



General Certificate of Education

Philosophy 5171/6171

Post-Standardisation

**PLY2 Moral Philosophy or
Philosophy of Religion**

Mark Scheme

2008 examination – June series

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Dr Michael Cresswell, Director General.

The following notes are not prescriptive and do not constitute 'model answers': they are intended as an 'aide-memoire' for Examiners. Marks should be awarded in accordance with the levels of response marking criteria.

1

Total for this question: 45 marks

- (a) Identify and briefly describe **two** characteristics that virtuous persons are said to possess. (6 marks)

Knowledge and Understanding (6 marks)

- 4 – 6** Demonstrates precise knowledge and understanding of **two** characteristics that virtuous persons are held to possess. Candidates may provide some background material on virtue ethics but full marks can be obtained for clear descriptions of two virtuous character traits. These are most likely to be drawn from the cardinal virtues – justice, wisdom, temperance and courage – and descriptions are likely to emphasise the selected traits as means between two extremes (although this might depend upon which traits are selected). Expect some references to Christian virtues, such as faith, love, charity, etc. Contemporary versions of virtue ethics emphasising the coherence of a narrative quest, immersion in a socially regarded practice and the acquisition of excellences within the practice should also be rewarded. No marks are available for evaluation although knowledge and understanding may be present in evaluative answers. Answers should be placed in this band according to the depth and detail presented. Answers at the bottom of this band may present one clear and developed description of a virtue and make a more general point about flourishing or living well.
- 1 – 3** Demonstrates basic or partial knowledge and understanding of **two** characteristics that virtuous persons are held to possess by offering a partial explanation, eg only one relevant trait is identified and described, or a basic answer in which traits are identified but not described, or a confused explanation, eg descriptions of the traits identified are imprecise or inaccurate. At the bottom of this band it may be difficult to accept that the traits identified are genuinely virtues.
- 0** No relevant philosophical knowledge and understanding is presented.

- (b) Explain and illustrate **two** criticisms of deontological ethics. (15 marks)

Knowledge and Understanding (6 marks)

- 4 – 6** Demonstrates precise knowledge and understanding of **two** criticisms of deontological ethics. Candidates will probably briefly outline what deontology involves (and in doing so refer to different versions of duty ethics) but full marks can be obtained by accurately identifying two criticisms. These may be drawn from: positions such as Kant's are too formal or abstract to be of much use as a guide to action; duty ethics are too rigid or insufficiently flexible; actions undertaken on the basis of strong feelings (rather than duty) have moral worth; whether we can know the motive behind an action; the problem of what to do when duties conflict; whether the consequences of actions

are irrelevant or any other relevant point. Responses which list a number of points or which blur three points together as two should be placed at the bottom of this band.

- 1 – 3** Demonstrates basic knowledge or partial understanding through offering a partial account in which only one accurate criticism is made *or* through a confused account in which criticisms are not clearly expressed *or* by identifying a valid criticism but developing and explaining a different point.
- 0** No relevant philosophical knowledge and understanding is demonstrated.

Selection and Application (9 marks)

Illustrations of two criticisms might be drawn from specific texts (eg Sartre's student might be used to illustrate a conflict of duties or a moral dilemma); from Kant (the rigidity/lack of feeling/relative disregard for consequences etc. of telling the truth to a psychopathic axe man); any situation in which motives for action aren't clear; any situation in which a morally worthy action is not undertaken through duty and/or which conflicts with some version of the categorical imperative (or divine command); any situation in which it is not clear how to treat someone as an 'end'; any action which seems moral but not universalisable (or vice versa).

- 7 – 9** Selects or constructs at least one relevant point or example and applies this to provide a clear illustration of **two** criticisms of deontological ethics. In this band the illustration(s) provided will clarify both of the criticisms selected.
- 4 – 6** Selects or constructs at least one point or example to provide a partial illustration, lacking detail and precision, of **two** criticisms of deontological ethics. In this band the illustrative example(s) will only partially illuminate the criticisms *either* because they are brief and undeveloped *or* because only one criticism is illustrated. Responses in this band may be characterised by detailed exposition, explaining various criticisms of deontology, and very brief illustration.
- 1 – 3** Selects or constructs at least one illustrative point to provide a basic, sketchy and vague illustration of at least one criticism of deontological ethics eg it is not clear how the example provided is relevant to the criticism given *or* to deontology. Answers at the bottom of this band may consist of vague exposition only, no attempt is made to illustrate. Answers in which the explanation provided is clear but not illustrated should be placed at the top of this band.
- 0** No relevant philosophical points are made.

