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General Certificate of Education June 2011

GCE Philosophy

Unit 4

Philosophical Problems

Final

Mark Scheme

PHIL4

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GCE PHILOSOPHY UNIT 4

GENERIC MARK SCHEME for part (a) questions (Total: 15 marks)

	Knowledge and Understanding	Interpretation, Analysis and Application
	AO1	AO2
Level 2	5–8 marks	4–7 marks
	At the top end of this level, there is a clear grasp of textual material. Detail must be present.	At the top end, relevance will be sustained. Examples are appropriate and their implications
	At the lower end of this level subtle detail may be lacking without affecting the general grasp of the material.	made apparent. Some detail may be lacking at the lower end of the level.
	Philosophical sophistication should be present at the top end of the level.	Textual material is applied in a directed manner regarding the requirements of the question.
Level 1	1–4 marks	1–3 marks
	There is a partial grasp of arguments/positions. Detail is omitted.	Analysis of arguments or positions is partial or lacking. Examples are not fully analysed.
	At the bottom end of this level there is little grasp of the material. At the top end a grasp of at least one topical idea is in evidence.	Implications may not be drawn out. The response may not always sustain relevance and there may be misinterpretation of key ideas.
0 marks	No relevant philosophical points.	No relevant philosophical points.

GCE PHILOSOPHY UNIT 4

GENERIC MARK SCHEME for part (b) questions (Total: 45 marks)

	AO1: Knowledge and Understanding	AO2: Interpretation, Analysis and Application	AO3: Assessment and Evaluation
Level 5			20–24 marks
			The evaluation displays accuracy and penetration. At least two arguments are treated in detail. A sophisticated grasp of the issues is apparent. Depth is demonstrated through the exploration of points, examples and their implications. Counter-arguments are considered. Positions are argued for and clearly related to the material discussed.
			The response is legible, employing technical language accurately and appropriately, with few, if any, errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar. The response reads as a coherent and integrated whole.
Level 4			15–19 marks
			There is an accurate and developed treatment of at least one argument. Counter argument is in evidence. A detailed treatment is expected at the top end of this level. Alternatively, a range of arguments may be present but a detailed treatment is lacking. Examples and counter- examples are used evaluatively. The assessment shows a sophisticated grasp of a position. The response is legible, and technical language is employed with partial success. There may be occasional errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar and the response reads as a coherent whole.

GCE PHILOSOPHY UNIT 4

	AO1: Knowledge and Understanding	AO2: Interpretation, Analysis and Application	AO3: Assessment and Evaluation
Level 3	8–10 marks	9–11 marks	9–14 marks
	There will be a clear grasp of the issues with appropriate detail. The text will have been engaged. Key positions/arguments are presented with clarity and philosophical sophistication.	The analysis is detailed. Examples are well constructed and their implications are apparent. Textual material is appropriately directed and relevance sustained.	At the top end of this level there is clear grasp of evaluative issues, but the assessment lacks penetration. There may be a juxtaposition of contrasting stances rather then developed assessment of a position. Use of examples may be limited to illustration with evaluative issues underdeveloped. This features strongly at the lower end of this level. Generality, rather than detailed treatment is likely to be a dominant characteristic. The response is legible, employing some technical language accurately, with possibly some errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar.
Level 2	4–7 marks	5–8 marks	5–8 marks
	There is a general grasp of the material shading into a basic grasp at the lower end. Textual detail is lacking. At the top end of this level a clear understanding of at least one argument must be present.	Examples or analogies should be present. The implications may not be fully drawn out but there is a clear sense of directedness. Detail is present at the top end, though the analysis as a whole may lack sophistication or be characterised as 'general'.	Evaluative points may be asserted rather than argued. There is little development of points and examples might be met with counter-assertions. Some arguments might be tangential. Sophistication may be lacking. The response may be legible, with a basic attempt to employ technical language, which may not be appropriate. There may be frequent errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar.
Level 1	1–3 marks	1–4 marks	1–4 marks
	A rudimentary or fragmentary grasp of the material is in evidence. Textual detail is lacking or misunderstood. At the top end a partial grasp of an argument or position must be in evidence.	The material may not directly impinge on the question. Examples are not fully analysed or explained. At the lower end of this level material may be misinterpreted. The analysis might be characterised as 'basic'.	Evaluation is misdirected or lacking in any detail. Arguments may be weak or absent. There is no development of issues. At the top end of this level there must be an indication of one evaluative issue. Technical language may not be employed, or it may be used inappropriately. The response may not be legible and errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar may be intrusive.
0 marks	No relevant philosophical points.	No relevant philosophical points.	No relevant philosophical points.

