

### **General Certificate of Education**

## Philosophy 5171/6171

PLY 4 Themes

# Mark Scheme

### 2006 examination - June series

Mark schemes are prepared by the Principal Examiner and considered, together with the relevant questions, by a panel of subject teachers. This mark scheme includes any amendments made at the standardisation meeting attended by all examiners and is the scheme which was used by them in this examination. The standardisation meeting ensures that the mark scheme covers the candidates' responses to questions and that every examiner understands and applies it in the same correct way. As preparation for the standardisation meeting each examiner analyses a number of candidates' scripts: alternative answers not already covered by the mark scheme are discussed at the meeting and legislated for. If, after this meeting, examiners encounter unusual answers which have not been discussed at the meeting they are required to refer these to the Principal Examiner.

It must be stressed that a mark scheme is a working document, in many cases further developed and expanded on the basis of candidates' reactions to a particular paper. Assumptions about future mark schemes on the basis of one year's document should be avoided; whilst the guiding principles of assessment remain constant, details will change, depending on the content of a particular examination paper.

#### **Theme: Philosophy of Mind**

1	Т	Total for this question: 50 marks	
(a)	Describe and illustrate <b>two</b> problems facing substance dualisr	n. (18 marks)	

#### **Knowledge and Understanding (9 marks)**

Candidates will probably provide a brief exposition of substance dualism as the view that every human being, or every person, has both a mind and a body or is both minded and embodied *and* that these are two substances with different essential natures. However, full marks can be obtained for a detailed and precise account of **two** problems that emerge through substance dualism without further exposition of the view. These are likely to draw from:

- The difficulty of explaining how mental states (causally) interact with physical states.
- The extent to which this leads to a view of mental states as mere epiphenomena.
- The difficulty of knowing other minds while each of us allegedly has privileged access to, and is certain about, our own mental states (thoughts, perceptions, sensations, intentions, etc) we do not have the same grounds for knowing the mental states of others (or if there are any minded others).
- The possibility of solipsism and/or the difficulty of explaining how or why we ascribe mental states to ourselves.
- The difficulty of how we assign different mental states to the same mind and/or of counting minded selves (there are 'x' bodies in the room, but how many minds?)
- The difficulty of seeing mind as a substance or of saying what sort of 'thing' 'a thinking thing' is: the tendency to employ negative descriptors (non-spatial, not extended, etc). The mysteriousness of the mental.
- The difficulties presented by not being able to study the mind (because it is private, unobservable, etc) of not advancing our objective knowledge.

Other relevant problems should also be rewarded.

- 7-9 Demonstrates detailed and precise knowledge and understanding of **two** problems that emerge through substance dualism.
- 4-6 Demonstrates either a range of knowledge, but general and prosaic understanding of **two** problems that emerge through substance dualism, or narrow and detailed but partial knowledge and understanding, eg one problem is developed but a second is omitted, unclear or unconvincing.
- 1-3 Demonstrates some knowledge and limited understanding of a least one problem associated with substance dualism.
- 0 No relevant philosophical knowledge and understanding is demonstrated.

Illustrations, or a single illustration covering two problems, might draw from the difficulties in explaining the link between mind and body (eg parallelism, occasionalism, epiphenomenalism) or the difficulty of explaining the connection between willing and acting; the contrast between the immediacy and certainty of self-knowledge and the less certain inferences made in relation to others; the difficulties of how to identify minds or the same mind through time; the problem of explaining how we could start from our own case; the successes of science, etc.

- 7-9 Selects or constructs a least one relevant example and applies this to provide a clear, detailed and precise illustrative analysis of two problems that emerge through substance dualism. The example(s) provided illuminate the problems identified.
- 4-6 Selects or constructs at least one relevant example to provide a partial explanation of **two** problems that emerge through substance dualism either because detail and precision is lacking or because only one problem is illustrated. Responses in this band may be characterised by detailed explanation and very brief illustration.
- 1-3 Selects and applies at least one relevant point to provide a basic explanation and/or sketchy illustration of at least one problem associated with substance dualism. Answers at the bottom of this band may consist of vague exposition only with no attempt made to illustrate a problem.
- 0 No relevant philosophical points are made.
- (b) Assess the view that consciousness cannot be reduced to the physical.

(32 marks)

#### **Knowledge and Understanding (8 marks)**

The notion of irreducibility could be approached in different ways:

- The irreducibility of consciousness, or of conscious mental states, consists in the intrinsically subjective aspect of mentality: conscious mental states are subjective insofar as they are private and not experienced by and/or accessible to other individuals. The phenomenal aspects of mentality, which resist reduction to physical phenomena, might also be described in terms of transparency or certainty, direct and privileged access, intentionality, qualia, etc.
- An account of dualism stressing the essential nature of consciousness and/or of other theories which have attempted to identify consciousness with/reduce consciousness to some objective feature accessible to others, eg behaviour, brain states, functional states.
- 7-8 Demonstrates detailed and precise knowledge and understanding of arguments and theories relating to the view that consciousness is irreducible.
- 4-6 Demonstrates either a range of knowledge, but general and prosaic understanding of arguments and theories relating to the view that consciousness is irreducible, or narrow and detailed but partial knowledge and understanding of arguments and theories relating to the view that consciousness is irreducible (eg a treatment of qualia only).
- 1-3 Demonstrates basic knowledge and limited understanding of aspects of relevant arguments and theories relating to the view that consciousness is irreducible.
- 0 No relevant philosophical knowledge and understanding is demonstrated.

Some of the following or equivalent points will be raised and discussed:

- A detailed exposition of different theoretical strands within dualism and/or of different dualist or non-reductive accounts of the properties of mental states which allegedly escape reduction, eg a discussion of the phenomenal and/or subjective nature of our experience and 'inner story'; illustrations of how sensations, emotions, moods, imaging, intentions, etc are allegedly, radically private; supervenience.
- This may be linked to the development of other issues in the philosophy of mind, eg the problem of interaction and the causal role of mental states, solipsism and the problem of other minds, what kinds of thing can we ascribe mental states to and on the basis of what? etc. These will be seen as genuine difficulties because consciousness is subjective and irreducible to some objective feature.
- An account of the alleged failures or limitations of various versions of reductive materialism. The treatment of 'mental' phenomena by various materialist approaches might be discussed and dismissed in order to clarify irreducibility as a feature of mentality.
- Alternatively, a discussion of the alleged successes of various versions of reductive materialism might appear in an account denying that consciousness is irreducible.
- Some may raise the view that we should not be trying to reduce something which doesn't exist. Mentality as folk psychology.
- 7-8 Selects or constructs relevant points and examples and applies these to provide a clear, detailed and precise illustrative analysis of arguments and theories related to the view that consciousness is irreducible.
- 4-6 Selects or constructs some relevant points and examples to provide a partial analysis, either narrowly focused (eg on privacy and other minds) or lacking detail and precision, of arguments and theories related to the view that consciousness is irreducible.
- 1-3 Selects and applies some relevant points to provide a basic analysis of at least one aspect of the irreducibility of mental states **or** some relevant points feature in a tangential approach to the question.
- 0 No relevant philosophical points are made.

