



**General Certificate of Education  
June 2011**

**Philosophy**

**PHIL1**

**Final**

***Mark Scheme***

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## AS PHILOSOPHY

### GENERIC MARK SCHEME FOR QUESTIONS WITH A TOTAL OF 15 MARKS

	<b>AO1: Knowledge and Understanding</b>
<b>Level 3</b>	<p><b>11–15 marks</b></p> <p>Answers in this level provide a clear and detailed explanation of the relevant issue and demonstrate a precise understanding of philosophical positions and arguments. Illustrations, if required, are appropriate and properly developed.</p> <p>Answers at the bottom of this level are accurate and focused but <i>either</i> too succinct <i>or</i> unbalanced: <i>either</i> important points and/or illustrations are accurate but briefly stated so that significance is not fully drawn out <i>or</i> one point is well made and illustrated but a second point or illustration is less developed.</p>
<b>Level 2</b>	<p><b>6–10 marks</b></p> <p>Answers in this level may <i>either</i> list a range of points or blur two or more points together <i>or</i> explanation is clear but unbalanced so that a point is well made but illustrative material is undeveloped or unconvincing <i>or</i> illustrations are good but the point being illustrated is less clear and perhaps left implicit. OR If two points are required answers in this level may <i>either</i> clearly identify, explain and illustrate one relevant point so that a partial explanation is given <i>or</i> points may be well made but not illustrated. OR The response is broadly accurate but generalised, generalised and lacking detail and precision.</p>
<b>Level 1</b>	<p><b>0–5 marks</b></p> <p>Answers in this level <i>either</i> make one reasonable point with little development or without illustration <i>or</i> provide a basic, sketchy and vague account <i>or</i> a confused or tangential account which may only coincide with the concerns of the question in places.</p>

*NB Answers may demonstrate characteristics of more than one mark band, for example:*

- Points are clearly identified and explanation is detailed and precise (Level 3) but only one point is illustrated (Level 2). The response should be placed at the bottom end of Level 3 (i.e. 11–12 marks).*
- Two points are required but only one relevant point is clearly identified, explained and illustrated (Level 2) and the second point and illustration is confused or tangential to the question asked Level 1). The response should be placed at the top end of Level 2 (i.e. 9–10 marks).*

## AS PHILOSOPHY

### GENERIC MARK SCHEME FOR QUESTIONS WITH A TOTAL OF 30 MARKS

	<b>AO1: Knowledge and Understanding</b>	<b>AO2: Interpretation, Analysis and Application</b>	<b>AO3: Assessment and Evaluation</b>
<b>Level 4</b>	<b>N/A</b>	<b>15–18 marks</b> A clear and closely argued discussion of the issue incorporating a well-developed appreciation focused on some relevant philosophical issues by applying and analysing a range of points in some detail and with precision.	<b>N/A</b>
<b>Level 3</b>	<b>3 marks</b> A sound understanding of some issues raised by the question, identifying relevant ideas/evidence.	<b>10–14 marks</b> Answers in this level are directed at the relevant issues but: <i>Either:</i> a narrowly focused response but detail is pithy and organised intelligently. <i>Or:</i> several issues are discussed but the application of points is less well-organised, the focus may drift or analysis may be less developed and unconvincing in places. Answers at the bottom of this band may be full but largely descriptive responses.	<b>7–9 marks</b> Answers at the top of this level provide a well thought out appreciation of some problematic issues raised by the specific demands of the question. Reasoning is employed to support the conclusion advanced. Lower in the band the critical discussion is not sharp and reasoning employed to support the conclusion is less well-developed. The response is legible, employing technical language accurately and appropriately with few, if any, errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar. The response reads as a coherent and integrated whole.

