



ASSESSMENT and
QUALIFICATIONS
ALLIANCE

Mark scheme

June 2003

GCE

Philosophy

Unit PLY5

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AS PHILOSOPHY UNIT 5

*Candidates must answer **one** question.*

Marks should be awarded in accordance with these levels-of-response marking criteria. Question-specific marking notes are provided for reference on the following pages.

Levels-of-Response Marking Criteria**Part (a)****Total: 14 marks**

- (i)** 2 marks: A full answer in accordance with the mark scheme.
- 1 mark: A partial answer.
- 0 marks: An incorrect response.
- (ii)** 4-6 marks: The candidate will select and apply relevant aspects of the passage in a directed and coherent manner. There will be few, if any, errors of spelling, grammar and punctuation.
- 1-3 marks: The candidate will select and apply some relevant aspects in a directed manner. Some points will be omitted and there may be lack of clarity at the lower end. Errors of spelling, grammar and punctuation may be present.
- 0 marks: No relevant aspects are selected.
- (iii)** 4-6 marks: The candidate will select relevant material which displays a directed evaluative element. The central requirement of the question will be addressed in a coherent and well-expressed form.
- 1-3 marks: Some relevant material will be selected but evaluation or criticism may be lacking or misdirected. There may be errors of spelling, grammar and punctuation.
- 0 marks: No relevant knowledge will be displayed.

Part (b)**Total: 11 marks**

Knowledge and understanding of text, showing an awareness of the arguments developed within it. The ability to identify, select and apply ideas and examples employed in the development of the philosopher's position, which involves a capacity to interpret text.

- 9-11 marks: The candidate shows detailed knowledge and understanding of the positions, concepts and argument, displaying an ability to select and apply relevant material in a sustained, coherent and well-structured form.
- 6-8 marks: The candidate displays either a detailed knowledge and understanding of limited aspects of the relevant material or a wide-ranging but non-specific grasp of the material. They will select and apply relevant information, but not draw on it fully, or leave important details out. The answer will be coherent and direct, but could contain passages that are not expressed clearly, or fail to sustain relevance.
- 3-5 marks: The candidate displays either a basic knowledge and general understanding of the material, or a limited grasp of at least one topical idea, selecting some relevant as well as some irrelevant material - but some knowledge will be effectively deployed. The answer will only partially address the question and could contain passages that are expressed very badly. There may be much repetition or assertion.
- 0-2 marks: This response is seriously incoherent or fragmentary, displaying little or no relevant knowledge.

Part (c)**Total: 25 marks**

The ability to interpret, analyse and evaluate philosophical argument, showing awareness of weaknesses and strengths in the Philosopher's position, and demonstrating the ability to express and defend their own positions, offering reasoned and supported judgements, and appropriate examples. This engages candidates' knowledge and understanding and their ability to select and apply relevant textual information. The candidate's ability to organise her/his response coherently and in good English will also be assessed.

- 20-25 marks: The candidate displays an ability to analyse, interpret and critically assess the issues and relevant evidence, supporting their own judgements with reasoned and considered argument. The response will read as an integrated whole developing in a coherent and fluent way. There will be few, if any, errors of grammar, punctuation and spelling.
- 15-19 marks: The candidate demonstrates an ability to analyse and evaluate some relevant material and to form judgements relevant to the requirements of the question. The arguments and/or supporting material will lack the imagination, insight or penetration characteristic of the top band. There may be occasional errors in spelling, grammar and punctuation.
- 10-14 marks: The candidate will demonstrate a limited appreciation of the key issues. Supporting material may not always be well selected, but the ability to select some relevant material must be present. Lower marks may denote responses that are not always well integrated. Evaluation must be present but will tend to lack penetration and/or depth. Some errors in spelling, grammar and punctuation may be present.
- 5-9 marks: The candidate displays an ability to analyse and interpret a limited range of relevant material. Reasoned criticism will tend to be replaced by the assertion of positions. The question may be read as one-dimensional. There may be errors of reasoning and understanding. There may also be errors of spelling, grammar and punctuation.
- 0-4 marks: The candidate demonstrates little or no ability to interpret, analyse or evaluate relevant material. Responses are likely to be incoherent in relation to the requirements of the question. They may be fragmentary. Errors in spelling, grammar and punctuation may be intrusive.

Candidates must answer one question.

1. Text: Aristotle's "Nicomachean Ethics"

Total for this question: 50 marks

N.B. The following marking notes are not prescriptive and do not constitute 'model answers'; they are intended as an 'aide-memoire' for Examiners. Marks should be awarded in accordance with the levels-of-response marking criteria.