#### **Interpretation and Evaluation (16 marks)**

Evaluation should be present through the points selected for discussion. Beyond this a number of responses are possible.

- A special first person authority might be accorded to consciousness without claiming that one is always aware of all mental states or that others are never able to make inferences about one's mental state. That is, consciousness is irreducible but this is not especially problematic (at least outside of philosophy).
- Alternatively, it may be argued that consciousness is irreducible and this does give, and has given, rise to ongoing and possibly insoluble problems in the philosophy of mind.
- An argument for irreducibility and for some theory which may encompass it, eg substance or property dualism/non-reductive materialism, might follow from an insistence that consciousness is irreducible and, following critical discussion, the claim that reductive or eliminative versions of materialism do not account for essential aspects of consciousness.
- An argument against irreducibility may follow from an account of materialism as the only plausible explanation of what the mind is and how it works; there may be some support for views that identify consciousness with behaviour, or with some neurological process or with variable realisation; others may claim that reduction is unnecessary and that the folk psychology of mentality should be eliminated altogether.

- 13 16 Demonstrates the ability to interpret and integrate a range of points selected for discussion into a reasoned and coherent argument, sustaining relevance and directly addressing the question.
- 9-12 Demonstrates a critical appreciation of arguments and theories by evaluating some material and forming explicit judgements or summaries in relation to the question: responses in this level may advance a clear but inadequately supported position.
- 5-8 Evaluation is present within an exposition of arguments but is either implicit in a juxtaposition of theoretical approaches, briefly argued possibly with limited depth, scope and accuracy or poorly focused in relation to the specific question.
- 2-4 Demonstrates a simple and basic appreciation of a limited range of material, or of limited aspects of the issue. Discursive points may be listed, asserted with very little explanation, limited and poorly developed or may have limited relevance.
- 0-1 Little or no relevant philosophical insight is demonstrated.

#### Total for this question: 50 marks

(a) Describe and illustrate **two** characteristics thought to be essential for persons. (18 marks)

#### **Knowledge and Understanding (9 marks)**

2

Candidates may provide a brief exposition of the concept of a person, suggest that being a person is a matter of degree rather than of kind and/or consider applications of the concept (animals, AI, etc). However, their focus should eventually be on criteria that should be satisfied in order to say that somebody is a person and full marks can be obtained for a detailed and precise account of **two** essential properties (or qualities, features, characteristics) without further exposition. Two characteristics of personhood may be drawn from:

- A thinking thing, capable of rational thought, reflective about their own experiences, feelings and motives as well as those of others.
- One who is self-aware and/or who possesses awareness of self as a continuing subject of experience, able to form goals and projects (possibly in accordance with a coherent 'inner' narrative).
- One whose distinctiveness is created through choices, goals, actions and reactions, etc.
- Autonomy. One who shapes themselves and is responsible, accountable and possesses rights in virtue of this. One whose existence precedes their essence.
- One who is embodied: one to whom we ascribe mental *and* physical characteristics. (There might be liberal and illiberal interpretations of what kind of body is necessary).
- One who is a language user, able to communicate meanings (perhaps able to say 'I' or 'not I') and/or a social being, one whose sense of self emerges in and is created through relationships with others.
- One who has a network of beliefs.

This is relatively open-ended and other relevant points should also be rewarded. For example, there may be some link to theories and views that, for example a person is one whose behaviour is sufficiently complex, or who functions as a person or who possesses a certain neurological make-up.

- 7-9 Demonstrates detailed and precise understanding of **two** essential characteristics of persons.
- 4-6 Demonstrates either a range of knowledge, but general and prosaic understanding of **two** essential characteristics of persons, or narrow and detailed but partial knowledge and understanding, eg one characteristic is developed but a second is omitted, unclear or unconvincing.
- 1-3 Demonstrates some knowledge and limited understanding of at least one essential characteristic of persons.
- 0 No relevant philosophical knowledge and understanding is demonstrated.

Illustrations, or a single illustration covering two characteristics, might draw from aspects of the literature concerning, for example, memory and persistence through time; the importance of body; whether solipsists could be persons; examples of humans who aren't persons and/or of non-humans who are (to a degree); damaged or limited persons; case studies where the characteristic is insufficiently present; Turing tests and other thought experiments, etc. NB examples may illustrate a situation or a being in which an essential characteristic is lacking.

- 7-9 Selects or constructs at least one relevant example and applies this to provide a clear, detailed and precise illustrative analysis of two essential characteristics of persons. The example(s) provided illuminate the features identified.
- 4-6 Selects or constructs at least one relevant example to provide a partial explanation of **two** essential characteristics of persons either because detail and precision is lacking or because only one characteristic is illustrated. Responses in this level may be characterised by detailed explanation and very brief illustration.
- 1-3 Selects and applies at least one relevant point to provide a basic explanation and/or sketchy illustration of at least one essential characteristic of persons. Answers at the bottom of this band may consist of vague exposition only with no attempt made to illustrate a feature.
- 0 No relevant philosophical points are made.

(b)	Assess whether the	problem of other minds can be solved.	(32 marks)
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#### Knowledge and Understanding (8 marks)

The problem will probably be outlined as emerging from a view of consciousness, or of conscious mental states, as radically private and indubitable: we have privileged access to and first person authority about our own mental states. The relevant questions, therefore, concern: *whether* and *how* we can know (or be justified in believing) that others are similarly minded; the *evidential criteria* we employ when making other-person ascriptions of mental states; whether, if others are indeed, their mental lives possess the phenomenal properties we know/believe ours to possess. (Some may extend their discussion into issues concerning *which* others are minded – animals, machines etc.