**GENERIC MARK SCHEME FOR QUESTIONS WITH A TOTAL OF 30 MARKS (cont)**

	<b>AO1: Knowledge and Understanding</b>	<b>AO2: Interpretation, Analysis and Application</b>	<b>AO3: Assessment and Evaluation</b>
<b>Level 2</b>	<p><b>2 marks</b></p> <p>Answers are relevant but <i>either</i> fail to maintain a focus on the specific question <i>or</i> partial ideas/examples lack detail.</p>	<p><b>5–9 marks</b></p> <p>Answers in this level provide some relevant material but:</p> <p><i>Either:</i> points are raised but not developed, analysis is limited and the answer lacks organisation.</p> <p><i>Or:</i> the relevance of points may be unclear.</p>	<p><b>4–6 marks</b></p> <p>Evaluation is not sustained, although it is present.</p> <p><i>Either:</i> alternative approaches are juxtaposed without explicit comparison or assessment.</p> <p><i>Or:</i> a position is briefly stated but not adequately supported by the preceding discussion.</p> <p>The response is legible, employing some technical language accurately, with possibly some errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar.</p>
<b>Level 1</b>	<p><b>1 mark</b></p> <p>Answers in this level demonstrate a basic grasp of aspects of relevant issues. Responses may be sketchy and vague; <i>or</i> confused <i>or</i> largely tangential although at least one point should coincide with the concerns of the question.</p>	<p><b>1–4 marks</b></p> <p>Answers in this level are sketchy, fragmentary responses <i>or</i> an isolated relevant point appears in an otherwise tangential <i>or</i> confused response.</p>	<p><b>1–3 marks</b></p> <p>Critical comments are sketchy and fail to contribute to any explicitly reasoned conclusion <i>or</i> argumentation may be confused so that the conclusion advanced does not seem to follow.</p> <p>Lower in the band a view may be outlined without any critical discussion.</p> <p>Technical language may not be employed or used inappropriately. The response may not be legible, errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar may be intrusive.</p>

**Theme 1: Reason and Experience****Total for this theme: 45 marks**

- 01** Illustrating your answer, explain the difference between analytic and synthetic propositions. (15 marks)

Identification of the difference, which may be briefly stated, may refer to some of the following:  
Analytic propositions may be described as:

- Statements that are true (or false) by definition.
- Statements that are true (or false) in virtue of the meanings of the terms employed.
- Statements which, if true, cannot be denied without contradiction.
- Statements in which the predicate is already contained within the concept of the subject.

Illustrations are likely to be brief, although several might be given. A bachelor is an unmarried man; a spinster is an unmarried woman etc. Some may refer to Hume and 'relations of ideas': if injustice is defined as a violation of property then where there is no property there can be no injustice.

Synthetic propositions may be described as:

- Statements that can't be determined to be true or false simply by analysing the terms involved.
- Statements that can be known (believed) to be true (or false) only through experience.
- Statements that can be denied without contradiction.
- Statements in which the predicate provides further information about the subject.

Again, illustrations may be brief and refer to the same subjects used in analytic statements. Some bachelors are bald; some spinsters are elderly; many spinsters are happy etc. Some may refer to Hume and 'matters of fact': the motion of billiard balls, water suffocates, fire consumes etc.

Further explanation is likely to be given in terms appropriate to classical rationalist and empiricist epistemology: analytic propositions are necessarily true and known a priori, they are immune to empirical falsification; synthetic propositions are regarded by empiricists as contingently true and known a posteriori, the contrary of every matter of fact is possible. Some may develop an account of the difference in terms of certain but uninformative knowledge versus uncertain but informative knowledge.

*No marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts – in which the synthetic a priori may be introduced – although relevant knowledge and understanding should be rewarded.*

- 02** Assess the claim that all knowledge and ideas derive from sense experience. (30 marks)

The view will be identified as an empiricist approach to the acquisition of ideas, beliefs and knowledge and probably linked to the view that knowledge, or at least non-trivial knowledge, is acquired through experience. The view of the mind as a tabula rasa, a piece of white paper devoid of any characters (Locke), is likely to be referred to and developed via references to Locke and Hume. References to Hume's account of the acquisition of complex ideas will probably feature. Top band responses will refer to both knowledge and ideas.