(a) (i) That pleasure is the (supreme) good. (2 marks)

(ii) Any **three** of the following:

(1) That all things aim at pleasure suggests it is the main good for each of the things in question.

(2) The opposition argument – pain is universally avoided, therefore its contrary would be pursued.

(3) It is chosen for itself, not for the sake of something else.

(4) The additions argument – when pleasure is added to a good, it becomes more worthy of choice.

(5) Ad hominem argument. (6 marks)

(iii) Any of the following might be used:

(1) At most the argument shows pleasure to be *a* good choice, not *the* good. *Any* good becomes more worthy of choice when another good is added to it – better to have two goods than one. This is closely related to:

(2) Plato's mixtures argument: a mixture (pleasant life + wisdom) is better than the individual good, if the mixture is better, then pleasure cannot be *the* good as it would not be possible to have something better than the good.

(3) If pleasure is the sole good, then how would it be possible to distinguish good/bad pleasures? A brief summary of Aristotle's distinction might be used as a counter-example.

(4) Reference might be made to arguments rejected by Aristotle which attempt to show that pleasure is not a good and, *a fortiori*, not *the* good. (eg indeterminacy/movement/replenishment arguments).

(5) Argument fails to establish that there is *one* thing that everything aims at. Reference might be made to Aristotle's point regarding different activities having *different* accompanying pleasures – do not directly aim at pleasure.

(6) It is unclear whether the claim is empirical or conceptual. (6 marks)

(b) (1) The many varied uses of 'good' make it implausible to claim there is one form in which they all participate. Dissimilarities are too marked to justify the notion of a universal good.

(2) Fields of study argument – many fields of study corresponding to diverse goods, not one field of study for all those things called good.

- (3) As far as goodness is concerned, there is no difference between 'Goodness itself' and particular things which are good. Eternal existence will not make the thing itself (Form) any more good than the particular goods, cf Aristotle's example of whiteness.
- (4) Even if it is claimed that it is only those things good in themselves (honour, justice, wisdom, etc) that participate in a common Form, we still find diverse accounts of what their goodness consists in.
- (5) Even if there is one Good, it is not attainable by man. For this reason, it cannot constitute the end/goal of political science.
- (6) Not only is it unattainable, it would be of little use even as a kind of guide. Aristotle casts doubt on the utility of knowledge of the universal and stresses the utility of knowledge of particulars by analogy with other subjects
- (7) Any relevant/directed criticism of the theory of Forms to be found in Aristotle, but this must be related by argument/analogy/transfer to the rejection of the Form of the Good.
- (8) The Categories argument (substance and relation). *(11 marks)*

- (c) There are a number of points that could be made in regard to what Aristotle meant by human goodness. Candidates may concentrate on one or more of the following:

A good man will exercise that aspect of him that is distinctly human (reason) to its highest degree. By human goodness is meant goodness of soul. The good person is the virtuous person – actions are performed in accordance with virtue, they are governed by virtue and proceed from a settled disposition. Virtuous actions are not performed by accident.

Virtue is a mean between excess and deficiency. The mean is determined by judgement, experience and insight. The 'good' person will thus have what we call intellectual virtues as well as moral ones.

A good person will not be weak-willed. He will not be well-intentioned but poorly educated. Lack of early training in virtuous conduct makes it very difficult to acquire virtue later.

Virtues are fixed dispositions which are the likeliest to lead to a successful Athenian life – materially, socially, politically and personally. They enable citizens to live well. We are born with the capacity to receive such virtues, but their proper cultivation depends on habit. Analogies are made between the practice of arts and crafts and the acquisition of virtue.

Discussion points:

- (1) There is far too much emphasis on 'function'. A 'good' man fulfils this function in the highest degree but this need not carry any implications regarding moral goodness. It is also possible to carry out the rationality function well and be a moral disaster. The function argument thus fails to establish that such a person would be a good person. It can also be argued that it is wrong to regard 'man' as such as having a function.