The issue may be approached theoretically: via Cartesian dualism and the strengths and weaknesses of this against other theoretical accounts in which the problem does not arise. Alternatively (and perhaps more likely), the 'problem' may be largely implicit in an account of various attempts to resolve it e.g. arguments from analogy, criteriological arguments, inference to the best explanation.

- 7-8 Demonstrates detailed and precise knowledge and understanding of arguments and/or theories relating to whether the problems of other minds can be resolved.
- 4-6 Demonstrates either a range of knowledge but general and prosaic understanding of arguments and theories relating to whether the problem of other minds can be resolved or narrow and detailed but partial knowledge and understanding of arguments and theories relating to this issue (e.g. a focus on analogy only).
- 1-3 Demonstrates basic knowledge and limited understanding of aspects of relevant arguments and theories relating to whether the problem of other minds can be resolved.
- 0 No relevant philosophical knowledge and understanding is demonstrated.

Some of the following or equivalent points will be made:

- The Cartesian starting point: how the problem emerges.
- An account of how we can argue analogously in order to other-ascribe. Behaviour similar to our own, given similar stimuli, justifies ascribing mental states to others. Problems with this: arguing from our own case is a weak inductive argument; analogous argument is either pointless or fails according to whether behaviour is regarded as logically adequate criteria for other-ascription; what of others who are not like us?
- Whether scientific research, e.g. on Al or brains, will assist other-ascription. Problems with this e.g. liberalism, chauvinism and the phenomenal properties of conscious states.
- Can we begin from our own case: An exposition of the private language argument.
- Is the concept of a person logically primitive? An exposition of the concept as that to which both psychological and physical predicates apply and why these must be applied (more or less simultaneously) to self: we wouldn't be able to self-ascribe unless we could other-ascribe. Problems with this, e.g. could we learn to self-ascribe in a community of robots in which our ascriptions of mental states to others are constantly mistaken?
- Inference to the best explanation: using other minds in an explanation of our social experience is more significant than certainty about other minds.
- Others have a role in producing certain mental states in us e.g. guilt etc. Our experience includes an awareness of the subjectivity of others.
- 7-8 Selects or constructs relevant points and examples and applies these to provide a clear, detailed and precise illustrative analysis of arguments and theories related to whether the problem of other minds can be resolved.
- 4-6 Selects, or constructs, some relevant points and examples to provide a partial analysis, either narrowly focused (eg on analogy) or lacking detail and precision, of arguments and theories related to whether the problem of other minds can be resolved.
- 1-3 Selects and applies some relevant points to provide a basic analysis of at least one aspect of this issue **or** some relevant points feature in a tangential approach to the question.
- 0 No relevant philosophical points are made.

#### **Interpretation and Evaluation (16 marks)**

The question does require an assessment of whether the problem can be solved.

- The Cartesian approach may be seen to encompass a truth about consciousness (eg in terms of certainty, privacy) and leave us with a genuine problem concerning other minds.
- It may be suggested that this view is ultimately self-defeating. How was Descartes able to pose sceptical questions? If his position leads to unacceptable conclusions must there be something wrong with it?
- It may be suggested that the problem is philosophically insoluble but that practically, e.g. in real cases of pain, we cannot doubt that others are minded (eg Wittgenstein).
- It might be argued that we can't 'start from our own case'.
- However, if ascribed mental states to others is a necessary criteria for ascribing mental states ourselves, does this require other-ascriptions which are true? What does the private language argument show? Is it a solution to difficulties concerning other minds? Do criteriological accounts beg the question?
- Versions of materialism may be suggested as resolutions to the problem.
- If explanation, rather than knowledge, is required does this solve the problem? Is the problem a pseudo-problem?

- 13 16 Demonstrates the ability to interpret and integrate a range of points selected for discussion into a reasoned and coherent argument, sustaining relevance and directly addressing the question.
- 9-12 Demonstrates a critical appreciation of arguments and theories by evaluating some material and forming explicit judgements or summaries in relation to the question: responses in this level may advance a clear but inadequately supported position.
- 5-8 Evaluation is present within an exposition of arguments but is either implicit in a juxtaposition of theoretical approaches; briefly argued possibly with limited depth, scope and accuracy or poorly focused in relation to the specific question (eg there is no reference to whether the problem of other minds can be resolved).
- 2-4 Demonstrates a simple and basic appreciation of a limited range of material, or of limited aspects of the issue. Discursive points may be listed, asserted with very little explanation, limited and poorly developed, or may have limited relevance (eg the focus is on idealism and solipsism).
- 0-1 Little or no relevant philosophical insight is demonstrated.

#### **Theme: Political Philosophy**

#### Total for this question: 50 marks

(a) Describe and illustrate two reasons why some laws might be considered unjust. (18 marks)

#### **Knowledge and Understanding (9 marks)**

3

The concept of an unjust law might be related to more inclusive theories of the nature, legitimacy and purpose of law generally. Thus, positive law might be described as having a normative function (or as not being morally indifferent) distinct from its obligation-imposing nature. Or, via versions of natural law theory, law may be seen as connected to the principles of natural moral law, justice, rights and universal reason. Some may refer to rule utilitarianism or social contract theory. So, depending on the context, an unjust law might be described as:

- A law which failed to connect to widely accepted moral and political values.
- A law which served sectional interests and which failed to promote the good of the social whole or the common good.
- A law which disrupted social unity, order and cohesion because it discriminated against certain groups and/or individuals *or* because it disrupted tradition.
- A law which attempted to regulate an area of life which is not regarded as the legitimate concern of lawmakers.

Other relevant reasons should also be regarded, eg those that might appear in theoretical accounts of why all laws are unjust. No marks are available for evaluative attempts to separate law from morality and principles of justice.

- 7-9 Demonstrates detailed and precise knowledge and understanding of **two** reasons why some laws might be seen as unjust.
- 4-6 Demonstrates either a range of knowledge, but general and prosaic understanding of **two** reasons why some laws might be seen as unjust, or narrow and detailed but partial knowledge and understanding, eg one reason is developed but a second is omitted, unclear and unconvincing.
- 1-3 Demonstrates some knowledge and limited understanding of at least one reason why some laws might be seen as unjust.
- 0 No relevant philosophical knowledge and understanding is demonstrated.