**Interpretation, Analysis, Application**

*Expect points of discussion to draw from the following:*

- Developments of the view that there are no innate ideas and no innate knowledge: references to Locke, and possibly Hume, will be employed to argue that all of our ideas and knowledge derive from sensory experience and reflection on sensory experience.

- Locke's view that if a proposition is innate its component elements must be innate – but there are no such innate elements. While 'whatever is, is' looks like a proposition that is known independently of experience, and should be universally assented to, its component elements are so abstract that no child knows the truth of it. Similarly 'whatever is white all over is not black all over' is necessarily true but not innate because it requires ideas of white black and difference.
- Examples of where sensory impairment and/or an inability to reflect deprive us (allegedly) of certain ideas and/or knowledge. Humean examples might feature.
- Examples of where the addition of sensory equipment would provide us with ideas, concepts, beliefs and knowledge e.g. Condillac's statue.
- There may be criticisms of Plato's argument in the *Meno*.

#### *Critique*

- However, do we not possess some concepts, capacities and knowledge prior to or independently of experience – do claims about e.g. God, the propositions of logic, identity, universals, morality, necessity etc. escape the empiricist framework? Some ideas are best regarded as innate, (e.g. a Euclidean straight line, God).
- The view is problematic in relation to our grasp of general terms or universals.
- The conceptual scheme under which our experience of the world is subsumed is acquired via experience and something else. The active power of the mind in shaping our knowledge. There may be references to Leibniz's example of the block of marble containing the figure of Hercules and/or to Kant's account of the categories through which the mind organises experience into something intelligible.
- Chomsky's claim that universal grammar (not language) is innate may feature.
- Some ideas (e.g. a missing shade of blue) do not appear to derive from experience.
- Plato's slave boy might be employed to argue that some knowledge is innate.
- Empirical justifications are not immune from scepticism. Some may develop a link between empiricist foundationalism and solipsism. There may be references to problems of meaning if words are deemed to be the names of private objects (although care should be taken to draw a valid point out of this e.g. that words are not the names of private objects and the implication of this, if any, for empiricism.)

NB References to instinct should not be highly rewarded.

#### **Assessment and Evaluation**

- It could be argued that: the claim provides a clear account of the acquisition of ideas sets a limit on appropriate objects of knowledge and allows us to proceed without getting distracted by empty metaphysical speculation. It reflects our experience of learning, knowledge is acquired through new experiences. At birth the mind is a tabula rasa.
- It could be argued that some ideas, concepts, capacities etc are held prior to experience and some knowledge does not depend upon experience. If experience is 'given' this is testimony to the existence of certain (synthetic *a priori*) principles which govern our experience of the world. At birth the mind is not a tabula rasa.
- Some may question whether the Kantian synthesis is necessary or convincing.

**Theme 2: Why should I be governed?****Total for this theme: 45 marks**

<b>03</b>	Explain and illustrate the difference between power and authority.	<i>(15 marks)</i>
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- Authority is, typically, seen as a normative concept. It is *de jure*. The exercise of power, the control and organization of resources, is recognised and consented to.
- Power is, typically, seen as a causal concept. The possession and application of power produces results, resources are controlled and organised. It is *de facto*.

There may be discussions of legitimacy. Legitimacy refers to the grounds, or reasons, given as an explanation and justification of why we are politically obligated and/or of why the state merits our allegiance. Legitimacy may also be connected to the achievement of certain outcomes e.g. securing the rights and liberties of individuals, promoting equality, welfare, happiness and/or versions of the common good. It may be suggested that authority is legitimate power in which case a distinction may be drawn between:

- Authority as legitimate power based on recognition, consent and approval.
- Power as illegitimately based on coercion, the threat and use of force.