- | | |
|---|-------------------|
| <p>(c) Assess whether any form of utilitarianism provides an adequate account of what it is to act morally.</p> | <p>(24 marks)</p> |
|---|-------------------|

Knowledge and Understanding (6 marks)

- 4 – 6** Demonstrates precise knowledge and understanding of 'forms' of utilitarianism. Candidates will probably outline classical utilitarianism as the teleological view that an action is good if it maximises utility and further describe it as the doctrine that we ought to perform an action if it maximises utility and/or leads to the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Answers in this band should refer to at least *two* variants of utilitarianism such as:

- Hedonism, the hedonic or felicific calculus and/or quantitative approaches to pleasure;
- negative utilitarianism, the minimisation of pain and suffering;
- qualitative approaches, higher pleasures and/or the pursuit and cultivation of certain ideals;
- preference utilitarianism, the satisfaction of preferences or desires;
- Act and Rule utilitarianism.

There may be references to Bentham, Mill, Hare, Singer and others. Responses which refer to two or more positions without clearly distinguishing between them should be placed at the bottom of this band.

1 – 3 Demonstrates basic knowledge or partial understanding *either* through offering an account of only one utilitarian position *or* by offering an account of utilitarianism which isn't clear, precise, detailed or clearly expressed.

0 No relevant philosophical knowledge and understanding is demonstrated.

Selection and Application (9 marks)

The positions identified should be related to moral actions or moral agency. Some of the following, or equivalent, points will be raised:

- practical issues: the consequences of actions may be difficult to predict; there are clearly difficulties involved in measuring the happiness and/or pain an action produces and of comparing the utility of different goods or the same good to different people; in many instances there are difficulties in knowing whose happiness and/or pain is to be included in the calculation, etc;
- indeed, in many situations we generally act without first undertaking a utilitarian calculation and in some situations we wouldn't have time to perform a utilitarian calculation (assuming that such a calculation were possible);
- maximising pleasure is a 'thin' theory of the good and neglects other values which might be socially useful or of benefit to individuals;
- sometimes acts which are simply wrong would be approved of because in certain instances such an act might have positive consequences;
- the same point applied to minority interests and/or acts that neglect or infringe upon individual rights. Difficulties of securing rights generally;
- apart from being excessively demanding with regard to the calculation of consequences, etc does it also have an excessively demanding requirement to ignore personal attachments?
- utility monsters and the problem of acting in a way to promote/secure distributive justice;
- utilitarianism is inconsistent with the moral integrity of agents; we might be held morally responsible for refusing to perform an action that, while having positive consequences, was against our principles.

Or any other reasonable point. Some of these points should be employed to consider whether, for example, rule utilitarianism, preference utilitarianism or qualitative approaches to happiness offer a more acceptable account of moral action.

7 – 9 Selects relevant points and examples and applies these to provide a clear detailed analysis of philosophical arguments about whether any form of utilitarianism provides an adequate account of what it is to act morally. Answers in this band will develop a critical analysis of the points raised for discussion.

- 4 – 6** Selects relevant points and examples to provide a partial analysis of philosophical arguments about whether any form of utilitarianism provides an adequate account of what it is to act morally, either narrowly focused on a couple of pertinent issues or listing a wide range of points which are not discussed in any detail and which may not be precisely stated.
- 1 – 3** Selects and applies at least one relevant point to provide a basic, sketchy and vague explanation of philosophical arguments about whether any form of utilitarianism provides an adequate account of what it is to act morally **or** some relevant points feature among many irrelevant points in a confused or tangential approach to the question.
- 0** No relevant philosophical points are presented.

Interpretation and Evaluation (9 marks)

A range of argumentation is possible and note that evaluative points may feature in the treatment of various issues and points selected for discussion without any additional 'summing-up'.

- it could be argued that utilitarian approaches to morality remain highly influential and that action aimed at the pursuit of happiness (or preference satisfaction) and/or the minimisation of suffering is morally worthwhile;
 - beyond this, it might also be argued that utilitarianism, or some version of it, can counter some of the critical points selected, eg that utility overrides rights or that the notion of rights is dubious; that utility trumps integrity; that utilitarianism can provide an account of distributive justice; that it doesn't require us to be impersonal or that there's nothing wrong with such a requirement; that majority interests ought to be pursued; that private experiences of pleasure are all that matters etc, etc;
 - it could also be argued, following points raised for discussion, that one particular version of utilitarianism is superior to others (faces fewer problems, counters more criticisms);
 - alternatively, it might be argued that no utilitarian approach to moral action is fully acceptable and that what is needed is an approach which guarantees respect for persons, which insists that certain acts are wrong or which focuses more on our development as moral agents. There may be references to alternative normative theories.
- 7 – 9** A critical appreciation of arguments concerning whether any form of utilitarianism provides an adequate account of what it is to act morally is provided and a clear argument or position is advanced. This may be balanced, ie strengths and weaknesses are acknowledged.
- 4 – 6** Evaluation is present within an exposition of arguments concerning whether any form of utilitarianism provides an adequate account of what it is to act morally but is either largely implicit in the selection of points for discussion (eg it is assumed that critical points are fatal) asserted with limited support (either argumentation is limited or the supporting evidence is limited) or not closely linked to moral action.
- 1 – 3** A simple and basic appreciation of arguments concerning whether any form of utilitarianism provides an adequate account of what it is to act morally is present either in a narrow, sketchy or largely descriptive response, in which points are listed or asserted without justification, or in a response in which the argument is confused.
- 0** No relevant philosophical insights are presented.

