual meaning, eg hypothesis of the dancing toys.

6.   The application of the principle produces an inadequate account of religious/aesthetic or ethical propositions. Any of these or a mixture may be used as a focus for the discussion.

7.   Ayer's examples of metaphysical 'nonsense' are removed from their appropriate contexts.

8.   Ayer fails to do justice to what Wittgenstein called 'deep nonsense'. There are differences between, eg religious/ethical/the mystical and nonsense poetry.

9.   There are problems with the verification of statements about the distant past.

10.   The philosophically correct/neutral approach is to regard certain areas of discourse as constituting counter-examples to verificationism.

11.   Some kind of verification/sense-experience may be relevant to religious propositions, eg eschatological verification or the theist's recognition that the problem of evil is a problem.

12.   Berlin's claim that the principle allows in nonsense. Given any statement 'P', and an observation statement 'Q', 'Q' follows from 'P' and 'If P then Q' without following from 'If P then Q' alone. This will work regardless of what we put in for 'P'.

25 marks
[Maximum for question: 50 marks]