Illustrative material may attempt to provide examples of

- Legitimate and illegitimate sovereign bodies – these may be fairly crude but broadly accurate contrasts between e.g. ‘rule by terror’ and democracy.
- How legitimacy is achieved e.g. how entitlement, acceptance and popular approval may be demonstrated – some might refer to contracts and/or to the ‘ideal types’ of authority presented as sources of legitimacy by Weber, rational-legal grounds, traditional grounds and charismatic grounds. References could also be made to individuals and/or groups able to exert influence because they are ‘an authority’.
- Examples may be given of legitimate authorities that have no power (e.g. a government in exile, a teacher who can’t keep control) or of powerful bodies that have no authority (e.g. a military coup, an intimidating teacher who isn’t an authority).

*No marks are available for evaluation – e.g. authority reduces to power or is power legitimising itself – although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.*

<b>04</b>	Assess the view that life in a ‘state of nature’ would be awful.	<i>(30 marks)</i>
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**Knowledge and Understanding**

Some reference will probably be made to how we should understand the concept of ‘a state of nature’ e.g. as a fictional device employed to illustrate why the existence of the State is in our interests or to illustrate what lies beneath political society (some may also suggest that it is our actual past). Beyond this, the focus of discussion will probably be different versions of the condition of man in a ‘state of nature’. The initial focus should be on Hobbes: in a state of nature there is a war of all against all in which life is ‘nasty, brutish and short’. This might be contrasted with Locke, in a state of nature men live together according to reason, in perfect freedom and equality without superiors (on earth) to judge them; or with Rousseau, in a state of nature men are happy and content, or noble, savages.

**Interpretation, Analysis, Application**

*Expect the following points of discussion:*

- More detailed descriptions of different accounts of life in a state of nature may be used to point out that there is no agreement concerning what life is like in a state of nature: whether it is characterized by mutual suspicion and hostility, an absence of faith or trust in others (Hobbes); or a state in which natural moral laws are present and generally prevail in man's relations with others (Locke); or a state in which men are, like 'brutes' driven by self-preservation *and* compassion (Rousseau).
- Further development of Hobbes' view and particularly of what would be awful: there may be references to the view of man implied in this position
- Whether the account offered by Hobbes is consistent or coherent: for example the state of nature is pre-moral yet there are laws of nature which appear to be moral guidelines; whether morality can be post-contractual; whether our motivation to survive generates conflict/war or co-operation/peace; whether we are rational egoists; whether man in a state of nature would differ from a non-human animal in a state of nature.
- Whether the account offered by Locke is consistent or coherent: there are references to both the 'inconvenience' of not having a body to enforce the moral law as well as to the 'executive power of the law of nature'; is man's life in a state of nature relatively ordered, rational, moral and harmonious or is it inconveniently less than peaceful? If the former then life would certainly not be awful (and the justification of the State would be weaker as, effectively, this is civil society minus the State); if the latter then Locke's view of mankind may be less accurate than Hobbes'.
- Whether the account offered by Rousseau is consistent or coherent. Life in the state of nature is far from awful; in fact it appears to be quite attractive. Is it likely that primitive life would be idyllic? If it is idyllic, why change? If we are driven both by self-preservation and by compassion would life in a state of nature be as idyllic as he suggests? If not then is this based on a romanticised view of man?
- There may be references to Anarchy and to claims that descriptions of man in a state of nature are not depictions of pre-social man but of man already corrupted by political society *and* that neither Locke nor Rousseau strongly justify government.

**Assessment and Evaluation**

It could be argued that:

- Accounts of man in a state of nature may not be especially convincing but nevertheless the concept remains a useful fiction – useful because of its connection to legitimacy, consent, civility, fraternity – and accounts that depict life in a state of nature as 'awful' are especially useful.
- The same discussion could be had in the context of whether the state of nature is supposed to be pre-social or a state which is ever-present, and suppressed, in society?
- Some accounts are less convincing than others because they describe post-social rather than pre-social man – this is Hobbes' mistake (a consequence of his own experiences?).
- If life in a state of nature wasn't awful wouldn't this undermine both liberal (Locke) and illiberal (Rousseau) attempts to justify the State?
- On the other hand if life in the state of nature is awful wouldn't this justify the existence of States in which life isn't much better?
- It might be suggested that the state of nature is not a believable concept, no-one has ever lived in one and life in it is therefore neither awful or pleasant