GENERIC MARK SCHEME for part (b) questions continued

Section A

Hume: An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding

01 Outline and illustrate Hume's distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact. *(15 marks)*

AO1

- The distinction is known as Hume's Fork and is concerned with types of knowledge and is regarded as exhaustive.
- Relations of ideas are known a priori, logically certain, necessarily true, demonstrable.
- They do not provide any information about the world.
- Matters of fact known through experience not reason. They are a posteriori, contingent.
- Provide genuine knowledge of the world.

AO2

- Analysis likely to include detail regarding the negation of relations of ideas being inconceivable by the mind, unlike matters of fact.
- Matters of fact can be presented via internal or external senses.
- Matters of fact rest on relation of cause and effect.
- Illustrative examples of relations of ideas are likely to be drawn from mathematics or logic. Those of matters of fact from science or everyday affairs.

AND EITHER

02 Critically discuss Hume's attempt to show that all our ideas are dependent on senseexperience. (45 marks)

AO1

- Hume has a radically empirical epistemology.
- There are no innate ideas.
- All ideas must be preceded by impressions of internal or external senses. Ideas are fainter copies of impressions.
- Simple and complex ideas.
- Role of imagination in forming complex ideas which have no corresponding impression.
- Deficiency in sense-organ leading to lack of corresponding idea.
- Exception of shades of blue.
- All empirical knowledge founded on cause and effect.

- Role of imagination likely to be illustrated by reference to golden mountains, mermaids etc.
- Shades of blue dismissed as too singular to merit serious attention.
- Exceptions might be referred to e.g. God human attributes on a large scale, infinity the finite magnified, augmented etc.
- Hume's challenge therefore to find an idea without a corresponding impression.
- Philosophical implications if no impression for an idea can be found, then the idea must be rejected as nonsensical.
- Limits of a priori reasoning, example of Adam and water, bread/lion.

- His dismissal of the shades of blue is too cavalier. Even if it was singular, it would not follow that it did not matter.
- The example is not singular; it could be applied to phenomena which can be graded on a scale.
- It might be argued that the imagination supplies the missing shade. However, this would be incompatible with Hume's claim that the imagination forms complex ideas not simple ones. A colour patch is a simple idea.
- Hume's thesis can be amended it is broadly right but is too particularised.
- Hume's thesis is inconsistent with his account of how we acquire the concept of necessary connection. Repetition is not an impression.
- Hume's challenge might be met by candidates considering counter-examples. Some of God's properties are not obviously like human ones (e.g. transcendence). God's love could be seen as different in kind from human love. Descartes' point that the infinite is not just the negation of the finite might be considered.
- Other examples that could feature: abstract ideas, liberty, universals.
- There might be some support for innate knowledge/ideas theories. Descartes, Plato, Chomsky could be adapted appropriately.
- It could be argued that Hume was wrong to claim that mathematics does not give us knowledge about the world and his theory of impressions fails to account for such knowledge. This might be developed into a general defence of rationalism.
- Hume's thesis is too dependent on the copy principle. He underplays the active or organisational features of the mind. Our acquisition of general principles is hard to account for in terms of imprinting/copying alone. This might be expanded into a discussion of knowledge in general or the formulating of imaginative scientific hypotheses – extrapolating, comparing etc.
- Candidates may approach the above issues through a discussion of Kant's categories. Critique of Hume on repetition.
- Hume misdescribes our experience of the world. Although our experiences can be subdivided, this does not imply that we experience the world in terms of sub-divisibles. Holistic perception.
- Bennett-type points how does Hume know e.g. a blind man has no idea of colour? Response in terms of what reason *could* he have for claiming this? The reasons he could have do not apply.

OR

03 'Hume has shown that a belief in the occurrence of a miracle will always be irrational.' Assess the validity of this claim. (45 marks)

AO1

- Hume's definition of a miracle in terms of a violation of a law of nature caused by a divine being.
- Probabilities always against miracles. Laws of nature and testimony.
- Accounts of miracles are inherited from barbarians.
- Assenting to the miraculous engenders pleasing emotions.
- Witnesses too few or lack credibility.
- Miracles could never serve as the foundation for religious systems. In discrediting the miracles of other faiths, testimony is discredited; but one's own miracles rest on testimony.

- There might be some discussion of laws of nature in terms of universal experience.
- Rationality seen in terms of past experience and probability.

- Whether Hume is claiming that miracles are impossible or highly improbable.
- Credibility of testimony.
- Any unexplained events will be explained by, as yet, unknown laws of nature.
- Examples of miracles/significance.