2

Total for this question: 45 marks

| | |
|---|-----------|
| (a) Briefly distinguish between emotivism and prescriptivism. | (6 marks) |
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Knowledge and Understanding (6 marks)

- 4 – 6** Demonstrates precise knowledge and understanding of the difference between emotivism and prescriptivism. Both positions may be described as non-cognitive meta-ethical theories (and this may be further explained) before they are distinguished as separate theories but full marks can be obtained without reference to any similarity between these positions. Prescriptivism may be described as an amendment to emotivism in which there is more emphasis on the rationality of moral utterances. This might be further explored through the idea that moral judgements should be universal and/or through the idea that there are logical relations between moral judgements. Alternatively, candidates might focus on the idea that prescriptions guide actions. The contrast with emotivism may be developed through descriptions of emotivism as a 'boo-hurrah' theory in which moral language expresses feelings of disapproval or approval and/or through the idea that moral language is intended to influence the views and actions of the listener. Illustrative examples may be used to assist explanation. No marks are available for evaluations of either position although marks should be awarded for relevant knowledge and understanding contained within them. Locate answers in this band according to the depth and detail presented. Answers at the bottom of this band may be accurate but undeveloped or fail to make the difference between the positions explicit.
- 1 – 3** Demonstrates basic or partial knowledge and understanding of the difference between emotivism and prescriptivism probably by providing an accurate account of one position and an imprecise account of the second so that the difference is either unclear or confused.
- 0** No relevant philosophical knowledge and understanding is presented.

| | |
|---|------------|
| (b) Explain and illustrate one strength of non-cognitive theories of ethics. | (15 marks) |
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Knowledge and Understanding (6 marks)

- 4 – 6** Demonstrates precise knowledge and understanding of **one** strength of non-cognitive theories of ethics. Following part (a), candidates will probably describe both emotivism and prescriptivism as non-cognitive meta-ethical positions maintaining that there is no ethical knowledge because there are no objective moral facts or truths that can be known/that can be true or false. Moral judgements involve an evaluative add-on from us in the form of an expression of emotion or commendation. Some of this may be implicit in the selection of a strength and full marks can be earned by responses which begin by identifying a strength. This is likely to be drawn from: the view that the natural world is non-moral, facts don't 'speak for themselves' (morally) and there is a gap between fact and value; the idea of a moral fact is odd, moral facts are 'queer entities'; non-cognitive

theories might be seen as being consistent with moral relativism or, more accurately, with contingency and/or moral neutrality; non-cognitive theories are consistent with the view that it doesn't seem possible to resolve moral disputes by appeals to facts alone; beliefs about the facts of the case are insufficient to guide action, one also needs appropriate desires/feelings/commitments; moral judgements are clearly connected to moral agency, we attach value to the world or any other reasonable point. At the lower end of the mark band explanations may lack detail, blur together more than one strength or identify a strength which only applies to one position (eg emotivism but not prescriptivism or vice versa).

- 1 – 3** Demonstrates basic or partial knowledge or understanding of one strength of non-cognitive theories by offering a confused account of a relevant point or by making a point which is not clearly a strength of non-cognitive theories (eg the point and/or the explanation seem to apply equally to cognitive positions).
- 0** No relevant philosophical knowledge and understanding is presented.

Selection and Application (9 marks)

The strength selected could be illustrated negatively through reference to weaknesses in cognitive theories, eg examples employed by writers like Foot or Searle, or examples involving aesthetics, etc which might be presented as unconvincing; examples of creating value used in texts (eg Sartre again); illustrations of how moral language is not (only) fact-stating language or of moral language as expressive and action-guiding; examples of moral agency based on feelings/commitments which is relative to particular groups; examples of seemingly irresolvable moral dilemmas or any other relevant illustrative point.