Illustrations, or a single illustration covering two reasons, might draw from specific laws which have been regarded and/or contested as being unjust, eg the poll tax, dangerous dogs, hunting with dogs, interference in parenting, discriminating against fathers etc *or* be fictional examples of a law which *would* be unjust.

- 7-9 Selects, or constructs, at least one relevant example and applies this to provide a clear, detailed and precise illustrative analysis of **two** reasons why some laws might be seen as unjust. The example(s) provided illuminate the reasons identified.
- 4-6 Selects, or constructs, at least one relevant example to provide a partial explanation of **two** reasons why some laws might be seen as unjust either because detail and precision is lacking or because only one reason is illustrated. Responses in this band may be characterized by detailed explanation and very brief illustration.
- 1-3 Selects and applies at least one relevant point to provide a basic explanation and/or sketchy illustration of at least one reason why some laws might be seen as unjust. Answers at the bottom of this band may consist of vague exposition only with no attempt made to illustrate a reason.
- 0 No relevant philosophical points are made.

#### (b) Assess whether law can be divorced from morality. (32 marks)

#### Knowledge and Understanding (8 marks)

The issue of whether the *concept* of law can be separated from the *concept* of morality is likely to involve accounts of the dispute between:

- Various versions of legal positivism claiming that law is morally neutral. Candidates may refer to theorists like Bentham (to an extent), Austin, Hart and Kelsen.
- Various versions of natural law theory claiming that law is connected to notions of justice, rights and the common good and, consequently, is essentially moral (and not merely organised force or systematic violence). Candidates may refer to theorists like Kant, Bentham (to an extent), Finnis and Dworkin.
- Some may refer to more radical positions claiming that neither law nor morality can be divorced from political power (eg Marxism, feminism).
- Some may refer to meta-ethical positions in consideration of whether one can give a purely *descriptive* account of the principles underpinning law or whether such an account must be *prescriptive*.

Some relevance may be found in discussions of the scope and purpose of law, eg whether its main function is to secure individual liberties or promote social cohesion, but it is likely that this debate will be based upon different moral positions and not be a fully adequate response to the question.

- 7-8 Demonstrates detailed and precise knowledge and understanding of arguments and theories relating to whether law can be divorced from morality.
- 4-6 Demonstrates either a range of knowledge, but general and prosaic understanding of arguments and theories relating to whether law can be divorced from morality, or narrow and detailed but partial knowledge and understanding of arguments and theories relating to this question.
- 1-3 Demonstrates basic knowledge and limited understanding of aspects of arguments and theories relating to whether law can be divorced from morality.
- 0 No relevant philosophical knowledge and understanding is demonstrated.

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Some of the following, or equivalent, points should be discussed:

- We typically do contrast law with mere force (eg through connecting law with concepts like rights, liberties, obligations, justice). Can this distinction be upheld without some reference to morality?
- The view that legal obligations and legal rights are not moral obligations and moral rights. Morality is not a logically necessary feature of law. A law emanating from an appropriate source is a valid law regardless of whether it is morally just or unjust.
- We can know positive legal norms but there are no moral facts for us to know (a non-cognitive approach to morality).
- The law can be reduced to a set of factual *descriptions* of commands and sanctions. So, eg the law is the common of that sovereign body which is habitually obeyed within a given territory (Austin). Does this distinguish adequately between law and force?
- We can avoid reductionism and preserve the *prescriptive* character of law without equating it with morality by accepting certain basic principles: 'the minimum element of natural law' (Kelsen) or the 'minimum content of natural law' (Hart). Both argue that the law ought to be obeyed and neither see the 'ought' as a moral ought. Is this convincing?
- Whether the good for man/human flourishing is associated with public life or with individual autonomy, on either conception there is a connection between law and morality.
- Legal positivism is a response to natural law theory. There are other responses. Rights are 'nonsense on stilts' and a conception of law based on natural rights is mistaken (putting the cart before the horse). Rights are 'a child of law' and any connection between law and morality is founded on utility rather than natural law.
- A coherent theory of law must express a deeper moral theory whether its basis is utility or natural law eg the law is (should be) connected to notions of human flourishing (the good for man) which can only be pursued within a community regulated by shared rules (Finnis).
- 7-8 Selects, or constructs, relevant points and examples and applies these to provide a clear, detailed and precise illustrative analysis of arguments and theories related to whether law can be divorced from morality.
- 4-6 Selects, or constructs, some relevant points and examples to provide a partial analysis, either narrowly focused (eg on the morality of individuals versus wider moral standards) or lacking detail and precision, of arguments and theories related to whether law can be divorced from society.
- 1-3 Selects and applies some relevant points to provide a basic analysis of at least one aspect of this issue **or** some relevant points feature in a tangential approach to the question.
- 0 No relevant philosophical points are made.

#### **Interpretation and Evaluation (16 marks)**

A range of argumentation is possible including an evaluation of positions taken in arguments selected for discussion. Beyond this, a case may be argued for:

- Law and morality are connected. Both connect to utility and/or the common good. The law is not morally neutral. How would we acquire the notion of just and unjust laws if law and morality weren't connected? Some aspects of legal positivism are not purely positivist but include a normative aspect (a basic principle or a minimum content).
- Law prescribes objective legal rights and duties but there are no objective moral rights and duties. Law is morally neutral. Knowledge of the law is not knowledge of what one ought to do morally (the is-ought gap).
- Is a middle ground possible? While law doesn't embody any universal moral principles it does have both descriptive and prescriptive elements that are culturally specific.
- The debate may be dismissed as ideological. Both morality and laws are socially constructed under specific conditions.
- 13 16 Demonstrates the ability to interpret and integrate a range of points selected for discussion into a reasoned and coherent argument, sustaining relevance and directly addressing the question.
- 9-12 Demonstrates a critical appreciation of arguments and theories by evaluating some material and forming explicit judgements or summaries in relation to the question: responses in this band may advance a clear but inadequately supported position.
- 5-8 Evaluation is present within an exposition of arguments but is either implicit in a juxtaposition of theoretical approaches; briefly argued possibly with limited depth, scope and accuracy; or poorly focused in relation to the specific question (eg morality is interpreted as the moral standards of a society at a given time).
- 2-4 Demonstrates a simple and basic appreciation of a limited range of material, or of limited aspects of the issue. Discursive points may be listed, asserted with very little explanation, limited and poorly developed, or may have limited relevance.
- 0-1 Little or no relevant philosophical insight is demonstrated.