- There might be alternative accounts of miracles. Expect Holland-type examples child on railway line.
- If by laws of nature we mean, e.g. laws of thermodynamics, Newton's laws of motion etc, then it is not clear that miracles are in direct conflict with them.
- It might be argued that miracles should not be taken literally. However, it seems that the resurrection is essential to Christianity.
- It is not clear whether Hume is excluding the possibility of miracles. What does he mean by 'full proof'?
- Hume does not tell us what would constitute an acceptable number of witnesses. Neither does he tell us what would count as the right quality.
- If miracles engender such pleasing emotions, then you would expect more reports of them.
- Examples of modern miracles not inherited from barbarians.
- Hume should allow the possibility of miracles as there is no necessity in his account of causation.
- Hume seems to be defining miracles out of existence. No matter what evidence is produced, it is always more likely for that evidence to be mistaken.
- If you witnessed a miracle yourself, you would be rationally bound to disbelieve the evidence of your own senses.
- Miracles are not to be seen as random one-off events but must be placed within a religious context, e.g. seen in terms of Christ's mission.
- The paradox of supernatural causation it must be understandable but, at the same time, mysterious in order to inspire awe and wonder.
- Hume seems right in claiming that miracles cannot serve as a foundation for religious belief. Can they not have another function?
- Hume's claim about the explanatory power of unknown laws of nature involves a leap of faith or is simply vacuous.
- Would a theory of causation in terms of natural necessity be at all helpful to a defender of the miraculous?

Section B

Plato: The Republic

04 Outline Socrates' attempt to refute Thrasymachus' claim that the interests of the stronger determine what is right and just. (15 marks)

AO1

- The first claim is that justice serves the interest of the stronger.
- The second claim seems to move to what the ruler thinks is in his interest, but this is not Thrasymachus' claim.
- The claim is that no skilled craftsman makes a mistake in his capacity as a craftsman. (When his knowledge fails him he is no longer skilled).
- The ruler in his capacity as ruler is infallible.

AO2

- Enactment of laws furthers the interest of the stronger party ('right' = interest of the stronger).
- Bad rulers are not infallible (bad laws).
- With bad laws it would be right to do what is **not** in the interest of the stronger.
- Each skill has its own particular interest (analogies doctor/patient, captain/crew).
- The interest of government is its subjects, so rulers in their capacity as rulers serve the interests of their subjects not their own.

AND EITHER

05 Assess Plato's distinction between knowledge and belief.

(45 marks)

AO1

- Knowledge is of the Forms, unchanging reality. Knowledge contrasted with belief or opinion which is of particulars and subject to change.
- Knowledge is infallible, belief is fallible. There might be reference to the *a priori* nature of knowledge (rationalism).
- Knowledge is of what is; ignorance of what is not. Belief/opinion lies between these extremes.
- Knowledge is direct or intuitive. Belief is mediated.
- Knowledge produces true understanding, belief reduces us to mere sight-seers.
- Possession of knowledge relates to ruling, belief or opinion relates to pandering or worse.
- Knowledge constitutes a different faculty from belief.

- Properties of Forms are likely to feature immutable, beyond the world of the senses, timeless, perfect.
- Hierarchical structure of the Forms, with the Form of the Good as the pinnacle.
- Simile of the sun might be used, an accurate diagram is sufficient.
- Other similes may be used but should sustain relevance. The cave may illustrate the objects of knowledge, belief and ignorance.
- The ship may be used with the fixed stars corresponding to the Forms.
- The beast may be used to illustrate knowing and merely pandering, empirical method of sophists.

- Differences in faculties will not establish ontological differences in their respective objects.
- Plato's distinction would alter our concept of knowledge beyond recognition. It is so restrictive that we could only be said to know *a priori* propositions.
- Knowing a state of affairs does not entail the necessity of that state.
- Directed, informed criticism of the theory of Forms as opposed to asserting there is no empirical evidence for them.
- Plato's notion that knowledge must concern that which cannot be false may have absurd consequences. Credit should be given for supportive examples.
- The distinction between knowledge and belief is well made within the world of the senses. Criteria can be given without recourse to another world.
- Plato's distinction generates absolutes. This can have ethically and politically dangerous implications e.g. moral experts, political despots, closed societies, elitism.
- It is not clear that anything can be known in the unqualified sense required by Plato.
- The relationship between the Forms and sensible particulars is not clear, e.g. what is 'partaking' and how is it achieved?
- Why should eternal existence carry any implications for what we can be said to know? Aristotle's example of whiteness may be used.
- Candidates may argue that believing is a component of knowing.
- Related to the above, there could be a discussion of knowledge as justified true belief. Good responses will consider Plato's own counter-example of Hesiod's Wagon.
- Can all ethical and political problems be resolved by the acquisition of knowledge? Credit should be given for realistic counter-examples.
- The apprehension of the highest knowledge (Form of the Good) borders on the mystical. Plato can make some response in terms of our limitations and how knowledge of other Forms can be acquired and demonstrated through the use of reason.
- Candidates may develop alternative accounts of universals e.g. Aristotle.