- 7 – 9** Selects at least one relevant example and applies this to provide a clear, detailed illustration in support of their explanation of one strength of non-cognitive theories.
- 4 – 6** Selects at least one illustrative example and applies this to provide a partial illustration, lacking detail or precision, of one strength of non-cognitive theories. Responses in this band may be characterised by detailed exposition and a brief but relevant illustration.
- 1 – 3** Provides a basic, sketchy and vague illustration of one strength of non-cognitive theories (eg it is not clear how the example provided relates to non-cognitive theories) **or** the response consists of explanation only, no attempt is made to illustrate (locate answers in which the explanation provided is clear at the top of this band).
- 0** No relevant philosophical points are made.

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| <p>(c) Assess the view that moral conclusions cannot be drawn from purely factual premises. (24 marks)</p> |
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Knowledge and Understanding (6 marks)

- 4 – 6** Demonstrates precise knowledge and understanding of the view that we can't draw moral conclusions from purely factual premises. Candidates will probably identify this as the 'is-ought' or 'fact-value' gap: the view that there is a logical gap between statements of fact and value judgements, that no statements of fact can logically entail a

moral value. There may be references to Hume and/or to non-cognitive positions stressing that whatever the facts of the case may be an evaluative add-on is required (so that, for example, we may agree about the facts of the case but evaluate them differently and make different moral judgements). Alternatively, knowledge and understanding may be demonstrated through the use of illustrative examples (eg it is a fact that the UK imprisons a higher proportion of juvenile offenders than other European countries, it is not a fact that this is wrong.) Responses at the bottom of this band may demonstrate a broad understanding of the issue but lack detail and precision.

- 1 – 3** Demonstrates basic knowledge and partial understanding through offering a confused account in which the alleged gap between statements of fact and value judgements isn't clearly indicated or expressed.
- 0** No relevant philosophical knowledge and understanding is demonstrated.

Selection and Application (9 marks)

This issue may be approached in different ways. Some of the following, or equivalent, points will be raised:

- Hume's point that it is 'altogether inconceivable' how a moral judgement could be deduced from a factual statement as 'ought' and 'ought not' express 'some new relation or affirmation';
- developed illustrative examples, possibly demonstrating that a valid deductive argument requires the invocation of a universal ought principle. (Whatever is difficult ought not to be taught at AS level. Meta-ethics is difficult. Meta-ethics ought not to be taught at AS level). But, in this case one is moving from ought to ought and there is the further difficulty of establishing universal ought principles;
- versions of the naturalistic fallacy might be employed to demonstrate that, however one defines something, moral questions relating to it are not self-answering;
- an account of the non-cognitive insistence that, whatever the facts may be, moral judgements require some form of evaluative add-on from us – an expression of emotion, a commendation, etc;
- the realist insistence that moral judgements can be true or false in virtue of the way the world is (the properties of a situation, action or person). So, there is no unbridgeable gap between fact and value because facts of an appropriate type support moral conclusions (and provide reasons for acting);
- well-known responses to the idea of an unbridgeable gap between fact and value are likely to be considered. For example, Foot's point that moral judgements are necessarily connected to human flourishing/the virtues and that it is impossible to make a value judgement about anything one likes; Searle's account of promising (of how the conclusion 'Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars' follows from factual premises);
- some candidates may employ analogous arguments from aesthetics;
- or any other reasonable point.

- 7 – 9** Selects relevant points and examples and applies these to provide a clear detailed analysis of the view that we can't draw moral conclusions from purely factual premises. Answers in this band will develop a critical analysis of the points raised for discussion.
- 4 – 6** Selects relevant points and examples to provide a partial analysis of the view that we can't draw moral conclusions from purely factual premises, either narrowly focused on one issue or listing a wide range of points which are not discussed in any detail and which may not be precisely stated.

1 – 3 Selects and applies at least one relevant point to provide a basic, sketchy and vague explanation of the view that we can't draw moral conclusions from purely factual premises **or** some relevant points feature among many irrelevant points in a confused or tangential approach to the question.

0 No relevant philosophical points are presented.

Interpretation and Evaluation (9 marks)

A range of argumentation is possible and note that evaluative points may feature in the treatment of various issues and points selected for discussion without any additional 'summing-up':

- it could be argued that the view in question is correct and that moral conclusions can't be drawn from purely factual premises because, for example, we may agree on the facts about, eg euthanasia but still disagree on what ought to be done; or because there will be instances where, eg I ought to keep my promise *doesn't* seem to be the moral thing to do; or because where a moral conclusion *does* seem to follow from the facts it is because the alleged facts are already normative;
- alternatively it could be argued that moral value, like aesthetic value, is in the world – or is connected to the way the world is – and that facts of an appropriate nature do provide reasons in support of moral conclusions. For example, it is a (normative) fact that fireworks are dangerous and this fact supplies a reason in support of the conclusion that fireworks ought not to be sold to children. There may be some references to how our abilities to detect normative facts or moral properties can develop through experience and training.

