

General Certificate of Education
June 2007
Advanced Level Examination



HISTORY

Unit 6W

Alternative T: Great Britain and Appeasement in the 1930s

HS6T

Friday 22 June 2007 9.00 am to 10.30 am

For this paper you must have:

- a 12-page answer book.

Time allowed: 1 hour 30 minutes

Instructions

- Use blue or black ink or ball-point pen.
- Write the information required on the front of your answer book. The *Examining Body* for this paper is AQA. The *Paper Reference* is HS6T.
- Answer **all** questions.
- In answering the questions you must use your own knowledge and understanding of the period.

Information

- The maximum mark for this paper is 40.
- The marks for questions are shown in brackets.
- You will be marked on your ability to use good English, to organise information clearly and to use specialist vocabulary where appropriate.

Advice

- You are advised to spend about 45 minutes on part (c).

Answer **all** questions.

1 Study the following source material and then answer the questions which follow.

Source A Serious indictments have been laid against those who made British military and foreign policy in the inter-war years, especially Baldwin and Chamberlain. However, the political leaders of the 1930s were not ‘guilty men’ as is sometimes claimed, nor men who acted out of blindness and later fear. Driven by idealism, optimism and courage, they worked and prayed for peace. Only retrospectively can it be seen how misplaced their political and diplomatic analyses and expectations were, and how much wiser they would have been to heed military advice earlier.

Adapted from E RANSON, *British Defence Policy and Appeasement between the Wars, 1919–1939*, 1993

Source B Army divisions available for a war in Europe

	January 1938	August 1939
Great Britain	2	4
Germany	81	130
Italy	73	73
France	63	86
USSR	125	125
Czechoslovakia	34	0
Poland	40	40

Source C The reactions in Britain to the Polish crisis in the summer of 1939 were a repetition of those over Prague a few months earlier. By now the Labour and Conservative anti-appeasers in the Commons were suspicious of Chamberlain, and refused to let Parliament adjourn lest negotiations with Hitler be concluded during the recess. These suspicions appeared justified in late August, as London urged Germans and Poles to settle their differences over Danzig; and even more so by 1 September, when the German attack commenced. For two days, while Poland was being bombed and shelled, Chamberlain and his colleagues hesitated, seeking to the last to find a *modus vivendi*, and also attempting to co-ordinate moves with the French, who were even more reluctant to plunge into war. But it was not to be. The public pressure on the government, far greater than that of March, forced it reluctantly onwards.

From P KENNEDY, *The Realities behind Diplomacy*, 1981

- (a) Use **Source A** and your own knowledge.

Assess the validity of the view in **Source A** about the foreign policies of Baldwin and Chamberlain in the 1930s. *(10 marks)*

- (b) Use **Source B** and your own knowledge.

How useful is **Source B** as evidence of the military reasons for the failure of Britain to support Czechoslovakia in September 1938? *(10 marks)*

- (c) Use **Sources A, B** and **C** and your own knowledge.

‘Public opinion forced Chamberlain’s government into the decision to go to war in September 1939.’

Assess the validity of this view. *(20 marks)*

END OF QUESTIONS

There are no questions printed on this page

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Question 1 Source A: From *British Defence Policy and Appeasement between the Wars, 1919–1939*, E RANSON, Historical Association.

Source B: From *Modern History Review*, April 1994, Philip Allan Updates.

Source C: From P KENNEDY, *The Realities behind Diplomacy*, Fontana, 1981. Reproduced by permission of David Higham Associates.

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