OR

06 'Democracy provides the most just and efficient form of political rule.' Assess whether Plato has shown this claim to be false. (45 marks)

AO1

- Distinctions are likely to be made between direct (Athenian) democracy and present day democracies.
- Relation between justice and knowledge.
- Democracy could not be just or efficient for Plato given its mode of administration.
- There are likely to be references to the Forms and their importance to political rule.
- Plato's views may be illustrated by reference to the similes.

- Analysis of similes, credit should be given for appropriate detail.
- Ship and beast similes are likely to figure prominently.
- Ship's captain deaf/stupid, crew (politicians) competing for control but no real knowledge of how to steer a course. What is ultimately good not even a consideration.
- Beast similes, beast is large, powerful, potentially dangerous. Tamed by those (politicians) who pander to its short-term whims. No conception of what is ultimately good for it.
- The cave simile might feature, especially in regard to the return to the cave of the freed prisoner.

- Analysis should result in a clear picture of Plato's conception of the people and their rules.
- There may be further illustration through the trial and death of Socrates.
- The importance of knowledge in regard to knowing what is good for people, being virtuous and effective rule.

- Are differences between direct and modern democracies of kind or degree? There might be some reference to the use of referenda.
- In a modern democracy an educated public can be distinguished from a rabble.
- The beast analogy may be seen as primarily concerned with the most efficient forms of **control** and pacification. Democracy does not and should not regard this as the ultimate political end.
- There may be reference to democratic goals such as self-determination, freedom and political participation, choice. These are ends in themselves and no just system can dispense with them.
- Knowledge can efficiently determine how to achieve ends, but not the ends themselves (weakness of ship simile).
- Politics is not an exact science (Aristotle) and it is a mistake to suppose that it ever could be.
- The similes have some resemblance to modern electioneering, but that is only **one** aspect of a democracy. Other aspects could be discussed, e.g. votes against capital punishment regardless of public opinion. Integrity as opposed to sophistry. The ultimate nature of accountability.
- Candidates may, however, argue that the comparison between sound bites and pandering is persuasive.
- Plato has a too pessimistic view of human nature the beast merely reacts, the captain is deaf/stupid, the prisoners in the cave are in the dark and **want** to remain there.
- Plato's alternative is inherently unjust a closed society, the parlous position of the individual. This could be parodied just as much as democracy.
- History teaches us the dangers and injustices of societies constructed on claims to have absolute knowledge. Highly competent administrators administered dreadful ends.
- Even if we make mistakes, it is preferable to learn for ourselves. Mill-type arguments against paternalism may figure.
- Why does there have to be **one** good? There could be discussion of metaphysical justifications for this claim. Can the Form of the Good be attained?
- Plato's conception of the public should be taken as an incentive to improve education.

Section C Mill: On Liberty

07 Explain Mill's Harm Principle and outline any **three** of his applications of that principle. *(15 marks)*

AO1

- Clear statement of the Harm Principle. Limit state interference in our actions to those actions which affect others in terms of harm.
- Self-regarding, other-regarding actions.
- Physical harm as opposed to offence.
- Individual is sovereign over his mind and body.
- Applications likely to include three of: drunkenness, fair competition, sale of drugs or poison, gambling, birth control, women's rights/issues, importing opium, education, fornication, religious observance, slavery. Harm Principle may be invoked in cases of incitement (corn dealer).

AO2

- Illustration of self and other regarding actions. The example of the unsafe bridge may feature.
- Outlines of the applications, e.g. the drunken policeman individual capacity and social duty, fornication in public offensive to public decency. Correct procedures and record keeping for the sale of noxious substances, location of gaming houses, fair competition in free trade or in job applications and interviews etc.
- Any three of the above or similar.

AND EITHER

 68 'Mill's account of personal liberty ensures the development of the individual and society.' Assess the validity of this claim. (45 marks)

AO1

- Freedom of action, experiments in living allow us to develop our own mode of being.
- Such freedom is important for its own sake **and** socially beneficial.
- We should avoid sheep-like imitation.
- Differences in physical and spiritual needs.
- Differences in what gives pleasure and pain.
- Importance of eccentricity and non-conformity.

- Need for different stimulations and environments.
- Analogies with the growth of a tree or machine might feature.
- Need to counter the dominance of average opinion. There might be reference to the 'tyranny' of public opinion, especially in moral matters.
- Eccentricity seen as a sign of mental vigour. Should be pursued for its own sake.
- There might be some account of Mill's attack on custom and the ape-like imitation it engenders.
- Relevant use of Mill's examples or similar.