# 4 Total for this question: 50 marks (a) Describe and illustrate two reasons why anarchists are critical of the State. (18 marks)

#### **Knowledge and Understanding (9 marks)**

Anarchy may be defined as an ideology which denies the need for the State and which views the State as unjust/unjustifiable or, more liberally, a position which rejects coercive authority in any sphere of social life. There may be reference to diverse versions of anarchism but full marks can be obtained by correctly identifying two reasons why anarchists are critical of the State without further exposition. The reasons are likely to be drawn from:

- Anarchists adopt an essentially positive view of human nature. Individuals are seen as capable of rational self-government without interference. The existence of the State is inconsistent with this, rational individuals have not or would not consent to the rule of one person over another.
- Interference in whichever social arrangements individuals care to pursue is an unwarranted infringement of their individual freedom. Individuals are (or may be) guided by moral law, State law is both unnecessary and unjustifiable.
- Individuals, and the communities or societies they form, are better off without the State. Power corrupts: it harms both those who exercise it and those who are coerced by it. Power or authority, to the extent that they might exist, should benefit and be accountable to those they serve rather than serving self-interested, sectional, bureaucratic and coercive bodies. Similarly, social organisations should be created from below rather than imposed from above.
- The State is an instrument of oppression, responsible for most of the oppression and violence we experience.
- State power is destructive of other values anarchists typically hold, eg equality and justice. Our social being is violated by state power and authority (which do not serve our interests anyway): human relationships involving co-operation between equals are violated by the State and by State institutions.

Other relevant reasons should also be rewarded. No marks are available for evaluating anarchism.

- 7-9 Demonstrates detailed and precise knowledge and understanding of **two** reasons why anarchists are critical of the State.
- 4-6 Demonstrates either a range of knowledge, but general and prosaic understanding of **two** reasons why some anarchists are critical of the State, or narrow and detailed but partial knowledge and understanding eg one reason is developed but a second is omitted, unclear or unconvincing.
- 1-3 Demonstrates some knowledge and limited understanding of at least one reason why anarchists are critical of the State.
- 0 No relevant philosophical knowledge and understanding is demonstrated.

Illustrations, or a single illustration covering two reasons, might draw from rejections of the view of man, or of the State of nature, presented in other theories; actual examples of state corruption, abuses of power, violence and oppression, powerlessness in certain areas, the mistreatment of certain groups etc *or* present fictional examples of possible utopias (or dystopias)

- 7-9 Selects or constructs at least one relevant example and applies these to provide a clear, detailed and precise illustrative analysis of **two** reasons why anarchists are critical of the state. The example(s) provided illuminate(s) the reasons identified.
- 4-6 Selects or constructs at least one relevant example to provide a partial explanation of **two** reasons why anarchists are critical of the state either because detail and precision is lacking or because only one reason is illustrated. Responses in this band may be characterised by detailed explanation and very brief illustration.
- 1-3 Selects and applies at least one relevant point to provide a basic explanation and/or sketchy illustration of at least one reason why anarchists are critical of the State. Answers at the bottom of this band may consist of vague exposition only with no attempt made to illustrate a reason.
- 0 No relevant philosophical points are made.

(b)	Assess the extent to which authority legitimises the exercise of power.	(32 marks)
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#### Knowledge and Understanding (8 marks)

The central concepts in the question should be clear:

- Authority is, typically, seen as a normative concept. It is *de jure*. The exercise of power, the control and organisation of resources, is recognised and consented to.
- Power is, typically, seen as a causal concept. The possession and application of power produces results, resources are controlled and organised. It is *de facto*.
- Legitimacy refers to the grounds, or reasons, given as an explanation and justification of why we are politically obligated and/or of why the state merits our allegiance.
- Legitimacy may also be connected to the achievement of certain outcomes, eg securing the rights and liberties of individuals, promoting equality, welfare, happiness and/or versions of the common good.

It may be suggested from the outset that authority *is* legitimate power. In which case a distinction may be drawn between:

- Legitimate power based on authority, recognition, consent and approval.
- Illegitimate power based on coercion, the threat and use of force.
- 7-8 Demonstrates detailed and precise knowledge and understanding of arguments and concepts relating to the extent to which authority legitimises the exercise of power.
- 4-6 Demonstrates either a range of knowledge but general and prosaic understanding of arguments and concepts relating to the extent to which authority legitimises the exercise of power, or narrow and detailed but partial knowledge and understanding of arguments and concepts relating to the relationship between legitimacy, authority and powers (eg two concepts are handled well, the third is ignored).
- 1-3 Demonstrates basic knowledge and limited understanding of aspects of arguments and concepts relating to the extent to which authority legitimises the exercise of power.
- 0 No relevant philosophical knowledge and understanding is demonstrated.

The issue of how autonomous individuals come to accept the exercise of state power as legitimate is a central question in political philosophy and could produce general discussions of theories of power, obligation and obedience. However, some of the following or equivalent points should be made:

- Conventionally, the notion of authority is linked to legitimacy via other normative concepts like *entitlement, acceptance* and *popular approval.*
- The 'ideal types' of authority presented as sources of legitimacy by Weber, rational-legal grounds, traditional grounds and charismatic grounds: the extent to which they can be found in political systems and the extent to which they pass the test of legitimacy.
- References could also be made to individuals and/or groups able to exert influence because they are 'an authority'.

More critical points might be drawn from:

- Power is the dominant concept, authority is a power-base and the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate power is not always clear.
- Authority, if it is to be effective, eventually reduces to the possession of power. Legitimacy is less significant than coercion. The *reality* of power is revealed when authority is challenged as, increasingly, it is due to more emphasis on individual autonomy and choice, scepticism with regard to tradition and value, the failure to secure rights, promote equality etc.
- In such cases one aspect of legitimacy might be retained, ie the entitlement to exercise power on rational-legal grounds, while another aspect, ie approval, is absent.
- To the extent that there are two aspects of legitimacy can we provide an adequate account of authority as legitimate power? Political communities are not morally perfect so authority may never be completely legitimate.
- An appeal to authority might short-circuit legitimacy.
- Can we distinguish between legitimacy based on 'genuine' consent from legitimacy based on 'manufactured' consent the role of ideology?
- Is the concept of authority and/or the grounds on which it is possessed (charisma, tradition and rational-legal rules) adequate as a theory of legitimacy? Should the legitimate exercise of power also be linked to securing other goods (justice, freedom, rights, equality etc) and aren't these the sort of goods that may be abused during a crisis of legitimacy?
- 7-8 Selects or constructs relevant points and examples and applies these to provide a clear, detailed and precise illustrative analysis of arguments and theories related to the extent to which authority legitimises the exercise of power.
- 4-6 Selects or constructs some relevant points and examples to provide a partial analysis, either narrowly focused (eg legitimacy is ignored) or lacking detail and precision, of arguments and theories related to the extent to which authority legitimises the exercise of power.
- 1-3 Selects and applies some relevant points to provide a basic analysis of at least one aspect of this issue **or** some relevant points feature in a tangential approach to the question.
- 0 No relevant philosophical points are made.