- (2) The emphasis on habit does not adequately capture what we mean by moral goodness. It might be argued that Aristotle's good person has mastered a technique but this is not what we mean by a 'good' person. The circularity problem can be discussed.
- (3) There might be some exploration of the possible relativistic interpretations of the Doctrine of the Mean. Do we praise/blame people for what they do *or* for what they do relative to themselves? It can also be argued that the Mean is an inadequate account of moral virtue.
- (4) There is a lack of emphasis on social aspects – our duties/obligations towards others. Aristotle's good person would be too egotistical for our moral tradition.
- (5) Aristotle's list of virtues, courage, temperance, prudence, magnanimity, are consistent with Christian virtues (and those of some other religions) so his 'good' man would be good by these standards. But see below.
- (6) Christian virtues such as humility or being grateful for little would not be recognised by Aristotle as virtues at all. This casts doubt on how recognisable his good person would be to other moral traditions. Candidates may use their own examples here and there is plenty of scope for doing so.
- (7) Utilitarian-type criticisms might be used. Aristotle neglects the consequences of our actions in moral assessment. Given the prevalence of this kind of ethical theory in the recent past, it might be wondered whether Aristotle's good person would be recognised.
- (8) Success in living has got nothing to do with moral goodness. What is good is good for its own sake, what it involves, not because of something else or some benefit. Could Aristotle accommodate a worldly failure being a good person? (25 marks)

Total for this question: 50 marks**2. Text: Hume's "Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding"**

N.B. The following marking notes are not prescriptive and do not constitute 'model answers'; they are intended as an 'aide-memoire' for Examiners. Marks should be awarded in accordance with the levels-of-response marking criteria.

(a) (i) From the constant conjunction of the events.
 "Habit" = 1 mark. (2 marks)

(ii) Habit is of key importance in the formation of the concept. We do not feel any connection on witnessing one occurrence of the conjunction, we do on witnessing many. There is, however, no difference between the single occurrence and the many other than the number of times. Given that this is the sole difference, it must account for why we have the feeling after many occurrences and not after one. (6 marks)

(iii) Any of the following or equivalent points may be used:

(1) Sometimes we do make a connection after witnessing just one instance of A going with B. Examples from science, especially astronomy, or from common sense might be given.

(2) Not all constant conjunctions give rise to a feeling of necessary connection. Again, examples can be given. These may centre on statistical oddities, accidents on a cosmic scale, or common sense – night/day.

(3) There might be a combination of (1) and (2) to make the point that repetition is neither necessary nor sufficient for asserting/feeling a connection.

(4) It could be argued that his account of the origin of the idea of necessary connection is inconsistent with his radically empiricist epistemology.

(5) Hume undermines the rationality of the scientific enterprise/active role of the mind. (6 marks)

(b) Hume divides knowledge into two kinds: relations of ideas and matters of fact (Hume's Fork). Relations of ideas are logically certain, they are demonstrable by the mind. They are known *a priori*. The negation of such a proposition is inconceivable (self-contradictory). Examples are truths of mathematics and logic. They do not, however, provide us with any knowledge of the world.

Matters of fact are known through experience not reason. Whereas relations of ideas are necessarily true and *a priori*, matters of fact are contingently true and *a posteriori*. The contrary of any matter of fact is conceivable, ie it does not involve a contradiction. Matters of fact can be presented via the internal or external senses, they provide genuine knowledge of the world and are founded on the relation of cause and effect. (11 marks)

(c) Hume is keen to reject any doctrine of innate ideas – this would be incompatible with his empiricist principles. All ideas in the mind must have had preceding sense impressions. The ideas are fainter copies of these impressions. They are causally dependent on the impressions. He thinks this accounts for the fact that where there are deficiencies in a sense organ, there will be no ideas characteristically associated with that organ. He issues a challenge to find an idea (of either internal or external senses) that does not have a corresponding impression.

Discussion Points

- (1) The role of the imagination. Surely we can imagine all kinds of things that we have never experienced. Hume allows for this by arguing that such ideas are complex ideas and their composites are simple ideas for which there have been corresponding sense impressions. Hume's thesis is essentially concerned with simple ideas. Candidates may discuss the adequacy of this account or whether Hume can properly distinguish imagination from memory.
- (2) Having issued a challenge, Hume identifies a counter-example to his central claim – the shades of blue. A number of approaches are possible here: Hume dismisses it too quickly, referring to it as so singular that we need not worry about it. It could be argued that being singular is exactly what any counter-example to a generalisation should be, or is it so singular? It seems to apply to any phenomenon which admits gradations. Or, Hume's thesis can be amended without too much damage to accommodate examples such as this, e.g. his thesis is broadly right but is too particularised.
- (3) His thesis is inconsistent with his account of our idea of necessity. Here he locates the source in repetition rather than in any particular sense-impression. He dismisses any impression of the internal/external senses as a possible source. His account of our acquisition of the idea of liberty may also be discussed.
- (4) Hume's account is too reliant on the copy principle. He underplays the active/organisational powers of the mind. Can we explain our acquisition of general principles on Hume's account – is the imprinting of single/simple impressions sufficient for the job?
- (5) Our experience of the world is not as Hume describes: the fact that experiences can be sub-divided does not imply that we experience in terms of sub-divisibles.
- (6) Are all complex ideas adequately explained in terms of putting together simpler ones? This may work for mermaids and centaurs, but what of God or infinity? This point might be further developed to discuss abstract ideas or universals.
- (7) There might be support for innate knowledge theories. This should concentrate on what are genuine problems, eg depth perception in babies.
- (8) Candidates may argue that Hume is wrong to claim that mathematics does not give us knowledge about the world and his theory of impressions fails to account for such knowledge. *(25 marks)*