- Mill's claim that actions or ways of life are valuable as they are one's own, might be regarded as inconsistent with utilitarian considerations. The possibility of a clash between two absolute principles might be explored.
- The value of action is contingent on what it produces.
- Eccentricity might be seen as a sign of mental weakness rather than strength. Examples might be given concerning whether being eccentric equates with being strong.
- Mill seems to condone the unusual or eccentric simply because it is unusual rather than for its content. Is this a sufficient justification? Is this socially beneficial?
- As a matter of logic, we cannot all be eccentric. Eccentricity derives its value from a general conformity and so cannot be an option for all. We can only recognise eccentricity against a general stable background.
- It might be argued that on a wider level societies that have become highly individualistic have lost moral cohesion and identity. Historical examples might be used to show that such societies have become weak, decadent or vulnerable to attack.
- Alternatively, in support of Mill, total conformity, unthinking endorsement of tradition or custom, intolerance of diversity have also had consequences inconsistent with individual or social progress. Historical examples may feature.
- Mill does not pay sufficient attention to the distinction between individual variation within a fixed background of stability, and variation of the background itself.
- Mill overestimates rationality. In regard to experiments in living, people can make damaging choices. Some of these could be irreversible. Are they worth it simply because they are one's own choices? There might be some discussion of paternalism.
- In defence of Mill, paternalism is incompatible with ideas of democratic participation and personal responsibility.
- Some customs have stood the test of time. Mill himself uses a similar argument to justify his version of rule-utilitarianism.
- If custom is to be rejected, it should be because of its content, not just simply because it is custom.
- Mill sees too close a connection between custom and despotism. There may be a
 defence of Mill: he is warning us against the **blind** endorsement of custom and tradition.
- Blind acceptance will stunt the growth of our mental faculties. This would result in a despotism of the mind and would be incompatible with the **progression** of mankind.
- Custom provides stability and has social utility. It is the glue of a cohesive society, it allows us to have firm expectations.
- There might be reference to a conservative view, e.g. Burke's idea of a partnership between the living and the dead.
- Any discussion of the freedoms Mill regards as important needs to sustain relevance regarding the development of the individual and society.
- There may be contrasts/comparisons with other views on how best to promote the individual/society (Marxism, anarchism). If this approach is taken, it should do more than merely juxtapose positions.
- Points about cohesion may be made from conservative and radical perspectives. Alternative liberal accounts of justice. Mill's position could be supported by those outside the liberal tradition.

OR

09 To what extent, if any, was Mill right to highlight dangers inherent in democracy? *(45 marks)*

AO1

- It might seem that there cannot be any real objection to a democratically elected government. Such governments enact the will of the people.
- Historical remarks concerning limiting the power of rulers whose interests did not coincide with those of the ruled.
- The shift to representative government and the idea that interests coincide.
- A nation does not need protection from itself.
- Problem concerning what is meant by the will of the people.

AO2

- In practice the will of the people may turn out to mean the will of the numerically greater or those who are politically more active.
- They may seek to oppress minorities.
- We may get a tyranny of the majority.
- Social tyranny can be exercised through current opinion, prejudice, superstition. It goes deeper than enacting laws.
- Majority must be prevented from dictating on moral issues, hence the need to limit the powers even of those who are elected.
- Examples might be given to illustrate Mill's historical remarks.
- Mill's position on dangers not confined to liberal or libertarian support.

- Has Mill overstated his case? Talk of 'tyranny' evokes certain images (examples). Does a working democracy fit such imagery?
- The case needs overstating in order to sustain vigilance. There is a real danger (examples) and Mill was right to warn against it.
- Mill is not opposing majority rule as such but warming of the ascendancy of a dominant class that decides moral issues.
- One of the most dangerous tyrannies is a creeping tyranny one that almost imperceptibly creeps into our lives and our thinking. This was Mill's concern, hence his wariness of public/current opinion.
- Mill is implying that the rightful claims of the individual are not exhausted by an examination of the prevailing social/political forces. But such a claim could only be defended within a democratic framework such a framework cannot therefore be characterised as a 'tyranny'.
- It might be argued that Mill's position is not consistent with general utilitarian considerations.
- Mill might respond by claiming that such considerations embody the lessons of history which we ignore at our peril. But there might be criticisms from other political positions to which Mill is vulnerable.
- A moral consensus is necessary for a unified or cohesive society. Toleration can be one of the values without implying unlimited application.
- Is Mill claiming that any view or activity should be defended on the grounds that it is practised by some minority? Do we not also have to consider what they involve? It could be argued that the ultimate judgement here must lie with the moral majority. What is the alternative?
- The Harm Principle may be invoked to deal with the issues raised above. But there is moral disapproval of certain activities regardless of whether direct harm accrues e.g. incestuous relationships, generation of certain images using computer graphics.