#### **Interpretation and Evaluation (16 marks)**

This may be present throughout points selected for discussion. Beyond this:

- It might be argued that a political system in which the exercise of power is seen as rightful (and which can be challenged) is better than a political system in which the exercise of power is based on coercion. This is why the notion of authority as legitimate power retains importance.
- It might be argued that authority, ultimately, is or rests on the possession of power. On occasions legitimacy collapses under a challenge and reveals the coercive face of power behind the mask.
- It might be argued that authority is inadequate as a theory of legitimacy.
- 13 16 Demonstrates the ability to interpret and integrate a range of points selected for discussion into a reasoned and coherent argument, sustaining relevance and directly addressing the question.
- 9-12 Demonstrates a critical appreciation of arguments and theories by evaluating some material and forming explicit judgements or summaries in relation to the question: responses in this band may advance a clear but inadequately supported position.
- 5-8 Evaluation is present within an exposition of arguments but is either implicit in a juxtaposition of theoretical approaches (eg in which authority is simply accepted as legitimate power); briefly argued possibly with limited depth, scope and accuracy; or poorly focused in relation to the specific question.
- 2-4 Demonstrates a simple and basic appreciation of a limited range of material, or of limited aspects of the issue. Discursive points may be listed, asserted with very little explanation, limited and poorly developed or may have limited relevance.
- 0-1 Little or no relevant philosophical insight is demonstrated.

#### **Theme: Philosophy of Science**

5	Total for this que	estion: 50 marks	
(a)	Describe and illustrate <b>one</b> proposed solution to the problem of induction.	(18 marks)	

#### **Knowledge and Understanding (9 marks)**

Candidates will probably describe the problem of induction as a problem concerning the justification of inductive arguments: how to justify reasoning from our experience of observed events/particulars to a universal law-like statement covering all non-observed events/particulars. The problem may be left implicit in an account of the proposed solution.

- Some (despite Hume) may offer inductive arguments as a solution to the problem of induction eg the attempt to establish an inductive principle or, more likely, the appeal to experience and past success. The circularity here is only apparently vicious.
- Some may replace universality in the conclusion of inductive arguments with probability.
- Some may refer to pragmatism. Inductive argument may not produce universal truth *but* to the extent that there is a truth inductive argument is the best way of reaching it.
- Some may refer to criteria of reasonableness. Inductive reasoning is part of what we understand by rationality.
- The solution most likely to appear is Popper's view that while scientific laws can't be verified they can be falsified. It is possible to corroborate a claim about the relationship between x and y through attempting to refute it. Allegedly, one counter instance of the relationship will conclusively refute a theory describing a law-like relationship between the two.
- Similarly, a solution might be drawn from Popper's views that "every scientific statement must remain tentative for ever ... it is not his possession of knowledge, of irrefutable truth, that makes the man of science, but his persistent and recklessly critical quest for truth". That is, the solution might involve giving up a view of scientific activity as the discovery and/or proof of universal laws.

Other relevant solutions should also be rewarded. No marks are available for evaluating the solution.

- 7-9 Demonstrates detailed and precise knowledge and understanding of **one** proposed solution to the problem of induction.
- 4-6 Demonstrates either a range of knowledge, but general and prosaic understanding of **one** proposed solution to the problem of induction, or narrow and detailed but partial knowledge and understanding, eg the proposed solution is stated accurately but very briefly.
- 1-3 Demonstrates some knowledge and limited understanding of **one** proposed solution to the problem of induction.
- 0 No relevant philosophical knowledge and understanding is demonstrated.

Examples illustrating the problem of induction may be given *and* the proposed solution applied to them. Reference may be made to white swans and/or black ravens. Hopefully some examples are drawn from science, but any inductive argument may be used as an example including those expressed algebraically. Examples may also draw from Hume (the sun rising etc) and illustrate what can and what cannot be established from this.

- 7-9 Selects or constructs at least one relevant example and applies this to provide a clear, detailed and precise illustrative analysis of **one** proposed solution to the problem of induction. The example(s) provided illuminate(s) the solution identified.
- 4-6 Selects or constructs at least one relevant example to provide a partial explanation of **one** proposed solution to the problem of induction because details and precision is lacking. Responses in this band may be characterised by detailed explanation and very brief illustration.
- 1-3 Selects and applies at least one relevant point to provide a basic explanation and/or sketchy illustration of **one** proposed solution to the problem of induction. Answers at the bottom of this band may consist of vague exposition only with no attempt made to illustrate the solution.
- 0 No relevant philosophical points are made.

(b) Assess the realist approach to scientific theory.

(32 marks)

#### Knowledge and Understanding (8 marks)

Scientific realism might be described as the view that:

- Scientific theories aim to describe reality and may be judged to be true or false with reference to whether they actually do describe reality. This may be stated progressively, ie the realist holds that scientific theories are getting better at describing reality this is what 'advances in science' means.
- We do have knowledge of the unobservable entities employed in scientific theorising (strings, quarks, etc) through the evidence provided by what is observed: the terms used in scientific theories describe real objects in the world.

In short, scientific theory is not simply about how the world appears to us and/or the constructs we employ to make sense of it: it is about reality.

- 7-8 Demonstrates detailed and precise knowledge and understanding of arguments and concepts relating to the realist approach to scientific theory.
- 4-6 Demonstrates either a range of knowledge but general and prosaic understanding of arguments and concepts relating to the realist approach to scientific theory, or narrow and detailed but partial knowledge and understanding of arguments and concepts relating to the realist approach to scientific theory.
- 1-3 Demonstrates basic knowledge and limited understanding of aspects of arguments and concepts relating to the realist approach to scientific theory.
- 0 No relevant philosophical knowledge and understanding is demonstrated.