3. Text: Mill's "On Liberty"**Total for this question: 50 marks**

N.B. The following marking notes are not prescriptive and do not constitute 'model answers'; they are intended as an 'aide-memoire' for Examiners. Marks should be awarded in accordance with the levels-of-response marking criteria.

- (a) (i)** In following the initiative of some individual in wise or noble things *or* internalising wise and noble things. (2 marks)
- (ii)** It is needed as a counter to the dominant mass opinion of the time. The social tendency is for such *average* opinion to dominate. It is vitally important for those individuals who stand apart from the crowd to assert themselves. Examples of non-conformity are needed against the 'tyranny' of public opinion. Individual eccentricity is a sign of mental vigour/courage. It should be pursued for its own sake. (6 marks)
- (iii)** There are a number of possible approaches:
- (1) Eccentricity could be a sign of mental weakness rather than strength. Examples might be used to question whether being different equates with being strong.
 - (2) It could be argued that on a wider level societies that have become highly individualistic have lost moral cohesion. Historical examples could be used to show that such societies have become weak, decadent or prone to attack.
 - (3) Mill is taking an extreme line in saying that in the past eccentric behaviour needed to be better, but now eccentricity *itself* is worthwhile. Condoning eccentricity regardless of its consequences is hard to reconcile with utilitarian principles. It is also difficult to imagine using eccentricity *itself* as a justification for an action.
 - (4) Mill's claim might seem quite harmless if we regard eccentricity as merely quaint – but is all eccentric behaviour like this? Where do we draw the line and who draws the line?
 - (5) Logically, we cannot all be eccentric. It seems that eccentricity must derive its value from a general conformity and that it cannot be an option for all. (6 marks)
- (b)**
- (1) Freedom of conscience – a liberty of thought and discussion on all issues. Such freedom includes that of expression and publication of those opinions.
 - (2) Liberty of tastes/pursuits/actions. We should be able to develop our lives in ways that fit our character – provided we do not harm others.
 - (3) Freedom of association – we should be free to unite for any purpose as long as the participants are mature, uncoerced and do not harm others.

The importance of the above three for Mill is that they constitute the hallmark of a truly free society. (11 marks)

- (c) There should be a clear statement of Mill's limiting principle: the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. The state has no right to interfere in matters affecting only the individual. He is sovereign over his own mind and body. For Mill, this is the only way for the individual to grow. Those not of mature faculties and barbarians are excluded from the principle.

Discussion Points

- (1) There can be a problem in distinguishing self-regarding and other-regarding actions. This could be compared with Donne's claim that no man is an island. Examples might also be used to illustrate this difficulty. Mill does address this issue with his reference to 'social acts'. If there is a risk of harm to others, then this will remove the act from the sphere of pure individuality. It is not clear how helpful this is when we are considering a highly inter-dependent society. There might be some level of description at which there is always a risk. Credit should be given for realistic and problematic examples.
- (2) There are difficulties in understanding what exactly is meant by 'harm'. Mill is clear that offence does not constitute harm and neither do financial catastrophes brought about by the operations of fair competition. Again, this might be questioned in an inter-dependent economic society. Offence does not constitute mental harm, but what does? If Mill means psychological damage, then the causation is notoriously difficult to establish. Recent court cases might be appealed to here. The maturity of faculties response might also be discussed here.
- (3) Some abhorrent practices are abhorrent for what they involve rather than because of any harm accruing to others. Voluntary incestuous relationships or the generating of pornographic materials on computers *need* not involve others. If the harm principle excludes interference here, are we creating too wide a gulf between morality and the law?
- (4) Is Mill consistent in the application of his principle to the case of voluntary slavery? Mill thought there would be something paradoxical in using one's freedom to relinquish one's freedom. This is part of a deeper problem with liberalism – should liberty be used to deny liberty? Freedom of speech to certain racist groups might be discussed here. Does the Harm principle really solve this problem?
- (5) Appeals to the utility principle might solve some of these problems. However, we would now have two absolute principles which could conflict.
- (6) Other applications of Mill's principle might be discussed – drug-taking, gambling, women's rights, intervention in attempted suicide, etc. These should be discussed in terms of consistency, implications and consequences.
- (7) How damaging to Mill are the existence of borderline cases? It could be argued that the use of *any* concept involves borderline issues, but this does not imply that the concept is inherently flawed. However, it should also be noted that Mill's principle is intended to be a principle of demarcation and if it fails here, then it is a failure.