- The whole issue of minority pursuits or interests must be clearly related to Mill's conception of man as a progressive being. It is not the case that just **anything** could be part of such a conception.
- Mill allows society to be the ultimate arbiter in what is necessary for its protection. Is this consistent with his remarks on tyranny?
- There could be some discussion of just what is meant by 'protection', e.g. from what? Specifiable harm, demonstrable harm, a society completely risk-free. Credit for relevant examples.

Section D

Descartes: Meditations

10 Explain and illustrate Descartes' ontolog	ical argument.
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(15 marks)

AO1

- It is a purely *a priori* argument. It moves from an analysis of the concept of God to the actual existence of such a being.
- God is defined as the perfect being, existence is a perfection and as a perfect being cannot lack a perfection, he cannot lack existence, so he must exist.
- 'God exists' becomes analytic.
- God is a unique concept- contains existence as part of its definition thus escaping the possible objection. See below.

AO2

- Existence cannot be separated from the essential nature of God no more than you can separate a mountain from a valley or a triangle from its logically necessary properties.
- But couldn't we deny these things together with their properties? His thought imposes no necessity on things.
- You could deny triangles and mountains as they do not incorporate 'existence' within their definitions.
- Existence inseparable from the concept of God.

AND EITHER

11 Assess Descartes' use of doubt and certainty in establishing his own existence.

(45 marks)

AO1

- By 'certainty' Descartes means the impossibility of doubt.
- We need a certainty as a foundation for knowledge.
- The use of the method of doubt.
- Senses can be doubted as they have been mistaken in the past.
- Dream argument nothing to distinguish dreaming and waking.
- Evil demon hypothesis global scepticism.
- The *cogito* only the 'l' survives as a matter of logic. This is the certainty.

AO2

- Descartes is using the sceptical method as a tool to defeat scepticism.
- Illustrations of the method.
- How the stages connect, objects in close proximity may survive the first stage but fall foul of the dream argument, general truths and demon hypothesis.
- The first certainty is the 'l', not God. The existence of God is doubted as part of the demon hypothesis.

- At most the method gives us an isolated self. We cannot get beyond this to construct a theory of knowledge.
- Descartes tacitly admits this when he tells us that his arguments for the existence of body are 'probable'.

- That a proposition is logically contingent does not entail that it cannot be known (Moore).
- Descartes' concept of knowledge is too restrictive **logical** certainty is too stringent a condition.
- The problem of narrow content. Basic foundational certainties do not have sufficient content to generate systems of knowledge.
- The above may be taken as a criticism of the project of finding **one** certainty.
- The validity of the *cogito* might be questioned. It may establish that there is a thought now, rather than an enduring self. Or, the argument is circular if expressed in syllogistic form and it needs to be to preserve logical validity.
- There may be a critical discussion of the method of doubt at its various stages. The kind of arguments likely to feature are as follows:
 - I. that the senses have let us down sometimes does not permit the inference that they may always do so (Austin, Ryle).
 - **II.** we must have a concept of reality, not only to compare the dream with, but also to formulate the concept of a dream.
 - **III.** are there no distinguishing features between dreaming and waking? Structure, sequence, coherence and remembering dreams as dreams seem likely candidates. There may also be reference to Malcolm and the issue of lucid dreaming.
 - **IV.** Is the demon hypothesis meaningful? Doubt requires a background or context, not the obliteration of all possible ones. It is not a genuine hypothesis as it is consistent with all eventualities, does not admit of the possibility of a counter-example, has no distinguishing features.
 - V. There might be references to the Matrix. If we allow deceptions within a deception, then those who control the Matrix could be deceived problem of infinite regress.
- The method of doubt is carried out through the use of language but what are the presuppositions of doing this? Wittgenstein type arguments may feature, especially regarding private rules/definitions, public criteria, whether expressions have a use, and hence, a meaning. To be able to self-ascribe, I must be able to other ascribe.
- To be consistent in the application of his method, Descartes should have doubted his memory. Although he refers to his 'deceptive' memory, he does not explore the implications of doubting his memory, e.g. he would have to take **some** memory as veridical either his own or another's, in order to recognise a deceptive case.
- There might be some reference to standard empiricist critiques concerning the impossibility of deducing *a priori* truths about the world. This should be related to Descartes' rationalism and the weight he puts on absolute certainty.

OR

12 'Descartes' position on mind and body is both incoherent and inconsistent.' Discuss the validity of this claim.

45 marks)

- Descartes' distinction between mind and body. Different essential natures. Cartesian dualism.
- There might be some unpacking of what is meant by 'essence'.
- Essence of mind 'thinking'
- Essence of body 'extension'.
- Interaction at pineal gland
- Intermingling thesis the disanalogy of pilot/ship example.