**Theme 3: Why should I be moral?****Total for this theme: 45 marks**

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| <b>05</b> | Explain and illustrate two reasons why we may not always perform our moral duties.<br>(15 marks) |
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The reference to duty might act as a cue for candidates to discuss (relevant) objections to Kantian ethics; however the question can be interpreted as being more open than this so that it would be legitimate to refer to:

- The view that moral beliefs, on their own, are inert. The fact that it may be noticed that an action possesses a particular moral property may not be accompanied by a motivation to act in a particular way: moral action requires moral beliefs and appropriate desires.
- There may be some discussion of the 'is-ought', or fact-value, gap.
- Psychological Egoism: if an action is not in my interest I have no reason to do it
- There is scope for a discussion of 'moral weakness' (e.g. the belief that courage is a virtue coupled with one's own cowardice) or of 'wickedness' (the acknowledgement that e.g. telling the truth is a duty coupled with the desire to deceive).
- There is scope for a discussion of strength, e.g. in Nietzschean terms, if moral duties are linked to conventional morality.
- If virtue ethics is referred to it might be suggested that some are in the process of learning the virtues (or learning from mistakes) or that there is more than one virtuous action and one can't perform both.
- If contractual theories are referred to it might be suggested that if we (as rational egoists) can get away with breaking a contract why shouldn't we?
- Two reasons might be drawn from deontological ethics: descriptions of perfect and imperfect duties are too abstract to be useful as a guide to action; the notion of duty is too rigid and insensitive to feelings or circumstances; duties or grounds of obligation might conflict; we might feel that the consequences of acting dutifully will be negative (and vice versa); ought may not imply can; whether the higher self (a good will) always over-rides the lower self (desires, instincts).

Good answers may select two reasons from criticisms of Kantian ethics or combine points from other approaches.

Illustrations are likely to be drawn from the literature (e.g. 'Gyges', a madman with an axe etc.) but candidates' own examples should be rewarded if they illustrate a relevant point.

*No marks are available for evaluation – e.g. duties should always be performed regardless... – although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.*

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| <b>06</b> | To what extent, if at all, is self-interest our motivation to be moral?<br>(30 marks) |
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Good responses could focus on a number of positions linking moral motivation to self-interest:

- Ethical Egoism – the morally right course of action is to 'look out for oneself'; this may be expressed either personally or impersonally (i.e. 'I should' or 'everyone should').
- Virtue Ethics – it pays to be moral, the moral life is rewarding (eventually if not immediately) so that it is in our interests to live a moral life.
- Contractual approaches – slightly different but it can be argued that it is in the interests of everyone to accept a moral framework designed to overrule narrowly conceived self-interests.

### **Interpretation, Analysis, Application**

*Expect the following points of discussion:*

- If self-interest is our motivation to act then we may or may not be moral. This might be expressed in terms of psychological egoism; Nietzsche may be referenced to question whether (conventional) morality is in the interests of everyone.
- Ethical egoists might point out that self-interest does not equate to selfishness and that self-interested motives can and often do lead to altruistic actions. However, personal ethical egoism is hardly a moral position and impersonal ethical egoism seems to collapse into something like utilitarianism. More importantly, perhaps, there seems to be no rational way for an egoist to resolve potential conflicts of interest.
- The view that we can't articulate self-interest independently of morality may be seen as more convincing. This may be linked to contract theories and/or virtue ethics and/or to concepts such as happiness, well-being, security and justice.
- However, is the idea that it is in our interest to be moral/virtuous convincing? Does it 'pay' to be moral or is virtue its own reward? Examples might be given of moral actions that do not seem to be self-interested or of moral individuals who do not appear to have 'flourished' (as well as of the reverse of these points). There is also the issue of whether motivation is always clear: whether an action is performed for the right reasons and/or whether it matters very much if it isn't (i.e. conformity to moral rules may be enough). This issue may be addressed in the context of whether this provides a complete account of morality. Suppose we have the opportunity of acting selfishly in a way that no-one will know about (so that our character is untarnished)? Some may refer to the 'Gyges'.
- The view that it is in the interests of all of us to set aside narrow self-interests in order that each may pursue and secure interests without threat from others may either be presented as essentially self-interested or as offering an insight into why a framework of moral rules serves everyone's interests.
- However, can morality be the product of a contract? Doesn't entering into a contract presuppose some moral principles (some versions suggest that a covenant is made to secure moral principles which, therefore, cannot be the product of a contract). Does the fact – if it were a fact – that we've agreed mean that we ought to honour our agreement? There may be references to 'free-riding' and/or to what, if anything, notions of tacit consent actually commit us to.
- Isn't the moral hero (someone who acts morally against their own interests and desires) as valuable, or more valuable, than the moral saint (someone who acts morally and lives well because they've developed the appropriate interests and desires)? Shouldn't self-interest be disregarded as a motivation for action in a genuinely moral system of universal rights and duties?