- (8) There could be some discussion of Mill's exemptions from the principle. Issues here could involve the difficulty in identifying barbarian nations. Maturity of faculties may also admit of some ambiguity. Mill seems to be referring specifically to children and idiots.
- (9) Does 'harm to others' cover such things as setting a bad example, seduction, undermining traditional values? Perhaps Mill owes us a more detailed discussion of these and similar examples. *(25 marks)*

4. Text: Nietzsche's "Beyond Good and Evil"

Total for this question: 50 marks

N.B. The following marking notes are not prescriptive and do not constitute 'model answers'; they are intended as an 'aide-memoire' for Examiners. Marks should be awarded in accordance with the levels-of-response marking criteria.

- (a) (i) With heredity and the innate. (2 marks)
- (ii) It is essentially instinctive. The instincts are the ultimate determinants and these are physiological in character. They are said to control even the autonomy of logic. The most that can be said for philosophical pronouncements is that they have a regulatory function in regard to our preservation. Ultimately, it is what lies behind them that is important. (6 marks)
- (iii) (1) Nietzsche fails to provide independent evidence for the existence of such instincts, let alone for the causal influence which they are said to exert.
- (2) It is not clear what kind of a theory this is intended to be. If it is empirical – and it seems it must be – then is Nietzsche prepared to specify any pronouncements which would be incompatible with it? It is also difficult to see what kind of evidence there *could* be for it.
- (3) Nietzsche is undermining the traditional philosophical goal of neutrality, but if he is to be taken seriously as a philosopher, then he ought to aspire towards such a goal. Failure to do so could lead to charges of special pleading or espousing a *different* set of prejudices.
- (4) Candidates might draw on examples from the history of the subject and argue that they do not fit in at all well with Nietzsche's account.
- (5) There is a distinction between the motives behind a claim and the truth of the claim. Nietzsche is conflating the two. Indicating the function of a claim is not *in itself* sufficient for dismissing it.
- (6) How plausible is Nietzsche's account when applied to formal logic or conceptual analysis? Presumably, he is calling into question the objective goal of truth – but what implication would this have for his own theorising? (6 marks)
- (b) With the coming of Frederick the Great, a new kind of scepticism emerged. This is a German (manly) scepticism which is disdainful, undermining, it withholds belief; it provides freedom of spirit while keeping the heart in line. (It brought Europe under the dominion of the German spirit.)

The critics are the experimenters. Their chief role is to subdue the past; ie to codify, tame it, present it as intelligibly as possible. They present a history of morals – this is how things were. The new philosophers *might* be sceptics but this is not essential to them. Similarly, philosophers are not just critics – they may push experimentation beyond the acceptable but will not be disillusioned with ideals of truth, etc. For them the will to truth *is* the will to power. The new philosopher says what is to be (commands), not just what has been. Scepticism/criticism may be stages a philosopher passes through, but not the ultimate terminus. They are essentially his tools. (11 marks)

- (c) There are many references throughout the text which could be used to answer this question. It will be sufficient for candidates to concentrate on three or four of these points for their critical discussion.

[Nietzsche is essentially concerned with the psychology of religion.]

Nietzsche speaks disparagingly of religion. It is the ongoing suicide of reason, it involves the sacrifice of freedom, of pride, spiritual self-confidence; subjugation and self-derision. Religion is described as a neurosis (solitude, fasting, sexual abstinence). It involves a denial of the world and the will. It has given rise to a wealth of superstition and nonsense - but still fascinates people. There are negative descriptions/comparisons regarding the passion for God. Although there is little sympathy for sainthood, the saint does have a positive aspect – those who bow down before the saint are aware of a superior force behind the pathetic appearance, such self-denial must have *something* behind it, namely, the will to power.