7 – 9 A critical appreciation of arguments concerning the view that we can't draw moral conclusions from purely factual premises is provided and a clear argument or position is advanced. This may be balanced, ie strengths and weaknesses are acknowledged.

4 – 6 Evaluation is present within an exposition of arguments concerning the view that we can't draw moral conclusions from purely factual premises but is either largely implicit in the selection of points for discussion (eg it is assumed that critical points are fatal) or asserted with limited support (either argumentation is limited or the supporting evidence is limited).

1 – 3 A simple and basic appreciation of arguments concerning the view that we can't draw moral conclusions from purely factual premises is present either in a narrow, sketchy or largely descriptive response, in which points are listed or asserted without justification, or in a response in which the argument is confused.

0 No relevant philosophical insights are presented.

3

Total for this question: 45 marks

(a) Briefly explain **one** objection to Pascal's Wager.

(6 marks)

Knowledge and Understanding (6 marks)

4 – 6 Demonstrates precise knowledge and understanding of one objection to Pascal's Wager. The wager or the purpose of the wager will probably be briefly outlined although understanding may be implicit in the objection selected and full marks are available for a clear and precise statement of a relevant objection. *One* objection will be drawn from: to believe for reasons of self-interest is to believe for the wrong reasons and/or God might not take kindly to this; whether one can generate genuine belief, or trust, in God in this way; whether, in attempting to do so, one is being intellectually dishonest; whether there are only two options open to us (the 'many Gods' objection); related to this, possibly the view that we can find spiritual fulfilment in other ways; whether it is true that we lose nothing by living a Christian life should it turn out to be the case that God doesn't exist; a life of sin might be seen, by some, as worth the risk; or any other reasonable point. Brief illustrations may be used to explain the objection. At the bottom of this band more than one objection may be given, two points may be blurred together or a list of objections might be offered. Answers in which one relevant objection is clearly stated should be placed in this band according to the level of detail presented.

1 – 3 Demonstrates basic or partial knowledge and understanding of one objection to Pascal's Wager. At the top of this band a relevant objection will be briefly, and accurately, identified but little or no explanation is offered. Answers at the bottom of this band may offer a partial or confused explanation of the purpose of the wager so that the objection offered is not clearly an objection to Pascal (eg this doesn't show that God exists).

0 No relevant philosophical knowledge and understanding is presented.

(b) Explain and illustrate **two** ways in which transcendence may be viewed as a problematic attribute of God. (15 marks)

4 – 6 Demonstrates precise knowledge and understanding of *two* ways in which transcendence may be viewed as a problematic attribute of God. Transcendence will probably be defined as the view that God is an entity beyond sense experience and/or as the view that God is not part of the universe and does not exist in space or time. Two ways in which this may be seen as problematic might be drawn from the views:

- that a transcendent entity is unknowable through experience and that religious and/or mystical experience, whatever it is, cannot be used to ground religious belief;
- it is difficult to conceive of and/or form a personal relationship with such a Being;
- no reasoned inference from our experience of the world to God as a transcendent creator can be made and, therefore, certain arguments for the existence of God fail;
- religious language, to the extent that it includes unverifiable statements about a transcendent entity, is meaningless (speculative metaphysics);
- it is difficult to see how a Being outside of time can act within time and/or to accept statements about God's intervention in the world.

At the lower end of the mark-band one problem will be clear but a second is briefly or vaguely stated.

- 1 – 3** Demonstrates basic or partial knowledge and understanding either by offering a very limited explanation, eg only one problem is identified, *or* by offering a confused account of two problems. Answers at the bottom of this band will demonstrate a very limited grasp of what transcendence involves and may struggle to identify a relevant problem.
- 0** No relevant philosophical knowledge and understanding is presented.

Selection and Application (9 marks)

Illustrative examples, or one illustrative example used to identify two problems, will probably draw from the literature. For example, Humean inspired critiques of inferences drawn from design and order; verificationist and/or falsificationist illustrations of meaningless religious statements; examples of allegedly religious and/or mystical experiences and their relevance; biblical examples of God's intervention in the world which clash with transcendence.