Some of the following or equivalent points may be offered in support of realism:

- Conformity with the belief that an 'external' world of physical objects exists independently of human action and consciousness: unobservable entities like protons and electrons exist, and they exist independently of our knowledge of them. Indeed it is through their existence that scientific errors and scientific ignorance, in relation to the way the world really is, are both possible.
- Popper's view that non-realism in science is inconsistent with the scientist's concern for truth and falsity instrumentalism is more concerned with whether a theory is able to make successful predictions than it is with truth and falsity.
- The success of science would be 'miraculous' if scientific theories did not describe reality. Scientists have successfully predicted how phenomena will behave (ie their predictions have been confirmed by later testing). How would this be possible if their theories were not true?
- The progressive search for a 'unified science' would not work if science did not describe reality: the fact that it is working, to the extent that one theory becomes successfully absorbed into another, shows that science describes reality.
- The activity of gaining scientific knowledge involves discovery not invention.

Some of the following or equivalent points may be offered against realism:

- It might be suggested that non-observable theoretical concepts (eg gravitational field, friction, atomic particle, etc) are convenient fictions for the understanding of observable entities or 'shorthand' descriptions of observable phenomena.
- Whereas theoretical concepts are replaced (making it unlikely that they were ever descriptions of reality and true or false in this sense), knowledge concerning observable entities has increased. This data is all that matters.
- There are grounds for 'pessimism' concerning theory: that is, as many theories in the history of science have turned out to be false it is likely that current theories will turn out to be false.
- Similarly, some may be unimpressed or unconvinced by the search for a unified theory of everything.
- The under-determination of theory by data: numerous and opposing theories are compatible with observed data. The theories we (presently) accept are simply those that have enjoyed predictive success. The point of scientific theory is that it can successfully predict: successful prediction is not an argument for realism.
- The world investigated by science is a world partly constituted by the minds of scientists who study it. Thus, explanatory power is not necessarily linked to truth.
- 7-8 Selects or constructs relevant points and examples and applies these to provide a clear, detailed and precise illustrative analysis of arguments and theories related to the realist approach to scientific theory.
- 4-6 Selects or constructs some relevant points and examples to provide a partial analysis, either narrowly focused or lacking detail and precision, of arguments and theories related to the realist approach to scientific theory.
- 1-3 Selects and applies some relevant points to provide a basic analysis of at least one aspect of this issue **or** some relevant points feature in a tangential approach to the question.
- 0 No relevant philosophical points are made.

#### **Interpretation and Evaluation (16 marks)**

This may be present throughout points selected for discussion and stem from an assessment of realism versus instrumentalism. Hence the discussion might be summarised:

- Either via Popper's view that 'it hardly makes sense' to argue that we submit an instrument to tests designed to refute it. So "instrumentalism ... is unable to account for the pure scientist's interest in truth and falsity". Science makes successful predictions and discoveries. This is not a 'happy accident' (the 'no miracle' view). Scientific progress consists in producing increasingly accurate and complex descriptions of the (largely invisible) world.
- Alternatively, instrumentalism may be strongly supported. Even some realists (like Popper) acknowledge it as 'the official view' (with the rider that 'few ... realise that they have accepted a philosophical theory'). Progress consists in developing instruments, theories and concepts, with predictive success and explanatory power not in any movement towards a true depiction of reality.
- 13 16 Demonstrates the ability to interpret and integrate a range of points selected for discussion into a reasoned and coherent argument, sustaining relevance and directly addressing the question.
- 9-12 Demonstrates a critical appreciation of arguments and theories by evaluating some material and forming explicit judgements or summaries in relation to the question: responses in this level advance a clear but inadequately supported position.
- 5-8 Evaluation is present within an exposition of arguments but is either implicit in a juxtaposition of theoretical approaches, briefly argued possibly with limited depth, scope and accuracy or poorly focused in relation to the specific question.
- 2-4 Demonstrates a simple and basic appreciation of a limited range of material, or of limited aspects of the issue. Discursive points may be listed, asserted with very little explanation, limited and poorly developed or may have limited relevance.
- 0-1 Little or no relevant philosophical insight is demonstrated.

#### **Total for this question: 50 marks**

(a) Describe and illustrate **two** reasons for doubting the objectivity of scientific method.

(18 marks)

#### **Knowledge and Understanding (9 marks)**

6

Candidates may identify scientific methodology as an 'ideal' of objectivity because the scientist is neutral and disinterested, without preconceived ideas or particular motives, and employs rigorous processes in a systematic attempt to test hypotheses and generate results which are objectively true or false. This may be implicit in the reasons given for doubting the objectivity of scientific method. The focus should be on scientific methodology and two reasons may be drawn from:

- Scientific methodology and practice is guided by theory, there are no pre-theoretical raw facts or basic statements from which the scientist begins. The scientist is looking for particular data in order to confirm, corroborate, amend or refute a theory. Scientific practices are not theory-neutral.
- Scientific methodology and practice is not disinterested: scientific hypotheses are contaminated by experience, by conceptual frameworks and by commitments to particular theories or paradigms.
- Scientific methodology and practice is not neutral. What is studied, how it is studied, depends on occupational cultures, the career interests of the scientist, and the social, economic and political climate in which science takes place.
- Scientific methodology and practice is not systematic. Important results are obtained when the 'rulebook' concerning methods is dispensed with; the process of research is creative and involves flair as well as accidents, writing-up the research methodology makes it seem systematic.
- Funding may dictate not only what is researched but also which results are of interest. Equally, some data may be ignored if not deemed important or if it doesn't 'fit'.

Other reasonable points should also be rewarded.

- 7-9 Demonstrates detailed and precise knowledge and understanding of **two** reasons for doubting the objectivity of scientific methodology.
- 4-6 Demonstrates either a range of knowledge but general and prosaic understanding of **two** reasons for doubting the objectivity of scientific methodology, or narrow and detailed but partial knowledge and understanding eg one reason is developed and a second is briefly stated, confused or omitted.
- 1-3 Demonstrates some knowledge and limited understanding of **two** reasons for doubting the objectivity of scientific methodology.
- 0 No relevant philosophical knowledge and understanding is demonstrated.