The religious instinct is no longer satisfied with theism. Reference might be made to the ladder of sacrifice. In 359 there is a clear implication of the falsity of religion. Religious belief is attributed to instinctual fear – the will to untruth at any price, the most persistent of all falsehoods. To love mankind for the sake of God is seen as the most beautiful error – we cannot do it without some sanctifying, ulterior motive. The new philosopher can use religion – for the strong it is a means of overcoming obstacles, it can help them to rule, forge bonds between rulers and ruled. They give the rulers their secrets. It can also create leisure and remoteness for removed rulers. Religion can provide guidance and opportunity to the right classes on their path to leadership. It can provide comfort in terms of illusory beliefs for the ordinary vast majority who must serve and only serve. The problems come when religion is seen as more than a means to the above ends – when it is seen as an ultimate end. As religions are for the suffering, they make a virtue of this. They preserve too much of what ought to perish – hence preventing the development of man (superman). This results in turning evaluation on its head. The ‘noble’ instincts are corrupted, transformed, leading ultimately to world denial. ‘Higher’ becomes inseparable from unworldly and ascetic. Such religions are responsible for the present sickly, mediocre European.

Discussion Points

- (1) To love mankind for the sake of God could be seen as an advantage for the masses inasmuch as it escapes Nietzsche’s new morality.
- (2) Religion is described as a consequence of leisure time; we are also told it can be the creator of leisure time. Nietzsche can defend this point by claiming the latter applies when religion is regarded as a means.
- (3) Although Nietzsche is primarily concerned with the psychology of religion, there are implied and stated points regarding its ultimate falsehood. Is this justifiable from psychological descriptions? There is a lack of rational argument regarding the ultimate truth of religious claims.
- (4) Could one choose to be religious or otherwise through examining advantages and disadvantages? Would this not render the entire matter meaningless?, cf purposive accounts in morality.
- (5) Related to the above, it could be argued that religion has to be regarded as an end in itself rather than a means. To do otherwise collapses the entire situation.

- (6) The criticism of religion as preserving too much depends on transcending morality. It could be argued that this is (a) not desirable, (b) not possible, eg Nietzsche still refers to certain instincts as 'noble'.
- (7) The supposed nobility of these instincts could be questioned. Equally appalling or lurid social descriptions could be generated from periods in which they were given sway. It is not clear that this is any better than mediocrity or that there are not worse evils than mediocrity.
- (8) One of the drawbacks of religion seems to be that it is inherently irrational but must it involve a suicide of reason? There have been attempts to show that faith can be rational and these are not to be dismissed simply by accusing their proponents of having certain motives. This also raises the issue of the evidence for such motives.
- (9) What evidence is there for a religious instinct as such? Similar remarks apply to other instincts. Is the evidence for such instincts the behaviour and does the behaviour throw us back on the instinct?
- (10) Nietzsche ignores a supposed advantage of complex religious systems – they provide believers with explanations of the world, eg a scientist seeing himself as unfolding God's plan.
- (11) There is too much emphasis on the sacrifices made by man while ignoring the Christian belief in the ultimate sacrifice made by God *for* man.
- (12) When religious practices are removed from their appropriate context, they are easily portrayed as absurd. But this *in itself* fails to show that the context is absurd. This kind of move is philosophically naïve – it can be done with just about any practice, eg voting, sport, etc.
- (13) It has been argued that Nietzsche was not concerned with matters of ultimate truth, or ultimate truth itself. However, he does appear to countenance talk of ultimate falsehoods. Is there a logical asymmetry here?
- (14) It is not clear why the saint must be expressing the will to power. It seems there are a whole list of equally plausible candidates for expression – including what the saint thought he was expressing!
(25 marks)