### **Assessment and Evaluation**

It could be argued that:

- If an act is right then the act ought to be performed because it is right and that this is the only genuinely moral motivation – self-interest is morally irrelevant.
- Motivations for action must include appropriate inclinations, desires, sympathies etc. and this in one way or another reduces to self-interest.
- We can provide an account of moral motivation in terms of inclinations, desires, sympathies etc. which does not reduce to self-interest (e.g. through our social nature, through our natural sympathies etc.)
- Some might question whether this is an empirical or conceptual issue.

**Theme 4: The Idea of God****Total for this theme: 45 marks**

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| <b>07</b> | Briefly explain how, if God is immanent, this may conflict with three of his divine attributes. | <i>(15 marks)</i> |
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Immanence will probably be defined as the view that God is an entity who acts in the world; a personal God with whom we can have a relationship, with whom we can communicate; a God who listens or observes and who may respond; a God able to intervene, a God who performs miracles. Some may suggest that immanence is closely related to omnipresence. Three potential conflicts with other divine attributes might be drawn from:

- Transcendence: expressed either in terms of God's distance from the world or in terms of Him being beyond our comprehension.
- Benevolence: if God is in the world then He is in the evil, pain, suffering etc. that exists in the world. If He acts in the world, is responsive, loving and benevolent then why is there so much suffering?
- Omnipotence: if God exists in space and time then it is difficult to see how He can also be the creator of space and time.
- Omniscience: if God exists in space and time then it is difficult to see how He can know everything – for example, events that have not yet happened.
- Eternal: if God exists in space and time, and acts in the world, then while He may be everlasting He cannot be eternal.
- Immutable: if He is responsive to our prayers then He is changed and not immutable.

Some points may be easier to develop (or illustrate) than others but elaboration needn't be lengthy. Answers that provide a precise account of three potential sources of conflict with some detailed development should be placed in the top band.

*No marks are available for evaluation – e.g. for accounts of how these potential conflicts might be resolved – although relevant knowledge and understanding, concerning the nature of the conflict, in such accounts should be rewarded.*

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| <b>08</b> | 'God did not make man. Man made God.'<br>Assess this claim. | <i>(30 marks)</i> |
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**Knowledge and Understanding**

The implications of both sentences may, initially, be described. The first denies a view of God as creator and, particularly, as the creator of man – God made man in his own image. In contrast, the second is the view that the idea of God has been constructed by man. There may be some elaboration of the former as denying a theistic view and of the latter as an atheistic view. Given the wording of the question, however, it would be legitimate to focus on *how* we conceptualise God as well as *why* we have done so.

**Interpretation, Analysis, Application**

Some of the following or equivalent points will be raised and developed:

Anthropomorphism – God is conceived in the form of Man, if not physically then at least psychologically insofar as He is wise, kind, loving, forgiving, willing etc. (or, perhaps, vengeful, cruel etc.) It might be claimed that we have to conceptualise God in this way as it would be difficult (impossible?) to form any kind of relationship (whether awe or trust) with a Being without any 'human' qualities so that we couldn't conceptualise Him at all.