- Arguments for the distinction.
- Knowledge argument first form: I can doubt the body, not the mind.
- Second form: things we know cannot depend on things we do not yet know.
- Appeal to God's omnipotence.
- Indivisibility argument.
- Official position mind and body as two radically distinct and separate substances.
- There may be some reference to the wax example but a detailed description is not required.

- Descartes' position is internally inconsistent. The arguments for separateness and distinctness are not consistent with the intermingling thesis.
- Regarding the mind as essentially an immaterial substance is inconsistent with our ordinary way of talking about persons.
- Dualism is inconsistent with the scientific goal of ontological simplicity.
- The thesis leaves us with the insoluble problem of interaction. The failure of the pineal gland solution. The mind cannot be spatially located.
- Does the concept of an immaterial substance make sense? 'Substance' implies materiality. Materialism might be developed.
- Difficulties in accounting for how brain changes can have effects on the mind. Corresponding difficulties for the materialist – how the mental can produce physical effects.
- Discussion of Descartes' actual arguments:
 - I. Knowledge argument fails in both forms. The first involves a misuse of Leibniz Law in intentional contexts. The second invokes a false principle as things we know may well depend on things we do not know. Conceptual distinctness does not guarantee ontological distinctness or causal independence.
 - II. The appeal to God's omnipotence fails to establish that God has **used** that power.
 - III. Indivisibility argument does not misuse Leibniz' Law but can be challenged on other grounds. Cases of split/multiple personality may be cited as counterexamples. Appeals to Freud's tri-partite division of the mind may also be made.
 - IV. Supporters of Descartes may argue that the above counter-examples are themselves inconsistent or incoherent. E.G. are there any limits to how many minds can inhabit one body? The examples are over-reliant on continuity of memory. Does it make sense to talk of mental states of which we are not aware?
 - V. Some form of dualism is required to account for facts of consciousness Candidates may discuss issues relating to irreducible states of consciousness, qualia, or to the problem of intentionality. Intentionality not a property of physical processes. Problems of naturalizing intentionality.
 - VI. There might be reference to the cases of comatose patients who apparently can respond to messages. This might be used to support the claim that brain damage effects the organ of expression rather than the mind itself.
 - VII. Note that alternative accounts of materialism should be firmly tied to problems with dualism, e.g. interaction problem, unity of scientific explanations.

Section E Nietzsche: Beyond Good and Evil

13 Explain and illustrate Nietzsche's ladder of religious cruelty.

(15 marks)

AO1

- The ladder is essentially about sacrifice.
- Three rungs are particularly important.
- First period concerns the sacrifice of human beings and may include that of loved ones to God.
- Second period involves the sacrifice of our very instincts, our nature. (The moral epoch).
- Third period, the modern epoch, involves the sacrifice of God himself for the sake of nothingness.

AO2

- First period is comon to prehistoric religion and may be illustrated by reference to the Romans (Tiberius on Capri) or Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his son.
- The second rung may be illustrated with Nietzsche's reference to the terrifying glance of the ascetic living rapturously contrary to nature.
- The final period is characterised by there being nothing left to sacrifice. Hope, faith, harmony, justice are all sacrificed. This period may involve the worship of stupidity, heaviness, fate and ultimately, nothingness. In the modern day we are familiar with this.

AND EITHER

14	Assess Nietzsche's distinction between master and slave morality.	(45 marks)

AO1

- Differences between master and slave morality the two basic traits or moral codes to which all others reduce.
- Can co-exist in same society or same person.
- Master morality as consistently harsh/severe.
- Slave morality based on fear or self-protection.
- Master will subjugate the weak.
- Master/slave relation an organic function.

- Master morality exemplified by noble, aristocratic values proud states of the soul.
- Individual not the action as bearer of moral predicates.
- Moral historians have inverted the true relation.
- Master determines value.
- Slave morality makes virtues of pity, suffering, Christian humility.
- Viking morality may be used to illustrate master's severity.
- For the slave 'good' is closer to stupidity.
- Exploitation of slave by master not subject to moral judgment anymore than any natural process is.
- To deny the nature of the relation is to deny life itself.