5. Text: Russell's "The Problems of Philosophy"**Total for this question: 50 marks**

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- (a) (i) Anything which is immediately known. (2 marks)
- (ii) In perceiving a physical object, all we immediately know are ideas (sense-data). The physical object's reality simply is the ideas – *esse est percipi*. Its permanence is guaranteed through its being a perception in God's mind. We participate in such perceptions and this is why we see the object similarly. Minds and their ideas constitute reality. Outside of them nothing can be known. (6 marks)
- (iii) There are a number of criticisms that could be used:
- (1) Russell fails to do justice to Berkeley's claim that on his scheme no object of experience is lost.
 - (2) Although Berkeley uses the term 'idea' in the broad sense identified by Russell, it could be argued that he was not guilty of any straightforward conflation arising out of the use of the same word.
 - (3) Russell rightly emphasises the role of God in Berkeley's system, but was wrong to go on to claim that this constituted a limitation on the mind's power to know.
 - (4) Russell's acceptance of the sense–data theory takes him too far down the same road as Berkeley, e.g. Russell's external world has a similar epistemological status as Berkeley's God.
 - (5) Do we prefer the external world to God purely on grounds of theoretical simplicity? Candidates may also question the simplicity claim. If all we are aware of are sense–data, then 'matter' is as remote as Berkeley's God.
- (6) What response would Russell have to phenomenalism? (6 marks)
- (b) Philosophy does not answer questions concerning ultimate reality. He criticises Hegel on this ground. You cannot work out through *a priori* reasoning what must exist. You cannot consider the nature of something and work out from that what must exist – this is the case in the realm of ideas and things. The nature of reality cannot be known through reason. There has to be a piecemeal investigation of the world – this is how discoveries are made. As to what philosophy can achieve – it (logic) can extend the realm of the possible. It can free us from mental prejudices (infinite sets/Zeno's paradox), by careful scrutiny it can reduce the risk of error. Its central role is that of critical thinking in a constructive sense, eg it can analyse the suppositions of science and common sense. (11 marks)
- (c) Russell wants to reject the claim that we cannot know that anything exists which we do not know. This claim would have serious implications for Russell's belief in the existence of the external world. He thinks it only has plausibility because it fails to distinguish between different types of knowledge. Once this distinction has been made apparent, it will be possible to claim that although we cannot know some things in one sense, we can in another and thus it will be false to say that we do not know them.

Knowledge can be of truths or things. Knowledge of things can either be by acquaintance or description. Knowledge by acquaintance is immediate knowledge of, eg sense-data, universals. Knowledge by description is a step removed from direct acquaintance and admits of gradations moving further away from acquaintance. In order to provide knowledge about the world, the description must ultimately be tied to an object of acquaintance. Knowledge by description is supposed to be the way we know physical objects. Knowledge by description enables us to pass beyond the data of our immediate private experience, eg Julius Caesar/Bismarck.

Discussion Points

- (1) Given that ultimately all knowledge rests on acquaintance, we are going to have to know truths of the form, “such and such sense-data are caused by a physical object”. The problem though is how we could ever know truths like this when all we are aware of are sense-data.
- (2) The Emperor of China analogy is not a genuine analogy. It is made to sound so by Russell switching to our ordinary way of talking. However, on Russell’s thesis matter is something which *in principle* cannot be an object of acquaintance.
- (3) In the light of the above, the claim Russell wishes to reject should be recast as – we can never truly judge that something with which we cannot be acquainted exists. Although this might be false, the problem for Russell is to say how he could ever *know* it was.
- (4) There are difficulties in the very idea of knowledge by acquaintance. There is a problem with non-propositional knowledge, namely, is it knowledge at all? There are problems with the idea that language is a barrier to securing uniqueness of reference, or that language somehow detracts from the purity of knowledge. There could be some reference here to Russell’s denotation theory of meaning, logically proper names and the demonstrative pronouns as candidates for the role. (An in-depth discussion of these issues is not expected.)
- (5) Examples might be used to illustrate these points, viz suppose a machine recorded bare stimuli on a punched tape – would we call *this* knowledge?
- (6) There could be a difficulty in setting up the descriptions given the private nature of the objects of acquaintance – how can we know that we are referring to the *same* particulars? As Ayer has pointed out it seems necessary for us to do this in order to communicate about, and agree on, our descriptions.
- (7) Is the setting up of descriptions always a straightforward matter? What are the implications of a generally agreed description turning out to be false? (25 marks)

6. Text: Ayer's "Language, Truth and Logic"

Total for this question: 50 marks

N.B. The following marking notes are not prescriptive and do not constitute 'model answers'; they are intended as an 'aide-memoire' for Examiners. Marks should be awarded in accordance with the levels-of-response marking criteria.