Nevertheless, this might be deemed to be a mistake. God is transcendent, beyond human understanding, any attempt to conceptualise God is founded in error.

There may be some ‘general’ critiques of religious belief as e.g. ‘a suicide of reason’ (Nietzsche) or as ‘the sigh of the oppressed’ (Marx) – and these may lead to specific claims concerning *how* or *why* we construct the idea of God. Hegel talked of the ‘treasures’ we have ‘squandered on the heavens’ and Feuerbach viewed God as the projection of the sum of man’s qualities, so that “poor man possesses a rich God”. In constructing the idea of God we are alienating ourselves from our own potential.

Such claims should not be treated uncritically. Does man ‘lose’ by believing in God? Is belief in God irrational? Even if it is irrational does it follow that it is misplaced?

An approach rooted in Russell or Hume is relevant: the idea of God is a response to fear (fear of death, fear of uncertainty), ignorance and/or the unpredictability of nature. God is a God ‘of the gaps’. The idea of God is due to our tendency to anthropomorphise nature: initially via polytheism and eventually via theism. Thus the idea of God is formed by ‘reflecting on the operations of our own mind, and augmenting, without limit ...qualities of goodness and wisdom’.

Hume’s account is more convincing for some of God’s properties than others (e.g. transcendence); it might also be claimed that God is different from humans in kind rather than degree.

Marx’s materialism leads him to see religion as ‘the heart of a heartless world’: ‘man makes religion, religion does not make man’. We construct religion in order to appease misery, distress, hardship. Religion is ‘the opium of the people’.

Does religion pacify? Do these views apply to all religious groups?

It might be argued that belief in a pre-ordained natural order is an instrument of oppression – this might be stated in Feminist terms (religious concepts are part of the armoury of ideas that enslave women) – but is this to do with God or institutional religion?

The Freudian view that belief in God represents the desire for a father figure, protection, security etc. may be referred to. Does this apply to all religions?

Evolutionary biology and/or psychology will also probably be mentioned (Dawkins). Belief in God is a (useless) by-product of an evolutionary advantageous tendency to trust in authority as children; or a by-product of the tendency to see design and order; or a by-product of the tendency to anthropomorphise nature. Again, is this convincing?

### **Assessment and Evaluation**

This is likely to produce strong (but not necessarily strongly argued) views:

- Some will argue that God is a construction – reflecting some kind of human need or perhaps some kind of error – and we would be better off without it. Although, it is also a construction that can/has served progressive interests. In some respects this may weaken the above argument. Top band answers should demonstrate some critical appreciation concerning such an approach – e.g. does it have any ontological implications?
- Against this, some will argue that the idea of God is not a human invention but that knowing God is a genuine experience we can have; that we can find God through faith; that it is not irrational to believe in God; that the idea is innate etc. The trademark argument may be referenced. Such approaches should be argued rather than asserted.

**Theme 5: Persons****Total for this theme: 45 marks**

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| <b>09</b> | Explain and illustrate <b>one</b> reason for thinking of ourselves as <i>surviving</i> through time rather than being <i>identical</i> through time.<br><span style="float: right;">(15 marks)</span> |
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. This view will probably be attributed to Parfit but there may also be references to Locke (the importance of psychological traits generally but with respect to connectedness and survival rather than continuity and identity through time). One reason will probably be selected from:

- There are too many difficulties involved in demonstrating that identity is continuous through time.
- Psychological continuity through time is not either necessary or sufficient for identity.
- Physical continuity through time is not either necessary or sufficient for identity.
- The distinction between numerical and qualitative identity may be raised to question how much qualitative change is possible if a person is to remain, numerically, 'the same'. A similar point could be developed from Locke's distinction between same man and same person: e.g. Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde may be the same man but are not the same person.
- Survival through time is all we have (in different degrees) and/or all we need. Its all we have because sometimes the question 'is she the same person as she was' will not have a definite answer: its all we need because, for example, as adults we don't really want to be identical with our childhood selves.