- 7 – 9** Selects at least one relevant example and applies this to provide a clear, detailed illustration in support of their explanation of problems associated with God's transcendence.
- 4 – 6** Selects at least one illustrative example to provide a partial illustration of two problems either because the example lacks detail and/or precision *or* because the focus is on one problem only *or* because the focus on transcendence is not maintained. Responses in this band may be characterised by detailed exposition.
- 1 – 3** Provides a basic, sketchy and vague example, or examples, linked to two problems associated with God's transcendence (eg it is not clear how the example provided illustrates a relevant problem) **or** an example or examples are used but application to the question is tangential (eg the focus drifts away from transcendence) **or** the response consists of explanation only, no attempt is made to illustrate (locate answers in which the explanation provided is clear at the top of this band).
- 0** No relevant philosophical points are made.

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| <p>(c) Assess whether the existence of evil should lead us to conclude that God does not exist. (24 marks)</p> |
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Knowledge and Understanding (6 marks)

The problem of evil (which may be quite briefly stated) is likely to be presented as a logical problem involving an inconsistency between the characteristics of God as perfectly good, omniscient and omnipotent (or, at least, as perfectly good and omnipotent) and the existence of moral and natural evils so that, allegedly, the propositions that 'the Christian God exists' and 'evil exists' are logically inconsistent.

It would also be acceptable to approach the issue evidentially: our experience of moral and natural evil should lead us to question whether or not there is a God *or* to at least question what He is like. Illustrations and/or definitions of moral and natural evil are more likely to feature in this approach.

4 – 6 Demonstrates precise and detailed knowledge and understanding of the problem of evil.

1 – 3 Demonstrates basic and partial knowledge and understanding of the problem of evil. Answers will lack detail and precision.

0 No relevant philosophical knowledge and understanding is presented.

Selection and Application (9 marks)

Some of the following, or equivalent, points will be selected for discussion:

- illustrations and/or definitions of natural and moral evil;
- the view that the existence of evil should lead us to abandon theism completely – there is no God;
- the view that, if there is a God, He's not worth worshipping;
- the view that we need to modify, rather than abandon, theism. Traditional theism should be rejected. For example, belief in God is a commitment to a form of life rather than a belief in an objective entity capable of acting in the world – so that the existence of evil isn't really a problem. Alternatively, God is an objective entity but not an omnipotent one. He can't prevent evil.

It is likely that most candidates will focus on attempted solutions to the problem such as:

- we have an imperfect grasp of good and evil and are not in a position to judge God's purposes;
- evil doesn't exist, only the comparative absence of good;
- evil is part of God's design contributing to balance, harmony etc. (Light/Dark);
- evil has to exist for a greater good to be achieved and/or goodness emerges from evil;
- evil makes us more virtuous, contributing to soul-making;
- evil is a consequence of human freedom which is itself a consequence of God's benevolent design;
- instability, and the resultant pain and suffering, is part of a God-given natural order, etc.

7 – 9 Selects relevant points and examples and applies these to provide a clear detailed analysis of whether the existence of evil should lead us to conclude that God does not exist. Answers in this band will develop a critical analysis of the points raised for discussion.

4 – 6 Selects relevant points and examples to provide a partial analysis of whether the existence of evil should lead us to conclude that God does not exist, either narrowly focused on one of moral or natural evil or one or two responses to the problem *or* listing a wide range of points which are not discussed in any detail and which may not be precisely stated.

1 – 3 Selects and applies at least one relevant point to provide a basic, sketchy and vague explanation of whether the existence of evil should lead us to conclude that God does not exist *or* some relevant points feature among many irrelevant points in a confused or tangential approach to the question.

0 No relevant philosophical points are presented.

Interpretation and Evaluation (9 marks)

A range of argumentation is possible:

- we should conclude that God does not exist – either because the nature and amount of evil is so overwhelming and undeniable that we have to conclude there is no God or because we can't logically reconcile this with the attributes of God;
- we could remain agnostic concerning whether or not God exists but claim that *if* He does exist, whatever His purposes are, He doesn't deserve awe, love and trust from us;
- we can modify the God of traditional theism – God cannot prevent evil because He hasn't the power to do so. At present, He is developing with us and suffers with us;
- we can avoid the problem by taking a non-realist stance on religiosity;
- we should not conclude that God does not exist – one or more of the attempts to reconcile evil and traditional theism are successful. (Although it might be questioned whether the attempt(s) is/are successful against both moral and natural evil).

7 – 9 A critical appreciation of arguments concerning whether the existence of evil should lead us to conclude that God does not exist is provided and a clear argument or position is advanced. Due to the nature of this question, this is unlikely to be balanced unless it is argued that a particular approach is partially successful.