- (a) (i) If the person knows how to verify the proposition in terms of observation. (2 marks)
- (ii) If its truth or falsity is consistent with *any* possible future experience, then the proposition is either a tautology or a pseudo-proposition, ie not a genuine proposition, but masquerading in the form of one. If the sentence is a question, the same test is applied. If no observations are relevant to answering it, then it is not a genuine question. Verifiability is the test *not* grammatical appearance. (6 marks)
- (iii) (1) It fails within its own terms (self-defeating). It cannot be verified empirically and, thus, is meaningless in its own terms.
- (2) It works as a theory of factual meaning but this does not imply that factual meaning is the only meaning, *or* it fails as an exhaustive account of factual meaning, eg hypothesis of the dancing toys, though there is some doubt whether this is a factual hypothesis. Nevertheless, it can be understood – but if Ayer is right then how is this possible?
- (3) Counter-examples might be given to illustrate diversity of meaning. Ideally, this should be coupled with (2) above or with the claim that it is philosophically suspect to impose one kind of meaning on all discourse.
- (4) The above points might be intermixed with Wittgenstein-type points regarding meaning and usage.
- (5) Ayer's concern was to save science, hence the qualifications of the principle. This is not a philosophically neutral approach.
- (6) Even when modified, the principle runs into difficulties with statements about the past or with fundamental statements of sub-atomic physics.
- (7) Berlin's criticism that the principle allows in nonsense. Given any statement, 'P', and an observation statement, 'Q', 'Q' follows from 'P' and 'If P then Q' without following from 'If P then Q' alone. This will work no matter what we put in for 'P'. (6 marks)
- (b) The problem of induction is the problem of how we justify a claim to know that the future will resemble the past. For Ayer, there are two possible ways of deducing such a principle:
- (1) From some purely formal principle – this cannot be done as all you can get from tautologies are more tautologies.
- (2) From an empirical principle – this cannot be done without begging the question. Therefore there is no solution possible, so the problem is a fictitious one. Ayer adopts a pragmatic solution – we should continue to use it as long as it is useful in predicting our future sense-contents. This is not irrational; what would be irrational would be demanding a guarantee that cannot be given. (11 marks)

- (c) Ayer's theory of moral judgements applies *mutatis mutandis* to aesthetic judgements – it is a theory of value judgements in general. It is the analysis of actual value judgement with which Ayer is concerned. He rejects traditional subjectivism and utilitarianism through adapting Moore's open question argument. He rejects intuitionism on the ground that intuitions are not self-validating. It seems that all that is left is emotivism – a radical version of subjectivism. Moral judgements are neither analytic nor synthetic, so, according to the verification principle, they are meaningless. Ayer sees that this will not do in itself, he has to give some account of their use/apparent meaning. They are non-cognitive expressions of feeling. This too is inadequate as it omits their dynamic effect, so Ayer adds that they are calculated to arouse feelings or provoke responses.

Discussion Points

- (1) Aesthetic judgements are not obviously calculated to have the effects Ayer claims. Credit for use of counter-examples.
- (2) How well do expressions of remorse fit Ayer's model?
- (3) Describing value judgements as expressions of feeling fails to distinguish them from factual judgements – 'I am bored'. Adding that they are non-assertoric and provoke others to action does not entirely remove the problem, eg the military command 'Charge'.
- (4) Is there such a radical distinction between the factual and the evaluative? 'It is dainty', 'it is quaint', 'it is cute' are evaluative but also carry *some* descriptive load as they could not be properly applied to just anything.
- (5) There could be an examination of the model of feeling Ayer is working with. John Wisdom's criticism could be used (feelings which do not imply any factual beliefs).
- (6) Ayer accepts that there cannot be disagreement on moral issues. This is unsatisfactory. Not all moral disputes reduce to factual ones and your moral position can determine what counts as a fact. It is also possible to change one's views morally without any change in the facts.
- (7) How emotive is our moral/aesthetic vocabulary? It might be argued that the traditional vocabulary of value judgements is not best suited for arousing actions/feelings.
- (8) Ayer's lack of realistic examples lends specious plausibility to his thesis. Ross has made the point that Ayer uses substitutes for such judgements.
- (9) Candidates may question whether there is only one kind of meaning, factual meaning.
- (10) Ayer contradicts himself – not all disagreements are expressible in the form of a contradiction, all disagreements are factual, but all factual disagreements *are* expressible in the form of a contradiction. Ayer has effectively given the game away.
- (11) If moral/aesthetic judgements' primary function is to express individual feeling, how does he account for a general consensus – especially in the case of moral judgements?
- (12) Surely it is possible to have rational discussion on the merits of a work of art. It is possible to change one's view without a change in the facts. We also defend our views/attempt to justify them and this does not have to reduce to abuse.

- (13) Criticism of the open question argument, eg it excludes the possibility of giving any definitions.
- (14) Even when all the facts of a matter have been agreed, there can be real disagreement on what ought to be done. It is hard to see how this is possible on Ayer's analysis, given that feelings do not contradict each other. *(25 marks)*