These points, drawn either from a critique of 'identity' or a positive outline of 'survival', might be supported by a wide range of relatively familiar examples drawn from the literature but examples from fiction/film or from the candidate's own experience should also be rewarded.

*No marks are available for evaluative accounts of Parfit – e.g. for suggestions that 'survival' may be just as awkward as 'identity' – although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.*

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| <b>10</b> | Assess whether any characteristics are necessary or sufficient for personhood<br><span style="float: right;">(30 marks)</span> |
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**Knowledge and Understanding**

There should be *both* an awareness of some proposed characteristics of personhood (for example, self-awareness, a sense of uniqueness and continuity through time, responsibility for oneself and/or self creation, the capacity to reason, the possession of higher order reflective skills, sociability and communication/language skills) *and* some grasp of what 'necessary' and 'sufficient' mean in this context (if we attribute personhood when an attribute is not present then it can't be necessary, if we refuse to attribute personhood when it is present then it can't be sufficient). NB The issue is complex (and difficult) and a broad grasp of what is at stake is enough for the top mark-band.

**Interpretation, Analysis, Application**

This is clearly a fairly open question and discussions might be quite wide-ranging and unpredictable. However some of the following, or equivalent, points could feature in discussions:

Necessary:

- The possession of each of the various attributes identified is necessary but each attribute is possessed as a matter of *degree* and some beings with these attributes do not possess them in sufficient degrees of complexity for personhood.
- There could be discussions of potential or ex-persons, simple persons, animals and machines in the above context.
- The possession of some attributes might be seen as necessary: the more likely candidates are self-awareness, reason and reflection, language and self creation.
- Again, there may be a discussion concerning what might be classed as a person and what as a non-person in terms of these characteristics.
- A reasonable approach would be to consider whether we would refuse personhood to those who were not social, who have diminished responsibility for themselves, who can no longer self-create, who do not have a continuous sense of self through time, who have very limited reasoning/reflective abilities etc.
- In this context there may be a discussion of diminution – again, a comparison may be made to animals and/or machines.

Sufficient:

- The possession of one or more attributes might be seen as sufficient – e.g. self-awareness (although 'I' thoughts surely also require language and sociability) – but wouldn't this produce excessively liberal results?
- The possession of all of the attributes at a simple level may be seen as insufficient – but wouldn't this produce excessively chauvinistic and/or elitist results?
- Again, there could be some discussion of whether some humans do not possess attributes sufficient for personhood and whether some non-humans do.

In the absence of any 'obvious' answer to this question, essentially what is required is a sense that candidates are prepared to grapple with the issue.

### **Assessment and Evaluation**

It is difficult to predict what might be argued – the following would all be legitimate arguments:

- The concept of a person is primitive: it is a being to which we ascribe both physical and mental attributes. However, how many and what kind of mental attribute? Is the concept of a person better seen as a sub-class of beings to which we ascribe physical and mental attributes?
- If being a person is seen as a matter of degree, is it possible to decide at what point of complexity personhood is attained? Are all attributes necessary or only some? Is some combination of attributes sufficient or are all required at some level? The question doesn't permit a precise answer.
- It is possible to identify some necessary attributes and to say what combination (and what level of complexity) is sufficient: this allows us to determine both how prepared we are to use the term 'person' in relation to non-humans and how prepared we are to exclude some humans from personhood.
- It might be argued that one can sustain relations with persons – and not with a non-person – and that this is a matter of 'know-how' rather than philosophical theorising.

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- **ASSESSMENT OBJECTIVE GRID**

<b>AS Assessment Objective</b>	<b>Marks allocated by Assessment Objective 15 mark questions</b>	<b>Marks allocated by Assessment Objective 30 mark questions</b>	<b>Total Marks by Assessment Objective</b>
<b>AO1</b>	15	3	18
<b>AO2</b>	0	18	18
<b>AO3</b>	0	9	9
<b>Total</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>45</b>

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