4 – 6 Evaluation is present within an exposition of arguments concerning whether the existence of evil should lead us to conclude that God does not exist but is either largely implicit in the selection of points for discussion (eg it is assumed that critical points are fatal) or asserted with limited support (either argumentation is limited or the supporting evidence is limited).

1 – 3 A simple and basic appreciation of arguments concerning whether the existence of evil should lead us to conclude that God does not exist is present either in a largely descriptive response, in which points are listed or asserted without justification, or in a response in which the argument is confused or tangential.

0 No relevant philosophical insights are presented.

4

Total for this question: 45 marks

- | | | |
|-----|---|-----------|
| (a) | Briefly explain one reason for holding the view that belief in God is basic. | (6 marks) |
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Knowledge and Understanding (6 marks)

- 4 – 6** Demonstrates precise knowledge and understanding of one reason for holding the view that belief in God is properly basic. There may be some ‘background’ reference to how this view sees belief in God as ‘foundational’ (if not, classically, foundationalist) in the sense that it does not depend on other beliefs or arguments but full marks can be obtained for good accounts of one supporting reason where the view itself is left implicit. One reason is likely to be selected from: religious belief is rarely (if ever) based on arguments attempting to prove God’s existence; religious belief can be rationally held without such arguments; arguments for God’s existence aren’t successful anyway; God’s existence is self-evident through our experience and/or through faith; belief in God might be seen as analogous to other beliefs that might be said to be basic – eg belief in the external world. At the bottom of this band answers may be generally correct but explanation is undeveloped or several reasons may be listed rather than one reason explained.
- 1 – 3** Demonstrates basic or partial knowledge and understanding *either* by providing an account of basic belief without referring to a reason for holding this view of belief in God *or* by offering a partial and/or confused explanation of the notion of a basic belief and/or a reason for holding that belief in God is basic. Answers at the bottom of this band may equate basic with simplistic.
- 0** No relevant philosophical knowledge and understanding is demonstrated.

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| (b) | Explain and illustrate two criticisms of teleological arguments for the existence of God. | (15 marks) |
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Knowledge and Understanding (6 marks)

- 4 – 6** Demonstrates precise knowledge and understanding of *two* criticisms of teleological arguments for the existence of God. It is likely that candidates will briefly describe what a teleological argument is before identifying criticisms but full marks can be obtained by answers in which this is implicit in the criticisms identified. *Two* criticisms may be drawn from: they don’t prove the existence of the God of classical theism; they make inferences from what we do have experience of to what we don’t have experience of; they don’t licence the conclusion that there is one designer; they don’t licence the conclusion that the designer is perfect; the universe is more like an organism than an artefact; order in the universe could exist by chance; we can explain order and purpose without reference to God; the androcentric nature of anthropic versions of the argument or any other reasonable point. Precise accounts of two criticisms should be awarded full marks. Answers at the bottom of this band may list criticisms, blur two criticisms together or

provide a clear account of one criticism and a brief or sketchy account of a second criticism. No marks are available for evaluating the criticisms identified.

- 1 – 3** Demonstrates basic or partial knowledge and understanding either by offering a limited explanation, eg only one criticism is identified, *or* illustrations of criticisms are assumed to be self-explanatory so that the criticism(s) is left implicit, *or* by offering a confused account of two criticisms. Tangential accounts, in which the focus shifts away from design, should be placed at the bottom of this band.
- 0** No relevant philosophical knowledge and understanding is presented.

Selection and Application (9 marks)

Illustrative examples, or one illustrative example used to identify two criticisms, will probably draw from the literature, for example, from Hume's 'Dialogues', Mark Twain or the Epicurean Hypothesis. Candidates should be rewarded for attempts to construct their own illustrative examples of, eg weak analogies, imperfect designs and imperfect designers, etc.

- 7 – 9** Selects at least one relevant example and applies this to provide a clear, detailed, illustration in support of their explanation of **two** criticisms of teleological arguments for the existence of God.
- 4 – 6** Selects at least one illustrative example to provide a partial illustration of two criticisms *either* because the example lacks detail and/or precision *or* because the focus is on one criticism only. Responses in this band may be characterised by detailed exposition and very brief but clear illustration.
- 1 – 3** Provides a basic, sketchy and vague example, or examples, linked to two criticisms of teleological arguments for the existence of God (eg it is not clear how the example provided illustrates a relevant criticism) **or** an example or examples are used but application to the question is tangential (eg the focus drifts away from design) **or** the response consists of explanation only, no attempt is made to illustrate (locate answers in which the explanation provided is clear at the top of this band).
- 0** No relevant philosophical points are made.