- There may be an exploration of the fact-value gap. From alleged facts about nature or organic processes what follows morally? Nietzsche may claim that he is only concerned with factual judgments.
- It may, however, be countered that such judgments are not purely factual. Any judgment concerned with how people ought to be treated is inherently moral. To deny this would alter our concept of morality beyond recognition.
- There is a strain in Nietzsche between giving an account that is beyond morality and yet at the same time moral. If there are moral implications, then it is open to rejection on moral grounds (Russell).
- There is nothing particularly admirable about natural processes *per se*. Our ability to resist exploitation can distinguish us from purely natural processes.
- To claim that exploitation is an organic function could be seen as an attempt to incorporate pseudo-science or evolutionary principles into ethics (Spencer and the treatment of American Indians).
- It may alternatively be regarded as an act of bad faith, i.e. to claim some necessity about our actions (Sartre).
- Alternative accounts of morality might be developed e.g. Aristotle, Kant.
- What is so special about exploitation? Are there not other equally plausible candidates for the essence of life? (Assuming that life has an essence).
- The implementation of master morality would be a social/political disaster. If adopted internationally it would be a recipe for chaos and suffering e.g. Hitler's remarks regarding the strong enacting their will.
- How do we distinguish the strong from the weak? Candidates may use arguments similar to those used by Socrates against Callicles, e.g. the herd is now the stronger.
- Nietzsche's historical account is suspect. He could be charged with naivety or romanticism. You cannot simply transport values across epochs. They are internal to their own social and economic conditions.
- There is a difficulty in Nietzsche's account of the bearers of moral predicates. Can you separate a particular type of individual from the actions they perform?
- Nietzsche's account seems to rely on truths about nature. Is this consistent with his general position on truth? In defence it may be argued that all that is required is that such judgments be life-enhancing. But, then the majority will quite reasonably reject them.

OR

15 'Nietzsche's account of the nature and scope of philosophy lacks accuracy and consistency.' Assess whether this is a justifiable criticism. (45 marks)

AO1

- He is concerned with the foundation of philosophy.
- Survey of past philosophy.
- Use of *ad hominem* arguments.
- The language which leads philosophers astray (bewitchments).
- What should matter in philosophy is the **function** of concepts.
- What matters ultimately is whether concepts are life-promoting or life-enhancing.
- There may be some discussion of perspectivism and the concept of truth.

- Examples of *ad hominem* arguments may be given. Kant, Plato are likely to feature.
- What has been traditionally presented as pure, objective truth is riddled with the preferences and prejudices of its authors.

- There may be discussion of how language can lead us astray. The subject-centred grammar of our language involves the imposition of our interpretation on the world.
- The above may be illustrated by reference to Descartes' *cogito* or the problem of freewill.
- The work of past philosophers may be compared with the Freudian concept of 'rationalization'.
- What have been regarded as fundamental concepts, e.g. causation are invented rather than discovered.
- Importance of physiological states.
- Fundamental concept is that of the will to power.

- Nietzsche's account of past philosophers is too selective. Candidates may offer examples of other philosophers that point to a different conclusion. Candidates may also draw from other areas of philosophy, e.g. formal logic, rules of validity, sense-data theories and argue that these are difficult to accommodate on the prejudice thesis. Good responses will clearly link this with the nature and scope of philosophy.
- Nietzsche's treatment of traditional philosophical problems is problematic E.g. it is too easy to dismiss 'the will' as a common prejudice; we should be suspicious of 'prejudices' which occur on a universal scale.
- The limitations of *ad hominem* arguments. You do not dispose of a thesis by attacking or revealing the motives behind it, e.g. Berkeley's dislike of materialism or Plato's elitism will not in themselves dispose of Idealism.
- The problem of Truth. There are a number of related issues here. Should we question the truth of Nietzsche's own claims or should we just ask what function they have? This is hard to reconcile with the way the claims are made. The problem of neutrality and perspectivism. There is also the function problem, i.e. function in relation to what?
- Related issue: problem of giving a 'true' account that undermines truth.
- Kant is criticized for arguing from possibilities to faculties (opium example) but Nietzsche uses similar arguments/strategies to justify his claims about instincts and the will.
- Is Nietzsche also subject to the strictures of language? Or, is this a case of special pleading?
- We are told that the writings of past philosophers are **caused** by their physiological states. We are also told that causation is an invented fiction.
- How would Nietzsche deal with the case of a philosopher reaching a repugnant conclusion, e.g. McGinn tells us he would like there to be a principle of universal justice – but there isn't. It might be argued that he could not have really wanted it – but this move could make the entire thesis vacuous.
- Realist arguments to show that we have good independent reasons to justify our concepts.
- There might be a directed, critical discussion of the will to power and its role in the new philosophy. How do we know about it? Is it a metaphysical concept? Does it have explanatory power? Does it have predictive power? Does it manifest itself in too many different and diverse ways? Does the notion of an unconscious will make sense?

A2 Assessment Objective	Marks allocated by Assessment Objective 15-mark question	Marks allocated by Assessment Objective 45-mark question	Total Marks by Assessment Objective
AO1	8	10	18
AO2	7	11	18
AO3	0	24	24
Total	15	45	60

ASSESSMENT OBJECTIVE GRID

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