Expect to see references to ducks and rabbits or to optical illusions in order to illustrate theory laden observation and the view that scientific methodology does not begin from a theory-neutral starting point. Hopefully, some examples of what is research (eg weapons) or of creative and/or accidental results are drawn from science.

- 7-9 Selects or constructs at least one relevant example and applies this to provide a clear, detailed and precise illustrative analysis of two reasons for doubting the objectivity of scientific methodology. The example(s) provided illuminate the reasons identified.
- 4-6 Selects or constructs at least one relevant example to provide a partial explanation of two reasons for doubting the objectivity of scientific methodology, either because only one reason is identified or because detail and precision is lacking. Responses in this level may be characterised by detailed explanation and very brief illustration.
- 1-3 Selects and applies at least one relevant point to provide a basic explanation and/or sketchy illustration of two reasons for doubting the objectivity of scientific methodology. Answers at the bottom of this band may consist of vague exposition only with no attempt made to illustrate the solution.
- 0 No relevant philosophical points are made.
- (b) Assess the view that differences between the natural and social sciences have been exaggerated. (32 marks)

#### Knowledge and Understanding (8 marks)

A number of issues could be seen to be entailed by the view in question:

- Whether and how the aims, methods and conclusions of the natural sciences and social sciences differ and whether differences in the relative status conventionally accorded to both is justified.
- Whether social science concerns the study of systems, structures and cultures, and the discovery of causal laws, or whether it concerns the study of individuals and the interpretation of how their subjective meanings, values and reasons for action construct the social world.
- The extent to which, following critical work on natural science, theories about how natural science works also apply to social science, eg falsification (both involve a process of conjecture and refutation).
- Whether both natural and social science can only be understood as cognitive systems generated within social systems.

Some attempt should be made to identify what the differences are, or have been, taken to be although this may be implicit in an account accepting that difference have been exaggerated and pointing to similarities.

- 7-8 Demonstrates detailed and precise knowledge and understanding of arguments and concepts relating to the view that differences between the natural and social sciences have been exaggerated.
- 4-6 Demonstrates either a range of knowledge but general and prosaic understanding of arguments and concepts relating to the view that differences between the natural and social sciences have been exaggerated or narrow and detailed but partial knowledge and understanding of arguments and concepts relating to the realist approach to scientific theory.

- 1-3 Demonstrates basic knowledge and limited understanding of aspects of arguments and concepts relating to the view that differences between the natural and social sciences have been exaggerated.
- 0 No relevant philosophical knowledge and understanding is demonstrated.

Some of the following or equivalent points are selected for discussion:

- Approaches focused on difference may adopt physics as a paradigm of scientific method and explanation or as the goal of a unified theory and contrast this with, for example, sociology or psychology as being unlikely to generate a unified theory. *Or*, possibly, it might be argued that the social sciences may, eventually, reduce to biology and then to physics.
- The importance of informative or testable hypotheses for genuine scientific theory might be used to claim *either* that social science is scientific *or* that some social science is not. (That is, as the test of what science is). The notion of paradigmatic disciplines may be similarly used.
- It might be questioned whether explanation in either natural of social science can ever be 'external': both are social constructs.
- References may be made to positivism in social science, eg via Hobbes, Hume, Mill, Comte etc. The goal of 'a science of man' as a valid pursuit. In contrast, it might be suggested that positivist social science is a myth due to the presence of normative concerns (eg social engineering). But doesn't this also apply to natural science?
- References are likely to be made to an interpretative approach in the social sciences claiming that the 'objects' of study for social scientists are not objects but human beings possessing a point of view of their own; unlike the natural scientists, the social scientist has to view the objects of study as subjects of experience, reflective, possessing intentionality, attaching meanings and values, having reasons for acting, etc.
- 7-8 Selects relevant points and examples and applies these to provide a clear, detailed and precise illustrative analysis of debates concerning the view that differences between the natural and social sciences have been exaggerated.
- 4-6 Selects some relevant points and examples to provide a partial analysis, either narrowly focused or lacking detail and precision, of debates concerning the view that differences between the natural and social sciences have been exaggerated.
- 1-3 Selects and applies some relevant points to provide a basic analysis of debates concerning the view that differences between the natural and social sciences have been exaggerated **or** some relevant points feature in a tangential approach to the question.
- 0 No relevant philosophical points are made.

#### **Interpretation and Evaluation (16 marks)**

A range of argumentation is possible:

- The study of humans is different from the study of inanimate objects. The concepts required in social science include rational or irrational action, beliefs, desires, motivations, intentions as *reasons* for acting. To what extent can the reasons that cause action be thought of in the same way as natural causes? There are differences between social and natural science. Understanding and explaining in the social sciences is not enhanced by the aims and methods of natural science. These differences, however, do not amount to differences between a *superior* and an *inferior* approach to study.
- It may be suggested that determinism is inappropriate in the social sciences *or* that it is compatible with freedom: the inhabitants of society are also its creators.
- Perhaps the differences between natural sciences and social sciences have been exaggerated. There are similarities. Both involve human processes and are underpinned by interests, values and commitment to theories. Neither are purely objective, both are socially constructed by individuals within social systems.
- Some might argue that the discovery of causal laws is an appropriate goal of both natural and social science.
- The similarities are more important. Both the natural and social sciences employ empirical research, form hypotheses, collect data systematically, etc. Verification and falsification occur in both. It might also be claimed that some social sciences have become paradigmatic and others are preparadigmatic. From a different point of view, if the goal of natural science is not the discovery of causal laws but the coherence and fertility of explanation, and subsequent prediction, then this is also similar in social science.
- 13 16 Demonstrates the ability to interpret and integrate a range of points selected for discussion into a reasoned and coherent argument, sustaining relevance and directly addressing the question.
- 9-12 Demonstrates a critical appreciation of arguments and theories by evaluating some material and forming explicit judgements or summaries in relation to the question: responses in this level may advance a clear but inadequately supported position.
- 5-8 Evaluation is present within an exposition of arguments but is either implicit in a juxtaposition of theoretical approaches; briefly argued possibly with limited depth, scope and accuracy; or poorly focused in relation to the specific question.
- 2-4 Demonstrates a simple and basic appreciation of a limited range of material, or of limited aspects of the issue. Discursive points may be listed, asserted with very little explanation, limited and poorly developed, or may have limited relevance.
- 0-1 Little or no relevant philosophical insight is demonstrated.