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| <p>(c) Assess whether religious experiences can be used to demonstrate the existence of God. (24 marks)</p> |
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Knowledge and Understanding (6 marks)

There should be some attempt to clarify the notion of religious experience as, for example, an experience caused by God; an experience possessing certain phenomenological properties; a life-changing experience. Beyond this, types of religious experience may be described (private and public experiences) as might the characteristics of religious experiences (ineffable, transient, etc).

Religious experiences are typically seen as a non-inferential way of knowing God.

- 4 – 6** Demonstrates precise and detailed knowledge and understanding of the notion of religious experience.
- 1 – 3** Demonstrates basic and partial knowledge and understanding of the notion of religious experience. Answers will lack detail and precision.
- 0** No relevant philosophical knowledge and understanding is presented.

Selection and Application (9 marks)

Discussion could involve:

- reference to philosophers who see religious experience as contributing to belief in God, eg Otto, James, Swinburne;
- accounts of experience which illustrates the characteristics employed in distinguishing it as religious as opposed to non-religious experience. For example, aspects of the immediate and direct nature of religious experience (eg its felt quality, the feeling of awe, reverence, exhilaration, fascination, etc) or of the impact of religious experience (eg visible signs of changed behaviour). There may be references to biblical examples;
- more detailed illustrations of types of religious experience. The (public) beauty of a landscape, public and private experiences of a 'presence', mystical (ineffable) experiences, private experiences that can be described (hearing the voice of God, etc). This may involve (but shouldn't dwell upon) experiences of miracles;
- (possibly) the view that all experience is religious;
- issues concerning credibility/testimony and/or whether the experience can be communicated to others or demonstrate God's existence for others (who have not had the experience) and/or related difficulties of accounting for why some have experiences which are, allegedly, religious and some do not;
- whether religious experiences support conflicting beliefs;
- the difficulties of distinguishing religious experiences from other experiences and, particularly, of demonstrating that the source of the experience was God;
- Flew's circularity argument;
- Owen's analogy with sense experience.

- 7 – 9** Selects relevant points and examples and applies these to provide a clear detailed analysis of whether religious experiences can be used to demonstrate the existence of God. Answers in this band will develop a critical analysis of the points raised for discussion.
- 4 – 6** Selects relevant points and examples to provide a partial analysis of whether religious experiences can be used to demonstrate the existence of God, either narrowly focused on one or two responses to the problem or listing a wide range of points which are not discussed in any detail and which may not be precisely stated.
- 1 – 3** Selects and applies at least one relevant point to provide a basic, sketchy and vague explanation of whether religious experiences can be used to demonstrate the existence of God **or** some relevant points feature among many irrelevant points in a confused or tangential approach to the question.
- 0** No relevant philosophical points are presented.

Interpretation and Evaluation (9 marks)

Evaluation is likely to be present in issues selected for discussion; beyond this a range of positions might be argued:

- language is meaningful to the extent that it employs concepts derived from experience and expresses propositions which can be confirmed through experience. Claims about religious experience may involve the former but not the latter. To an extent, then, we might be inclined to disregard such claims as not meaningful. Also, isn't it more credible to see claims about religious experience as reflections of certain psychological factors, commitments, needs, forms of life?
- on the other hand is it appropriate to speak of 'demonstrating' God's existence? Can't we accept faith as a route to God and a path to experiencing the world in a religious way? Even from outside of a language game/form of life we can understand claims about religious experience and we do have some evidence about the nature of religious experiences that some have (changed lives, etc.). The alleged analogy between sense experience and religious experience;
- assessment of the persuasiveness of the principles of credulity and testimony. Do we need a 'special' reason for doubt or is doubt sufficient? Surely we can't doubt that so called religious experiences could have other causes. If the principle of credulity is convincing is the negative principle of credulity equally convincing? Where does this leave us?
- some might argue that the principles of credulity and testimony are acceptable and that we can use religious experience to demonstrate the existence of God.

7 – 9 A critical appreciation of arguments concerning whether religious experiences can be used to demonstrate the existence of God is provided and a clear argument or position is advanced. This might be balanced, strengths and weaknesses of a particular view are acknowledged.

4 – 6 Evaluation is present within an exposition of arguments concerning whether religious experiences can be used to demonstrate the existence of God but is either largely implicit in the selection of points for discussion (eg it is assumed that critical points are fatal) or asserted with limited support (either argumentation is limited or the supporting evidence is limited).

1 – 3 A simple and basic appreciation of arguments concerning whether religious experiences can be used to demonstrate the existence of God is present either in a largely descriptive response, in which points are listed or asserted without justification, or in a response in which the argument is confused or tangential.

0 No relevant philosophical insights are presented.